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Hannah Arendt famously argued in the Origins of Totalitarianism that human 
rights were unable to protect the stateless people produced by the conflicts of 
the first half of the 20th century because they were unable to secure the 'right 
to have rights.' Commentators on her thought have puzzled over this phrase 
for over 50 years.  The question is how to reconcile the clearly universalist 
spirit behind Arendt's reflections on rights and the clearly local character of her 
overall approach to politics.  In this dissertation, I argue that Arendt's approach 
presents a profound critique of liberal human rights theory which is itself 
central to contemporary human rights theory.  Specifically, I take up Arendt's 
claim that in order to be a bearer of rights, a person must have 'a place in the 
world'.  I argue that Arendt's concept of ‘world’, an idea that she appropriated 
from Heidegger and outlined in The Human Condition, was already at work in 
The Origins of Totalitarianism.  I further argue that it is only in light of her 
concept of 'world' that we can understand the ‘right to have rights’.  This 
dissertation is therefore both an interpretation the political thought of Hannah 
Arendt and an application of that thought to contemporary human rights theory 
and practice.  It consists in an evaluation and critique of the role of human 
rights in international politics, engaging with normative human rights theory, as 
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Human rights stand at the centre of any contemporary consideration of 
international morality.  Many would regard their enjoyment by everyone on the 
planet to be humanity’s primary responsibility and, therefore, the fact that a 
large proportion of human beings cannot enjoy them, its biggest failure.   
However, what is most disturbing is that for the last century or so, as human 
rights discourse has gained strength and become incorporated into the 
relations between states through treaties and conventions, human suffering 
inflicted by humans seems to be on the rise.  It is as though the more we 
affirm the innate dignity of human beings in global discourse, the more it is 
denied or denigrated in practice.  One of the purposes of this dissertation is to 
explore this puzzle in an attempt to under<stand whether there is something in 
human rights discourse that contributes to the violation of its own principles or 
whether it is simply a matter of human cruelty and indifference outstripping our 
own ability to defend against it. 
  
That human suffering might be linked to human rights was raised by 
Hannah Arendt after the Second World War as part of an attempt to 
understand how European society could have collapsed so completely to have 
allowed the atrocities of the Nazi and Stalinist regimes to have taken place.  
Her critique of human rights reprised Edmund Burke's at the time of the 
French Revolution.  Burke argued that there was something paradoxical in 
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affirming the dignity of the human in general.  For Burke, it was not the fact of 
one’s humanness that conferred dignity but rather one’s place in society.  
Similarly, Arendt was disturbed by conceptions of universal human rights that 
broke down as soon as human beings were no longer protected by their 
nation-state of birth.  
 
Arendt’s reflections on human rights are both promising and problematic.  
Unlike Burke who had no trouble dismissing the idea of the Rights of Man as 
dangerous, revolutionary nonsense, Arendt subscribed to the ideal of a 
common humanity that animates human rights discourse while remaining 
skeptical about human rights themselves.  What struck her most forcefully was 
the insufficiency of human rights to the task of protecting and empowering 
human beings.  It is for this reason that it is worthwhile to revisit her thoughts 
on the perplexities that surround human rights and the relationship between 
these reflections and her political theory more generally.  Given the empirical 
inadequacy of human rights discourse to the task of protection human beings, 
it is worthwhile to reconsider, with Arendt, whether there is something about 
human rights discourse itself that gets in its own way.  Arendt famously said 
that the point of her book, The Human Condition, was nothing more than to 
“think what we are doing.”1  The point of this dissertation then is to think about 
what we are doing when we talk about human rights.  
 
                                            
1 H. Arendt, The Human Condition (referred to below as HC), (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1958), p. 5. 
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Arendt famously argued in the Origins of Totalitarianism that human rights 
were unable to protect the stateless people produced by the conflicts of the 
first half of the 20th century because they were unable to secure the 'right to 
have rights.' Commentators on her thought have puzzled over this phrase for 
over 50 years.  The question is how to reconcile the clearly universalist spirit 
behind Arendt's reflections on rights and the clearly local character of her 
overall approach to politics.  In this dissertation, I argue that Arendt's approach 
presents a profound critique of liberal human rights theory which is itself 
central to contemporary human rights theory and practice.  Specifically, I take 
up Arendt's claim that in order to be a bearer of rights, a person must have 'a 
place in the world'.  I argue that Arendt's concept of ‘world’, an idea that she 
appropriated from Heidegger and outlined in the Human Condition, was 
already at work in the Origins of Totalitarianism.  I further argue that it is only 
in light of her concept of 'world' that we can understand the ‘right to have 
rights’.  This dissertation is therefore both an interpretation the political thought 
of Hannah Arendt and an application of that thought to contemporary human 
rights theory.  It consists in an evaluation and critique of the role of human 
rights in international politics, engaging with normative human rights theory, 
constructivist accounts of the effects of human rights in international politics as 
well as specific problems of statelessness, international responsibility and 
international intervention. 
 
Hannah Arendt’s reflections in the Origins of Totalitarianism on the 
difficulties raised by the Rights of Man remain relevant for us in that they 
address the puzzle of human rights from two sides.  On the one hand, human 
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rights represent the assumption of responsibility for the World which was 
made one by the confluence of modern technology and imperialism.  As a 
political doctrine, the Rights of Man asserts that we all belong to a common 
humanity, that we all inhabit a common global world in which actions in one 
part are likely to have repercussions in any other no matter how far away, and 
that we all have a responsibility to protect and enrich this one world.  On the 
other hand, human rights, as they are understood within the liberal 
philosophical tradition, tend to downplay the importance and the complexity of 
the individual’s relationship to the world.  For Arendt, rights are at most a 
partial means of establishing a proper relationship between the individual and 
the world he/she shares with others.  The liberal tradition from which the 
human rights doctrine emerged suggests that respect and enforcement of 
rights exhausts the responsibilities we have as human beings (as opposed to 
the greater obligations that we may have as citizens of a state).   
 
That both sides of the historical debate around rights, the revolutionary 
version inspired by the American Founding Fathers, and the anti-revolutionary 
version raised by Burke should both find expression in Arendt's thought is 
what makes it both interesting and challenging.  With her background in 
continental phenomenology, she does not come from within the liberal 
philosophical debates around human rights.  Though she does not take rights 
to be foundational, as liberals do, she still considers them to be an important 
part of our collective political life.  Despite her understanding of politics as a 
kind of collective action, she is not a communitarian. Though she takes the 
political community seriously, her critique of rights does not rely on a 
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conception of the individual's obligation to a cultural community.   Her idea of 
community is not cultural or natural (she was harshly critical of tribal 
nationalisms)2, but rather mediated by a relationship to a shared world.  She is 
not a Marxist, though she worries about the excessive formalism of human 
rights, she does not dismiss rights themselves as purely formal. Instead, 
Arendt develops an original conception of our political life as a relationship to a 
shared world that creates the conditions for human freedom.  Her conception 
of rights is based on that worldly conception of politics and her critique of 
liberal human rights theory is based on the fact that it does not recognize that 
our rights can only be made possible by the same conditions that make 
possible our political life more generally. 
 
Arendt was well-known for her criticism of the liberal tradition.   She 
believed that liberalism was so wary of the dangers of communal life that it 
viewed "freedom from politics"3 as the goal of political life.  By focussing only 
on negative liberties, liberalism attempted to protect the individual only in his 
or her private life while understanding public life as simply the place to pursue 
our private goals in competition with others.   This had a number of 
consequences.  One is the instrumentalization of politics, which is viewed as 
the means by which one advances one’s private ends.4  Second is the 
understanding of politics as the domain of command and obedience, which 
she took to be a relationship modelled on the despotism of the private 
                                            
2 OT p. 226-234 
3 H. Arendt, ‘What is Freedom?’ in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political 
Thought, (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 150 
 
4 HC p. 228-229 
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household.  Both of these devalue the political life, which Arendt sees as 
based on a plurality of people acting in concert in a public place. Liberalism, by 
seeing politics as the realm of the gaining of power to pursue one’s private 
ends5 conceives of politics as being primarily about managing violence.   
 
Liberalism, as part of the modern era’s rejection of the authority of religious 
institutions, also had a part in raising life to the highest good. Putting life at the 
centre of public concern had the effect of turning people away from the world, 
which, for Arendt, is the context in which freedom occurs.  Together, these 
trends have contributed to a growing erosion of the political activity of 
individuals.  It is clear that she viewed liberalism as part and parcel of the 
increasing trend towards world alienation that she identified in modern western 
political history.  For Arendt, human beings who are alienated from the world 
are susceptible to totalitarian ideologies of the sort that she describes in the 
Origins of Totalitarianism.6  
 
My approach in this dissertation will be to look at Arendt’s critique of 
liberalism from a different angle, that of the question of human rights.  By 
starting from the relationship between the world and human rights, I hope to 
be able to raise questions that will allow me to engage with problems in 
contemporary liberal human rights theory.  The point is to look at the 
intersection between Arendt’s thoughts on human rights and the contemporary 
                                            
5 H. Arendt, ‘On Violence,’ in Crises of the Republic, (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1972), p. 136 
6 HC p. 257 
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liberal thought on human rights, inspired by John Rawls, to see if the meeting 
can produce insights for both approaches. 
 
In the first chapter, I look at Hannah Arendt’s thoughts on the paradoxes of 
human rights. I outline the paradox as she described it in the Origins of 
Totalitarianism.  Though many commentators who apply Arendt's thought to 
contemporary international politics, such as Seyla Benhabib, Jeffrey Isaac and 
Peg Birmingham, have suggested that her idea of a right to have rights 
presupposes some global conception of human rights, I will argue that this 
interpretation is inconsistent with Arendt’s more general understanding of 
politics. Rather, the ‘right to have rights’ points to the political conditions of 
rights themselves. For Arendt, rights can only be enjoyed by people who have 
a stable place in the world.  Rights must be understood as the product of 
politics rather than the foundation of politics.  To the extent that the right to 
have rights can be guaranteed, it is only as part of political structures and 
institutions that derive their legitimacy from outside of rights discourse.   
 
The second chapter explores the ways that liberal theory has responded to 
the challenge of constructing a political conception of human rights.  Liberal 
conceptions of rights, such as those inspired by John Rawls, see a ‘political’ 
conception of rights in opposition to a ‘metaphysical’ conception.  As a result, 
they attempt to develop justifications for human rights that are independent of 
comprehensive theories about the nature of the Good.  Many contemporary 
human rights thinkers such as Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge and Joshua 
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Cohen work on the implications of Rawls' ideas to international politics.  I 
argue in that chapter that contemporary human rights practice cannot be 
completely separated from the liberal rights tradition.  Even if it is possible to 
separate human rights from their traditional metaphysical justifications, it is not 
possible to separate them from the understanding of politics embedded in 
liberalism since its inception.  Whatever else human rights are, they imply a 
conception of politics that makes the individual the source of legitimate state 
power.  It is this conception, rather than any specific justification for it, which 
creates the paradoxes outlined in chapter 1. 
 
Chapter 3 asks the question: is there a basic right to political membership?  
From a liberal perspective, the most common and straightforward 
understanding of Arendt’s idea of a ‘right to have rights’ takes the form of the 
idea of a right to political membership.  This seems straightforward because 
Arendt identifies the loss of human rights as being concurrent with the loss of 
a political community.  Those who were cast out of the society of nations found 
themselves without any institution to guarantee their rights.  It seems natural to 
go from her negative claim that the absence of membership in a national state 
led to the loss of human rights, to the positive claim that the right to have rights 
is the right to membership in a political community.  Many thinkers, such as 
Seyla Benhabib and Frank Michelman, have interpreted Arendt’s reflections 
on rights according to some form of this logic.  In this chapter, I argue that if 
there are any basic rights at all, in the sense that they are described by Henry 
Shue, then we must understand the right to political membership as one of 
them. However, once we recognise the importance of political membership it 
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becomes clear that its conditions have the effect of denying the logic of basic 
rights.  The problem of a liberal right to membership shows similarities to the 
boundary problem in democratic theory.  Just as the democratic polity cannot 
be determined by way of a democratic decision, a limited political community 
that guarantees individual rights cannot derive its authority from the rights of 
its members.  The distinction between member and non-member is not 
something that can be determined prior to a full understanding of the 
relationship between the individual and the political community to which they 
belong.  Though it cannot help but be arbitrary from a moral point of view, 
membership cannot be considered a matter of Justice or Rights.  Rights do 
rely on membership but membership relies on a much more complex set of 
political relations than can be guaranteed by rights. 
 
In the fourth chapter, I return to Arendt's thought in order to outline what it 
means to have 'a place in the world.'  For Arendt, the world refers to those 
things that are created by human activity – everything from buildings to 
political institutions.  Human rights, like all elements in the world, are a product 
of human artifice.  They are emphatically not natural.  Following Dana Villa, I 
argue that the primary connection to the world – the basis for the ‘right to have 
rights’ - is productive or 'equipmental' before it is participatory.  This is a 
counter-intuitive claim because, as I mentioned above, Arendt is harshly 
critical or instrumental or utilitarian approaches to politics.  Nevertheless, by 
looking at the importance of Heidegger’s influence on Arendt's conception of 
the world it is clear that 'usefulness' provides an important connection to the 
world.  Drawing Margaret Canovan's interpretation of Arendt, I then go back to 
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the Origins of Totalitarianism to show that this equipmental conception of the 
world was operating in that book and that it is directly connected to her 
thoughts on the paradoxes of human rights. This treatment of the equipmental 
aspect of Arendt's concept of world refutes the argument, made by many 
Arendt commentators, that the right to have rights should be understood as a 
right to politics. 
 
Chapter Five examines Arendt’s conception of ‘ccollective responsibility’ as 
a further expression of what it means to have a place in the world.  She 
argued that we are vicariously responsible for actions taken by our political 
community or in its name.  She distinguishes responsibility from guilt.  We are 
guilty when we commit wrong actions, but we are responsible for things that 
we ourselves have not done.  As such responsibility is a feature of living in a 
political community to which we do not choose to belong.  However, while this 
may often be thought of as a burden, Arendt suggests that it is considerably 
better than to be in a condition of absolute innocence.  Absence of 
responsibility is, for Arendt, a sign of worldlessness and rightlessness.   If we 
take this idea seriously, then there must be a connection between 
responsibility for a community, political participation, and the exercise of rights.  
Being part of the world means interacting with others within an artificial 'world' 
for which we assume a collective responsibility.  Understanding that rights 
emerge out of our collective responsibility for an objective world that we share 
in common allows us to begin to think of political relationships that are not 
derived from the individual will.  The Kantian inspired liberal tradition is 
concerned with deriving political obligation from the will of the individuals who 
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make up the state.  While this is clearly true for Habermas, who sees his 
discourse ethics as a form of will formation, this is also true of the Rawlsian 
tradition, despite its attempt to escape liberalism’s metaphysical legacy (see 
chapter 2).  Understanding politics as based on collective responsibility allows 
us to conceive of spatially limited political units that are not based on 
sovereignty,  which Arendt sees as the manifestation of the will in politics.  
Contrary to the liberal tradition, which derives political obligation from a kind of 
contract, Arendt, for whom promising is also a fundamental aspect of political 
life, sees promising as anchored in the world.  In effect, promising requires the 
existence of political responsibility between many people in order to be 
realised. 
 
That human rights might be related to collective responsibility for a spatially 
limited state certainly seems counter intuitive.  However, most of the aporias 
that surround human rights are based on the tension between the universalist 
justification for human rights and the territorially delimited modern state.  The 
liberal tradition is only really able to understand political inclusion and 
exclusion in legal terms.  Arendt gives us a richer account of the character of 
political boundaries while acknowledging their necessity in creating the space 
where rights can be enjoyed.   In the concluding chapter, I will summarise the 
argument of the dissertation and bring out the fundamental question raised by 
the dissertation – how should we understand the political world that is the 
basis for our having rights in Arendt’s thought? How should we think about a 
worldly conception of political boundaries. 
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In the last section, I also use the concept of responsibility developed in the 
dissertation to look at the Responsibility to Protect – an attempt to reformulate 
the norm of sovereignty by the Canadian sponsored by  International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.  I show that some the 
conceptual difficulties in that document become visible when one bears in 
mind Arendt’s conception of collective responsibility for a shared political 
space. 
 
Understanding the importance of having a place in the world to the 
enjoyment of rights brings to light the difficulties that emerge from the legalistic 
and individualist language of contemporary human rights theory.  There is no 
doubt that Arendt personally supported what she called, the “idea of humanity” 
– the principle that all human beings should have equality within a 'polis' .  
However, the question is whether this principle is best expressed in the 
language of human rights.  This dissertation suggests that the most urgent 
moral challenges in international politics – notably, how to respond to 
humanitarian crises such as genocide and ethnic cleansing – may not best 
addressed through the language of human rights.  This does not mean that we 
should not support international interventions in these crises.  It is simply that 
we must acknowledge that even the most urgent international disasters are 
likely to resist a uniform legal response.  Moreover, securing rights on a more 
permanent basis requires rebuilding the connection between people and their 
shared world.  As such they require rebuilding the political institutions which 
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themselves can secure the rights of populations.  This is difficult to accomplish 
within the framework of the current human rights regime. 
 
The challenge of this dissertation is the attempt to make Arendt’s political 
theory and contemporary liberal rights theory speak the same language.  From 
a Rawlsian perspective, Arendt’s is simply one more comprehensive 
conception of how political life might be organized and not a particularly 
persuasive one at that.  From an Arendtian perspective, liberalism champions 
a freedom from politics, an unwillingness to acknowledge the unpredictability 
inherent in political life, which at its worst can lead to a desire to eliminate that 
contingency altogether.  There is indeed a wide gulf separating these 
approaches.  The effort is nevertheless worthwhile.  Human rights are far from 
realized globally and often seem little more than an empty ideal deployed to 
justify less than noble actions. Given that Arendt starts with the claim that 
there is something about the historical articulation of the Rights of Man that 
contributed to the rise of totalitarianism, it is worth looking at her thought to 
see if there is something in the contemporary articulation of human rights that 
contributes to their current failure to secure something like the ‘right to have 
rights.’  It is my contention that Arendt’s thought has quite a bit to contribute to 
questions raised within the Anglo-American thought on rights.  With some 
exceptions,7 her thought does not receive very much attention in that tradition.  
It may therefore prove more fruitful to consider her approach in light of the 
                                            
7 See for example, J. Waldron, “Hannah Arendt’s Constitutional Politics,” in D. Villa, ed. The 
Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
pp. 201-219. 
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liberal tradition rather than the point of view of Habermas’s discourse ethics, 
which is already very familiar with her approach.8 
 
 On the other side of this exchange, as rich and original as Arendt’s 
thinking is, it is open to the charge of utopianism from even her sympathetic 
readers.  It is important to see whether her original yet idiosyncratic view of 
politics can engage with more mainstream political thought.  This dissertation 
applies her thought to the question of how to think about humanitarianism and 
international moral theory beyond the terms set by human rights discourse.
                                            
8 See M. Canovan, “A Case of Distorted Communication: A Note on Habermas and Arendt,” 
Political Theory,  (11:1, 1983), pp. 105-116 and S. Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of 
Hannah Arendt, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996) 
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Chapter 1:  Hannah Arendt and the Paradox of Human Rights 
 
There is little doubt that the role of human rights in international politics has 
been increasing since the end of the Second World War.  Their protection has 
been the guiding principle behind military interventions by the UN and NATO 
into Kosovo, East Timor and, belatedly, Rwanda.  That they are even invoked 
in support of interventions which are clearly not (at least not only) about 
protecting human rights is further testimony to their importance.  It has 
become almost universally accepted that, besides self-defence, the protection 
of human rights is the only legitimate reason for international military action.1  
Though some international relations scholars continue to argue that that their 
influence is considerably less than the relative power and interests of states, is 
it is clear that, for the most part, moral action, whether by states or NGO’s has 
been expressed through the protection and promotion of human rights.   
 
The moral authority evoked by the idea of human rights brings them into 
frequent conflict with the sovereignty of states.  Since the Treaty of 
Westphalia, sovereignty has come to signify the state’s ultimate authority over 
all matters, moral, religious or otherwise that fall within its jurisdiction.  The 
realist tradition in International Relations takes as its first principle that 
sovereign states either should or do pursue their national interest above all 
other considerations – especially moral considerations.  Proponents of human 
rights therefore see state sovereignty as the biggest obstacle to the enjoyment 
                                            
1 Michael Doyle, “The New Intervention”, Metaphilosophy, 32 (1-2, 2001) p. 222. 
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of human rights by everyone on earth.  In Jack Donnelly’s words, human rights 
offer the possibility of a “new standard of civilization… needed to save us from 
the barbarism of a pristine sovereignty.”2  Similarly, Jurgen Habermas argues 
that “(t)he rights of the world citizen must be institutionalized in such a way 
that it actually binds individual governments.”3 
 
However, the relationship between human rights and state sovereignty is 
considerably more complicated than both the liberal proponents of global 
rights and the realist proponents of state authority recognize.  Christian Reus-
Smit4 has persuasively argued that the moral authority that allows a state to be 
recognized as sovereign varies in different historical periods.  He claims that in 
the modern international system, legitimate state sovereignty is itself based on 
the liberal conception of rights that developed in the 17th and 18th centuries.  
Once one accepts that the modern conceptions of sovereignty and human 
rights share a common historical origin then it becomes difficult to accept the 
aforementioned liberal position that they are fundamentally antagonistic.  It 
raises the question of whether some of the negative aspects of the sovereign 
state system may have some connection to human rights and therefore raises 
doubts as to the ability of human rights to serve as a corrective to the 
problems of the international political system. 
                                            
2 J. Donnelly, 'Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?', International Affairs, Vol 74, 
no. 1 (Jan. 1998) 15-16. 
3 J Habermas, ‘Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years’ 
Hindsight’ trans. J Bohman, in J. Bohman and M. Lutz-Bachmann eds, Perpetual Peace: 
Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal, (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press , 1997), p. 127 




A half century ago, Hannah Arendt expressed similar doubts about the 
adequacy of human rights to the task of rehabilitating international politics in 
large part because of their philosophical and historical entanglement with the 
sovereign authority of the Nation-State5.  Her rather melancholy reflections on 
the paradoxes of human rights in a system of nation-states remain significant 
because we continue to live in a world that regards sovereignty and human 
rights as two mutually antagonistic regimes6.  Some authors, such as Seyla 
Benhabib, Jeffrey Isaac and Peg Birmingham7 have argued that Arendt’s 
reflections point the way towards the admittedly difficult task of securely 
grounding human rights on a global scale.  Against this position, I will argue 
that Arendt’s reflections in the Origins of Totalitarianism and in her later 
writings constitute the basis for a thorough problematisation of the liberal 
conception of human rights.   
 
While Arendt certainly applauded the principle of humanity that inspired 
many Enlightenment thinkers and can still be said to animate human rights 
thinkers and activists today, the enshrinement of this principle in a conception 
of human rights that is still intimately linked to the sovereignty of states is far 
from being up to the task of guaranteeing what she called ‘the right to have 
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rights.’ I argue that the ‘right to have rights’, a formulation that, for obvious 
reasons, lends itself to multiple interpretations, is not best understood as an 
attempt to find a more secure ground for human rights than the one that was 
furnished by Enlightenment reason.  For Arendt, the idea of a ‘right to have 
rights’  makes the point that the connection of individuals to a shared human 
world (the true condition of having rights, in Arendt’s view) cannot be fully 
understood in the language of rights.  It is not that human rights can have no 
philosophical ground, it is rather that such a ground would have no political 
consequence.   
 
In this chapter I will outline the difficulties Arendt raises in the liberal 
conception of human rights.  I will begin by explaining the paradoxes that 
arose in a system of nation-states based on the ‘Rights of Man’.  I will then 
argue that her well-known concept of a ‘right to have rights’ cannot be 
understood in the terms of liberal human rights theory and that those authors 
that attempt to do so achieve this only by dropping fundamental aspects of 
Arendt’s political thought, most notably the understanding of human rights as 
part of a limited, shared political world and her understanding of the 
relationship of philosophy to politics.  Finally, I will argue that Arendt’s later 
thought can contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between 
human beings and their shared world in order to shore up that connection and 




1.1 The Nation-State and the Perplexities of Human Rights 
 
Writing shortly after the Second World War, Hannah Arendt was one of the 
first to reflect on the paradoxes of universal rights in a world characterized by 
multiple sovereign nation-states.  The chapter entitled the “Decline of the 
Nation-State and the end of the Rights of Man” in the Origins of Totalitarianism 
examines the complexities of the relationship between rights and sovereignty 
and their ultimate connection to the Holocaust.  While this chapter is 
sometimes read as a precursor to the liberal view, that the protection of human 
rights requires the establishment of global restrictions on state sovereignty, 
Arendt’s emphasis on the interrelatedness of these two ideas suggests that 
they cannot be conceived of except in relation to one another.  Arendt’s 
reflections represent a thorough problematisation of the individualist 
conception of human rights that is prevalent in the liberal tradition.   
 
Arendt was rather ambivalent about the value of the nation-state as a 
political form.  On the one hand it is closely tied to dominance of biological 
concerns at the expense of genuine politics because it treats the nation as one 
large family or household, something that she criticises relentlessly8.  She 
understood the troubles of the first half of the 20th century to be caused in part 
by the 'conquest of the state by the nation'9 - the undermining of the rule of law 
that occurred when the state was conceived of being in the service of the 
nation.  On the other hand, at the beginning of the 20th century, it remained a 
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limited political space that recognised the equality of its citizens – something 
she understood as fundamental to a stable political order.  “(I)nsofar as the 
establishment of nation-states coincided with the establishment of 
constitutional government, they always had represented and had been based 
upon the rule of law as against the rule of arbitrary administration and 
despotism.”10  Flawed as it was, it was the nation-state system that was the 
last political barrier to fall before the onslaught of totalitarianism.   
 
The acquisition of foreign lands and foreign peoples during the imperialist 
era strained the foundational principles of the nation-state.  The nation-state in 
the modern period was based on the equality of citizens within a limited 
territorial space.  As the imperialist states acquired more and more overseas 
territories, they acquired dominion over more and more people that they could 
not recognise as equals.  What Arendt calls ‘race-thinking,’ the idea that 
inherent, hereditary differences justified political domination, was invoked to 
legitimise the domination of foreign peoples by the imperialist powers.  
“Imperialism would have necessitated the invention of racism as the only 
possible ‘explanation’ and excuse for its deeds, even if no race-thinking had 
ever existed in the civilized world.”11  The difficulties involved in incorporating 
imperialist possessions into a national state set up a conflict between, on the 
one hand, the imperialists’ desire for infinite expansion and the arbitrary 
(proto-totalitarian) methods used by colonial administrators and, on the other, 
the desire of the political state to follow legal procedures which would 
recognise the claims of the colonised.  In the Western European states these 
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contradictions did not lead to totalitarian governments in the metropole 
because the national state had strong historical grounding and the imperialist 
possessions were in far-off lands12.  However, in Eastern Europe, where the 
national state was a recent and not fully realised achievement, a kind of 
continental imperialism developed in the form of the pan-germanic and pan-
slavic movements that brought to the forefront contradictions that the nation-
state system could not withstand. 
 
The difficulties Arendt describes turn on the historical convergence of the 
‘Rights of Man’ and the nation-state.  Whereas during the Absolutist period, 
the power of the monarch was derived from his relationship to God, since the 
French Revolution, sovereign power was increasingly understood to rest on 
the prior inalienable Rights of Man.   
 
Since the Rights of Man were proclaimed to be ‘inalienable,’ 
irreducible to and undeducible from other rights or laws, no 
authority was invoked for their establishment; Man himself was 
their source as well as their ultimate goal.  No special law, 
moreover, was deemed necessary to protect them because all 
laws were supposed to rest upon them.  Man appeared as the 
only sovereign in matters of law as the people was proclaimed 
the only  sovereign in matters of government.  The people’s 
sovereignty (different from that of the Prince) was not proclaimed 
by the grace of God but in the name of Man, so that it seemed 
only natural that the ‘inalienable’ rights of man would find their 
guarantee and become an inalienable part of the right of the 
people to sovereign self-government.13 
 
The ‘Rights of Man’ and state sovereignty are therefore inherently linked 
but also in tension.  The sovereignty of the state and the authority of the law 
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rested on them but, at the same time, limited their scope.  Thus the 
constitution of national government was seen as the realisation of the ‘Rights 
of Man’.  The ‘Rights of Man’ could not impose any limit upon state power 
since to do so would involve constituting a second authority higher than that of 
the state, which could only rest on the same source.   
 
This tension between the nation-state and the Rights of Man remained 
latent as long as the number of people who found themselves at odds with 
their governments was relatively small.  Exceptions could be handled with 
laws granting asylum to those persecuted within their own states.  However, 
these exceptional measures proved inadequate to the phenomenon of mass 
population movements that occurred in the interwar period.  The failure of the 
nationality principle in the ‘belt of mixed populations’ led to millions of refugees 
and stateless people who suddenly found themselves unwanted in their 
nominal state of origin and unwelcome anywhere else.  It quickly became clear 
that, in a world where human rights find their expression in membership in a 
national state, to be stateless was equivalent to being rightless14 
 
Rightlessness is a condition far worse than that of being deprived of any 
specific right.  For Arendt, rightlessness consisted in being without a place in 
the world where one can be recognised as an equal by one’s peers.   
 
Something much more fundamental than freedom and justice, 
which are rights of citizens, is at stake when belonging to the 
community into which one is born is no longer a matter of course 
and not belonging no longer a matter of choice, or when one is 
placed in a situation where, unless he commits a crime, his 
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treatment by others does not depend on what he does or does 
not do.15 
 
The effects of the perplexities surrounding human rights turned out to be 
profound.  The nation-state system was built on the idea that the human rights 
were the most basic values in the secular political world.  Yet it turned out that 
something more basic had to exist – membership in a community – in order to 
guarantee these rights.  This meant that even though political power was 
thought to rest on human rights it turned out that practically, rights could only 
exist if they rested on political power.  This paradox was embodied in the 
stateless person.  As a person who had lost all specific political protection, 
she/he was the quintessential bearer of human rights: a human being tout 
court.  As it turned out, that person was the one who found her/himself in the 
condition of rightlessness. 
 
1.2 The Paradoxes and Perplexities of Human Rights 
 
Hannah Arendt refers to the difficulties surrounding the emergence of 
human rights alternatively as a paradox and as perplexities. To call it a 
paradox implies an internal contradiction within the doctrine of the Rights of 
Man itself whereas perplexities imply multiple complications which might be 
both theoretical and practical.  Since she tends to use the terms 
interchangeably, it is difficult to zero in on what constitutes the paradox.  
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One understanding of the paradox of human rights seems to be the idea, 
according to the formulation offered by the French Revolution, that the source 
of individual human rights was the same as the nation’s source of power and 
legitimacy.  According to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, 
both the inalienable rights of Man and the power of the French nation were to 
be derived from the innate dignity of Man.  The consequence of this is indeed 
a paradox.  It meant that, practically, the Rights of Man could only be claimed 
as a citizen of a particular nation and that exclusion from a nation state 
became equivalent to exclusion from humanity itself.   
 
The same essential rights were at once claimed as the 
inalienable heritage of all human beings and as the specific 
heritage of specific nations, the same nation was at once 
declared to be subject to laws, which supposedly would flow 
from the Rights of Man, and sovereign, that is, bound by no 
universal law and acknowledging nothing superior to itself.16 
 
Arendt goes on to show that in a system of nation-states, deriving law and 
power from the same source – Man – had the effect of subsuming the 
individual into a people.  Though the Rights of Man were seen as self-evident, 
their only legal expression came in the form of national laws.  If a people were 
denied their Rights, they were expected to fight for them.  The principle of 
national self-determination was that each nation was responsible to guarantee 
the rights of its citizens.  There was a need for a people to earn their rights.  
The problem is that the individual, whose rights were supposedly the source of 
all legitimate political power, was again subsumed into a people17.  This result 
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was all the more problematic because of the mixing of populations, especially 
in Eastern Europe.   
 
The practical consequence of this paradox is that the human being, 
stripped of her membership in a nation-state, turns out to have no rights at all.  
To the extent that these are human as opposed to civil rights, they are 
supposed to be the rights inherent in the fact of being human, prior to any 
political organization.  The problem was that, as a practical matter, as soon as 
one found oneself as a human being tout court, that is, as soon as one found 
oneself in the situation that Human Rights are designed to provide for, it is at 
this precise moment that one finds oneself in the condition of rightlessness. 
The paradox involved in the loss of human rights is that such 
loss coincides with the instant when a person becomes a human 
being in general – without a profession, without a citizenship, 
without an opinion, without a deed by which to identify and 
specify himself – and different in general, representing nothing 
but his own absolutely unique individuality which, deprived of 
expression within and action upon a common world, loses all 
significance.18 
 
Thus human rights, the inalienable rights of human beings as human 
beings, served a source of legitimacy for the national state by authorizing its 
political power.  The national state was then responsible for protecting the 
rights of its citizens.  As a consequence, the only people who could expect to 
enjoy the benefits of human rights were those that were solidly incorporated 
into a national state.  As soon as one found oneself without nationality – a 
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human being as such – one found oneself in the condition of rightlessness.  
The paradox is therefore that human rights authorize national rights which 
cancel out human rights.  Arendt presents human rights as, in Jacques 
Rancière’s words, the ‘rights of those who have no rights’19 
 
Arendt draws on Edmund Burke’s critique of natural rights at this point to 
show that the ‘pragmatic soundness’20 of Burke’s critique of human rights 
comes from this recognition that individual, natural human rights did nothing 
for individual humans.  It is important to note that Burke’s Rights of 
Englishmen are not the Rights of Man as embodied in the laws of the United 
Kingdom but rather the inherited Rights that Englishmen acquire by their birth 
into the British legal system.  They are not the particular expression of a 
universal law, but a set of recognized privileges whose particularity runs all the 
way down.  Moreover, since rights could only be enjoyed from within a 
community anyway, the demand for natural rights that underpinned all political 
authority could only undermine those rights that had been inherited by virtue of 
membership within a community.   It did so for two reasons.  First, by deriving 
equality from a natural attribute of humans, it had the effect of diminishing the 
importance of the artificial, worldly rights that were guaranteed by history, 
tradition and circumstance.  Second, it brought to bear what Arendt saw as 
Man’s ‘natural’ suspicion of the natural.   
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Though Arendt never gives an unambiguous account of this ‘natural’ 
suspicion, she refers to it on at least two separate occasions.  First, in 
discussing Conrad’s Heart of Darkness in the Origins of Totalitarianism, she 
argues that the ‘natives’ inspired hatred and brutality on the part of the 
European settlers because, having not built an artificial world for themselves, 
they seemed not human and, at the same time, they clearly were.  They 
inspired hatred because they were an unwelcome reminder of the natural side 
of human beings.  The second reference to this question of the natural occurs 
later, in The Human Condition.  There, she claims that one of the features of 
modernity is that human beings are only able to know what they make 
themselves.  Knowledge of nature or scientific knowledge, is generated by 
artificially recreating nature by means of the experiment.  The corollary is that 
modern human beings are unable to understand anything they have not made 
themselves21.  An understanding of rights based on their inherence in human 
nature is highly problematic in a modern world that is suspicious of anything 
that is not 'made'. 
 
If a human being loses his political status, he should, according 
to the implications of the inborn and inalienable rights of man, 
come under exactly the situation for which the declarations of 
such general rights provided.  Actually, the opposite is the case.  
It seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the very 
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Another perplexity raised by Arendt’s account of human rights is the 
problem that the loss of human rights does not correspond the loss of any of 
the rights enumerated as human rights.  One could be deprived of any 
combination of the rights listed (the right to life, the right to free expression 
etc.) without being deprived of human rights in general and, conversely, one 
could find oneself in full enjoyment of all these basic liberties and still be in a 
condition of rightlessness23.  Having rights is not simply a matter of being able 
to move or speak freely, one must be able to stake a claim.  The troubling 
condition of rightlessness as opposed to the situation of being deprived of 
certain rights leads Arendt to the ambiguous and possibly paradoxical 
formulation of the “right to have rights.”24 
 
1.3 How to Understand the Right to Have Rights 
 
The idea of the ‘right to have rights’ can best be illustrated by making a 
distinction between a violation of rights and a denial of rights.  A violation of 
rights is a deprivation of one or more of the rights listed in the various 
declarations – free speech, assembly, property etc.  If one is retried for a crime 
for which one was acquitted, one’s protections against double jeopardy have 
been violated, but not one’s right to trial, legal representation etc.  A denial of 
rights is an action of placing a group of people in a situation of rightlessness.  
It does not deprive one of any of the rights that might be recognized in one of 
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the myriad documents in the human rights tradition.  It put one in a condition of 
being unable to make a rights claim at all.  In the current system, it is the 
condition in which people without states who recognize them find themselves. 
 
Not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of a community 
willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever, has been 
the calamity which has befallen ever-increasing numbers of 
people.  Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man 
without losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity.  
Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity.25 
 
The only way to make sense of this within the liberal tradition is as a kind of 
right to inclusion or right to membership which grounds, but is not included in, 
the enumerated list of ‘rights’.  This is the direction that Benhabib and Isaac 
seem to want to push Arendt, but, as Frank Michelman points out, this is not a 
productive way to understand Arendt’s phrase, since it posits an idea of rights 
grounded in something we have ‘naturally’ by virtue of being human – 
something that Arendt argues against and that was a source of the paradox to 
begin with.  Michelman suggests that the right to have rights points rather to 
the “irreparable groundlessness of rights”26  and the necessity of protecting 
human rights as a kind of collective political challenge.  This is probably right 
as far as it goes, but it begs the question of what the conditions of the 
practical, political protection of rights might be.  But this just restarts the 
vicious circle by asking what are the conditions of the ‘right to have rights’. It is 
just one iteration removed from the question of what are the conditions of 
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having rights at all that inspired the paradoxical phrase in the first place.  I will 
discuss the difficulties in thinking about a right to membership in Chapter 3. 
 
The last element of the paradox is the fact that the emergence of humanity 
as an ‘inescapable fact’ actually cemented the condition of rightlessness 
among those who were stateless.  Now that the entire planet is covered by 
treaties that reciprocally recognize the citizenship laws of each state, there is 
nowhere one can go to escape the condition of rightlessness.  The paradox 
lies in the fact that every emergence of a universal humanity had the effect of 
further excluding certain people from the category of holder of human rights.  
The political emergence of universality cemented human rights as only 
enjoyable as particular, civil rights.  It makes it clear that the condition of 
rightlessness is itself a product of the emergence of human rights on a global 
scale.  As a product of civilization, rightlessness is as much an artificial 
condition as being a rights-holder.  It is a product of civilization – manufactured 
barbarism.   
 
We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and 
that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s 
actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of 
organised community, only when millions of people emerged 
who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the 
new global political situation.27 
 
This phrase, ‘the right to have rights’ carries within it the paradoxes that 
produced our awareness of it.  I argue that the paradoxes that Arendt 
discussed continue to plague contemporary human rights theory and practice.   
                                            
27 OT 296-297 
31 
1.4 Rightlessness and the Right to Have Rights 
 
The recognition of the fact that the discourse of human rights had failed 
those who needed it most and contributed to the collapse of the nation-state 
system is the basis for Arendt’s scepticism of human rights as being capable 
of guaranteeing human dignity.  She argued that the events leading up to the 
end of the War served as an “ironical, bitter, belated confirmation” of Edmund 
Burke’s arguments that the ‘Rights of Man’ were merely an “abstraction” and 
that “it was much wiser... to claim one’s rights to be the ‘rights of an 
Englishman’ rather than the inalienable rights of man.”28  In spite of this, it has 
been argued that Arendt’s concept of a ‘right to have rights’ is in fact an 
attempt to ground human rights more securely than they were in the first half 
of the 20th century.  This leads to an interpretation whereby the proper body to 
guarantee the right to have rights would have to be some kind of supranational 
or international organisation.  
 
The idea that Arendt believed that there ought to be some international 
guarantee of human rights is certainly not unreasonable.  Consider the 
following quotation. 
 
“This new situation, in which ‘humanity’ has in effect assumed 
the role formerly ascribed to nature or history, would mean in this 
context that the right to have rights, or the right of every 
individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by 
humanity itself.”29 
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She argues here that since humanity has become the source of political 
legitimacy, it is only humanity that could guarantee the right to have rights.  
Given Arendt’s other work, such as the Human Condition and On Revolution, 
which emphasise local political deliberation, no one seriously believes that 
Arendt would endorse anything like a world state.  Her experiences in the 
Second World War clearly convinced her that a world state could too easily be 
turned against its original purpose.30 Nevertheless, some commentators do 
think that some form of international institutional guarantee for the ‘right to 
have rights’ follows from Arendt’s reflections.  Jeffrey Isaac argues for the 
recognition of a conception of ‘human dignity’ in Arendt’s work that must be 
guaranteed by “a new law on Earth.”31  Seyla Benhabib, while recognising that 
Arendt was reluctant to endorse a specific form of politics on moral grounds, 
sees this hesitation as a by-product of Arendt’s fascination for Greek forms of 
political life.  Benhabib believes that we need to think ‘with Arendt against 
Arendt,’32 by recognising that her thought requires a ‘normative core’ in order 
to be made coherent.  That normative core, for both Benhabib and Isaac, is 
apparent when we look at Arendt’s commitment to the plight of the stateless 
and her insistence on the importance of political action for all human beings.  
They both read her thoughts on human rights in light of this implied 
universalism.  
 
Arendt is not willing to go all the way with Burke...  She cannot 
agree... that one’s moral status is determined exclusively by 
one’s local habitus, wholly “the offspring of convention,” for if this 
were the case there would be little ground on which to condemn 
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the suffering and disempowerment of those stateless, homeless, 
marginal persons who fall between the cracks of national or 
other authoritative political identities and outside officially 
recognized categories of membership.  And there would be just 
as little basis for the defense of the principle of human dignity, an 
emphatically universalist principle, one that Arendt insists must – 
the imperative is ethical – find a new guarantee.33   
 
Both of them take Arendt’s clear sympathy for stateless people as a sign 
that she must endorse some form of institutional guarantee to prevent people 
from finding themselves in this position. Practically this means that the 
protection of ‘the right to have rights’ involves the recognition and adoption of 
human rights norms in international institutions, in the work of international 
human rights organisations, international tribunals for the prosecution of 
crimes against humanity, and even the tentative steps by the UN to intervene 
militarily in humanitarian disasters.34 
 
While Arendt would no doubt applaud many of these developments, it is 
my contention that understanding her as a kind of cosmopolitan manquée is 
wrong. One could certainly think that the expression ‘right to have rights’ is a 
call for re-evaluation of the rights we currently hold as fundamental in favour of 
another right even more fundamental. However, as Frank Michelman argues, 
the first ‘right’ cannot be conceived as a right at all but rather a recognition of 
the fact that human rights cannot be held as the fundamental political value in 
the way that liberal theory envisions because she refuses to let them be 
grounded in some ‘feature of us’35  Rather, for Arendt, rights themselves 
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depend on political organisation for their appearance, their recognition and 
their enforcement.  In Arendtian language, they depend on the existence of a 
shared human world.   
 
 
1.5 The Futility of Seeking a Ground for Human Rights 
 
A similar argument is made by Peg Birmingham in Hannah Arendt and 
Human Rights.  Birmingham argues that Arendt did indeed provide an 
ontological grounding for human rights – in the twin principles of natality 
(initium) and givenness – in the combination of our capacity for initiating new 
beginnings with the fact of our individual uniqueness.  She argues that human 
beings are inherently public36 and that it is on this that the right to have rights, 
understood as the right to belong to a political community that ensures the 
freedom of expression and association, is grounded.   
 
(T)he right to have rights, which is established through the 
principle of initium restated as the principles of publicness and 
plurality, is the right to belong to a political space.  These 
principles carry the rights of freedom of expression and 
association.37 
 
I will discuss Birmingham’s argument for grounding human rights in our 
‘second’ birth in language at greater length in chapter 4.  For now, it is enough 
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to point out that interpreting the right to have rights as an attempt to point to a 
new grounding for human rights misses the point of Arendt’s critique.  Within 
the framework of Arendtian thought, one searches is vain for a ground for any 
of her political opinions.  A philosophical reading of Arendt’s political theory is 
already a distortion of her thought. She has explicitly described her work as an 
attempt to view politics “with eyes unclouded by philosophy.”38   Any attempt to 
ground human rights philosophically would represent an attempt to reconstruct 
a ‘banister’ which would release us from the responsibility of deciding for 
ourselves what must be done.  Any attempt to implement such a philosophical 
conception of rights would be at best futile (because philosophical truth has no 
necessary compatibility with political action) and would likely be counter-
productive because it either represents empty speech (promises with no hope 
of fulfilment) or is dangerous because it would involve the introduction of an 
absolute into the world. 
 
However much Arendt differed with Burke in her insistence that equality 
was the condition of political life, she certainly agreed with him that the search 
for a philosophical justification for rights does nothing to secure rights for 
people.   The only evidence we need for the political irrelevance of grounding 
the right to have rights can be ascertained by Arendt’s discussion of human 
nature.  Arendt does not deny a human nature, she denies an unchangeable 
human nature.  Human beings, for Arendt, have the capacity for freedom – the 
ability to initiate a new chain of events.  But this capacity is not permanent.  
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The evil of totalitarianism is that it sought to change human nature, to destroy 
the human capacity of action.  If this is possible then it makes no sense to 
speak of a ground for human rights.    
 
 
1.6 Sovereignty and Rightlessness 
 
On the other side of the question, Giorgio Agamben argues that Arendt’s 
reflections on the Rights of Man pointed to a fundamental flaw in the Western 
tradition’s understanding of politics.  Unlike the liberal interpretations of the 
right to have rights mentioned above, Agamben does not believe that the 
paradox of Human Rights can be resolved by simply redoubling our efforts to 
have human rights recognised in international institutions and practice. 
 
Agamben’s analysis is a synthesis of Arendt, Michel Foucault and Carl 
Schmitt.  Agamben takes the position that the right to have rights is integrated 
into the law by way of the sovereign decision.  Drawing on Schmitt’s Political 
Romanticism, Agamben argues that the Sovereign’s decision on the exception 
that Schmitt saw as enabling the ‘normal’ functioning of the law is the same 
decision that marks the boundary between political life and bare life. Bare life, 
is Agamben’s term for the natural, biological life which is integrated into the 
political system by way of its exclusion – i.e. bare life is the life that is treated 
as apolitical by the political power.  In this way, juridical power and bio-power, 
which Foucault famously separated, are reconnected.  The life that is 
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considered political (human beings as citizens) is governed according to 
juridical power – the law.  Bare life is governed according to Foucault’s 
conception of bio-power: as undifferentiated life.  Agamben makes the 
argument that this relationship, based on the Sovereign exception, has been 
with us since the appearance of the Greek polis.  The increasing dominance of 
bio-political practices since the Enlightenment chronicled by Foucault as well 
as the growing importance of social concerns criticised by Arendt (which both 
point to similar phenomena) are both symptoms of a growing indistinction 
between political life and bare life.  This indistinction reached its apex with the 
appearance of the concentration camp in which human beings were reduced 
to bare life in its pure form.  The concentration camp, for Agamben, constitutes 
the paradigm of the Western conception of sovereignty which will continue to 
hang over our heads unless we are capable of reconceiving the fundamental 
sovereign relation that has plagued Western political forms since the Ancient 
Greeks. 
 
According to Agamben then, the paradoxes of human rights are not simply 
a consequence of modern human rights discourse but are rather embedded 
deeper still within the Western tradition of sovereignty, a tradition that goes 
back to the Greek polis.  This makes for a far more pessimistic outlook than 
even Arendt’s melancholic reflections seemed to warrant.  Not only is it 
impossible to guarantee the right to have rights for those that are not citizens 
of nation-states but even citizens are increasingly being treated as though 
there are rightless 
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Though Agamben is right to see the paradoxes of human rights as related 
to the question of sovereignty he either ignores or dismisses two of Arendt’s 
distinctions that put the problem in a different light.  Whereas Agamben 
considers sovereignty to be constitutive of Western politics, Arendt argues that 
sovereignty and politics are nearly antithetical.  Second, and relatedly, Arendt 
distinguishes between power and violence.  Neither of these distinctions show 
up in Agamben’s analysis.  In itself, this is not surprising.  Arendt argued that 
the confusion between these is at least as old as Plato understanding of 
politics as subject to the expertise of philosophers.  From Plato to the French 
Revolution and beyond, political philosophers have attempted to ‘make’ a 
good polis in the way one might make a piece of furniture.  “You cannot make 
a table without killing trees, you cannot make an omelet without breaking 
eggs, you cannot make a republic without killing people.”39 The activity of 
fabrication, Arendt argued, is inherently violent.  It is fundamental to the 
human condition – it is the process that has allowed us to build the artificial 
world that we inhabit.  However, attempting to order our political relations 
according to this model necessarily treats human beings as means to be 
violently formed according to whatever schema the fabricator has in his/her 
head. 
 
Arendt believed that the modern approach to sovereignty is philosophically 
tied up with the identification of freedom with the faculty of the will.  She traced 
                                            
39 H. Arendt, ‘What is Authority’ in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political 
Thought, (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 139. 
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this relationship back to St-Augustine (significantly, it was absent in Greek 
thought) and to the stoics.  But the philosophical perplexities inherent in this 
understanding of freedom are clear enough in Kant’s moral theory.  In order to 
save freedom from the determinism that he saw in a universe governed by 
physical laws, Kant posited a transcendental standpoint such that actions 
which seemed to be determined by empirical causes could nonetheless be 
understood as being initiated by a free individual.  Moreover, this freedom, 
located in the will, turns out to be obedience to yet another law, the moral law, 
rather than the natural physical laws that operate in the empirical world. 
 
Arendt rejects this transcendental conception of freedom in favour of a 
political conception derived from the Ancient Greeks.  For Arendt, freedom can 
only be realised in action.  However, when freedom is understood as a form of 
sovereignty, politics becomes impossible. 
 
Politically, this identification of freedom with sovereignty is 
perhaps the most pernicious and dangerous consequence of the 
philosophical equation of freedom and free will.  For it leads 
either to denial of human freedom – namely, if it is realized that 
whatever men may be, they are never sovereign – or to the 
insight that the freedom of one man, or a group, or a body politic 
can be purchased only at the price of freedom i.e., the 
sovereignty of all others...  The famous sovereignty of political 
bodies has always been an illusion, which, moreover, can be 
maintained only by the instruments of violence, that is, with 
essentially nonpolitical means.  Under human conditions, which 
are determined by the fact that not man but men live on the 
earth, freedom and sovereignty are so little identical that they 
cannot even exist simultaneously.  Where men wish to be 
sovereign, as individuals or as organized groups, they must 
submit to the oppression of the will, be this the individual will with 
which I force myself, or the ‘general will’ of an organized group.  
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If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must 
renounce.”40 
 
Sovereignty is linked to human rights by the fact that both constitute a 
denial of human plurality.  In a sense, the defining conflict between 
sovereignty and human rights is simply a conflict between competing 
sovereignties – that of the individual and that of the collective group.  Arendt 
believed that it was possible to overcome this relationship by spreading out 
political power.  Her example is the United States, where, in her view, the 
separation of powers and the federal system mitigated against sovereignty 
being held in one spot.  She was concerned about the centralisation of power 
in the federal executive, a trend that has continued in the 40 years since she 
wrote on this, but, at least historically, the United States was seen to be able 
to resist the pitfalls of sovereignty.  
 
This question of sovereignty is very closely related to Arendt’s concept of 
power.  She didn’t see the separation of powers as limiting the political power 
of the United States, but rather as amplifying it.  Power for her is always 
collective and always, at least to some degree, cooperative.  When violent 
means are used, this is a symptom of the breakdown of political power.  In the 
words of Lisa Disch, she rejects the idea of power as ‘leverage,’41 a force 
exerted by one individual or group over another most explicitly held by the 
political realists (“men’s control over the minds and actions of other men”).42  
Rather Arendt sees power as the effect of human beings acting in concert, it is 
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not a matter of physical strength or weaponry (though those things can destroy 
power) but of cooperation.  As such, power can be magnified by being 
separated.  The codification of this principle is one of the reasons for her 
admiration of the United States Constitution.  Most importantly, though, power 
is replaced by force and violence when it is consolidated, whether in the 
individual or the collectivity. The paradoxes of human rights turn precisely on 
the conflict between the competing sovereignties of individuals and collectives, 
both of which seek to claim their rights through non-political means. 
 
Much of Arendt’s political theory is oriented towards disentangling politics 
from sovereignty and power from violence.  On Revolution is precisely such an 
attempt.  According to Arendt, the American Revolution succeeded in 
establishing a Republic (more or less) non-violently and without invoking 
sovereignty.  The revolutionaries ‘discovered’ that power and violence are not 
synonymous and that by separating it, it would be augmented rather than 
divided.  Her point is that sovereignty and politics, violence and power need 
not be thought of together.  Her attempt to ‘recover’ an understanding of 
politics that maintained these distinctions is in part motivated by the paradoxes 
raised by the Doctrine of the Rights of Man. 
 
The problem with Agamben’s identification of politics with sovereignty and 
power with violence is that it compounds the paradox of human rights, making 
it both inevitable and unresolvable.  If sovereignty is the decision that enables 
the distinction between violence and law and constitutes the political space 
and the rightless are those that are cast outside the pale of the law, it follows 
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automatically that the only possible political relation to them is one of violence.  
Moreover, if rightlessness is a necessary by-product of this distinction, then it 
becomes obvious that Western conceptions of politics require that there be 
rightless people with whom we can only relate in terms of violence. 
 
However, Arendt provides us with the tools to think about this is a different 
way.  For her, the ‘right to have rights’ is more than a legal category. It means 
to have a place in a shared, human world and rightlessness is the condition of 
someone who has been deprived of this relationship.  Powerlessness has 
many manifestations for her of which the legal is only one.  However, if we 
insist on equating sovereignty with the will and power with violence, then 
Agamben’s dystopia may well be the inevitable result.  I will show in 
subsequent chapters that this understanding of sovereignty still persists in 
contemporary liberal human rights theory and, for that reason, it is unable to 
escape the perplexities of human rights that Arendt raised. 
 
1.7 Rights, Politics and Plurality  
 
For Arendt, the difference between human rights and the ‘right to have 
rights’ turns precisely on the question of plurality.  
 
Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without 
losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity.  Only the 
loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity. 
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The right that corresponds to this loss and that was never even 
mentioned among the human rights cannot be expressed in the 
categories of the eighteenth century because they presume that 
right spring immediately from the ‘nature’ of man....  The decisive 
factor is that these rights and the human dignity they bestow 
should remain valid and real even if only a single human being 
existed on earth; they are independent of human plurality and 
should remain valid even if a human being is expelled from the 
human community.43 
 
That human rights are conceived as ‘independent of human plurality’ 
means that they are understood as being valid prior to political organisation. 
The belief that sovereignty should rest on a state’s ability to protect the rights 
of its citizens implies that these rights are prior to the state’s authority, that the 
latter rests on the former.  The liberal construction of the sovereignty/rights 
opposition implies that we must treat human rights as the absolute value in our 
political life. 
 
The reason that political structures are so important to Arendt’s view of the 
basis of the ‘right to have rights’ is that, for her, rights, freedom and equality 
are not natural, but artificial.  They are a product of human beings working 
together to actively create the conditions in which we can regard one another 
as equals and we can guarantee each other rights.  One may argue (with 
Benhabib and Isaac) that Arendt must assume a basic equality between 
human beings in order that they may recognise each other as individuals 
capable of creating the conditions of ‘artificial’ equality.  In a sense this is true; 
she certainly believed that, under the proper circumstances, human beings 
were capable of this.  But for Arendt, it isn’t the case that they are naturally so.  
Human beings are capable of seeing each other as equals when they stand in 
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relation to a common world.  Whether this is possible is a matter of historical 
circumstance.  The worst excesses of imperialism came as a result of the 
inability of the Europeans to see many of the colonised as human beings.  
According to Arendt this was a result of them not seeing their societies as 
having built a common artificial world. 
 
Also, the imperial era had the effect of making every point on the planet 
accessible, of bringing people together from all parts of the planet.  In short, 
imperialism – the disastrous effects of which continue to be felt today – helped 
create the conditions under which it is possible to imagine a common world 
covering the entire globe.  In short, it created the political conditions in which 
human rights can become a possibility. 
 
(H)umanity, which for the eighteenth century, in Kantian 
terminology, was no more than a regulative idea, has today 
become an inescapable fact.  This new situation, in which 
‘humanity’ has in effect assumed the role formerly ascribed to 
nature or history, would mean in this context that the right to 
have rights, or the right of every individual to belong to humanity, 
should be guaranteed by humanity itself.  It is by no means 
certain whether this is possible.44 
 
1.8 The World as Crucial to the Right to Have Rights 
 
Most attempts to come to terms with the right to have rights get caught up 
in the language of rights and the concept of humanity and, in so doing, miss 
the part of Arendt’s formulation that connects the right to have rights most 
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directly to the rest of her thought.  For Arendt, “the fundamental deprivation of 
human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in 
the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective.”45  This one 
phrase turns all legal, moral or metaphysical conceptions of rights inside out.  
Human rights need to be understood in relation to a human world, a product of 
human artifice and the site which makes human action possible. 
 
The right to have rights is a worldly condition for political action.  It 
represents the connection between people and their shared human world.  As 
a feature of the world, rights are reified action – things created out of the 
action of the past.  Their value lies in their maintaining the link between 
individuals and the common world.  The right to have rights is not a ground for 
human rights.  Arendt’s conception of politics is based on appearance, there is 
no room for a ground.  Even if we could determine what it was, it would be of 
no political consequence.   
 
The importance of Arendt’s thought is that it points to the importance of the 
existence of a worldly self upon which rights may be inscribed.   Thus the 
distinction is not between zoe (bare life) and bios as life that is fully 
empowered.  It is between life that has a visible connection to a shared human 
world and one that does not.  It is between those who have an artificial self 
and those that are deprived of this.  Without a connection to the world, legal 
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rights have nothing to ‘stick to’.  They remain the rights of those who have no 
rights. 
 
Furthermore, it may be possible for human beings to live with a visible 
connection to the human world and yet not have recognized rights.  Human 
beings living in a tyranny for example.  It seems that, under Arendt’s 
understanding, human beings living in an arbitrary dictatorship may well lack 
rights but they might be difficult eliminate by way of a genocide without first 
making an effort to sever their connection to the common world.  Therefore, 
the right to have rights does not refer to having human rights but rather living 
in a condition where one may be able to claim rights – i.e. having an artificial, 
public self upon which to ‘inscribe’ human rights.  This artificial self cannot be 
established through moral reasoning or the necessary features of free 
communication.  Its grounding is not ontological but political in the widest 
sense compatible with Arendt’s thought – i.e. having a relationship to a shared 
human world. 
 
The consequence of this is that having the right to have rights has is not 
strictly speaking a matter of having rights.  It is at most a necessary condition 
and as such is compatible with not enjoying rights at all.  Thus the problem of 
the right to have rights cannot be solved by correcting the discourse of human 
rights but rather by specific political action designed to (re)establish ties to a 
common, shared artificial world. 
47 
 
Subsequent chapters will explore the consequences of this understanding 
of human rights.  First, I will look at different contemporary conceptions of 
human rights in order to show that they are unable to resolve the perplexities 
of human rights precisely because they are unable to account for the worldly 
basis for rights.  Second, I will look at the place of the ‘world’ in Arendt’s 
thought in order to show how having a relationship to it constitutes the basis 
for an artificial self that can credibly enjoy a ‘right to have rights’.  This requires 
an understanding of responsibility in Arendt’s thought since it is responsibility 
that establishes many of our ties to our shared world.  Our artificial self is most 




The fundamental paradox in Arendt’s reflections on human rights is not 
primarily a matter of theory but rather a phenomenal problem of living in one 
world.  It is as though once we had realized Kant’s dream of a federation of 
sovereign republics that covered the entire planet, it turned out that man could 
no longer be recognized as a fully moral creature – an end in himself.  The 
reality turned out to be beyond Kant’s worst nightmare, not only were we not in 
a kingdom of ends, we weren’t even in a kingdom of means.  Human beings, 
qua human beings, turned out to be entirely superfluous. 
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No doubt Kant would not have recognized the League of Nations as the 
federation of republics that he had envisioned.  However, Wiemar was a 
republic in fact and the USSR at least in name, and the actions of both the 
Nazi and Stalinist regimes were not self-interested in the manner that Kant 
feared in the Perpetual Peace.  The world consolidated by imperialism in the 
19th century was surely not based on the regulative idea that nature, through 
human unsociability, was pushing us towards a peaceful international 
federation.  However, the distortion of Kant’s idea of humanity might well be 
compared with Eichmann’s distortion of the categorical imperative into “act in 
such a way that the Fuhrer, if he knew of your action, would approve it.”46   
The connection between the two lies in the selflessness of the actions that 
these distorted principles inspired.  Eichmann’s were the individualized version 
of the totalitarian impulse to remake the world in accordance with nature’s law.  
In totalitarian ideology, Kant’s ‘pious hope’ that nature was pushing us towards 
a kingdom of ends gave way to the deadly certainty that history was playing 
out a more basic class or race struggle. 
 
Arendt’s response to this was a reaffirmation of the importance of the 
human world.  Not surprisingly, Arendt turned to Kant’s critique of judgement 
to understand his political theory precisely because it was the only one of his 
critiques that was concerned with giving meaning to worldly affairs even if only 
as a spectator rather than an actor.  The worldlessness of Kant’s practical 
reason was too close to the worldlessness of totalitarianism for comfort. 
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For this reason we need to understand the paradox of human rights as 
struggling with the problem that the doctrine of the Rights of Man produced, 
and continues to produce people who were radically cut off from the world. 
The challenge of political theory is to think about how this connection might be 
rebuilt or reinitiated.  Insisting that human beings simply have rights and that 
they ought to be observed or protected misses the problem.  Effective rights 
are the effects of coexistence in a shared world. Agamben’s exclusive concern 
with the paradox in its legal form doesn’t take into consideration Arendt’s aim 
of re-establishing a connection between individuals and a stable human world 
of which legal recognition is only a part.  To be sure, there is no way, within 
current legal structures, to guarantee that no one will ever find herself outside 
of the legal order.  There may however be institutional ways to shore up the 
relationship between individuals and the world in such a way as to make it less 
likely that people will find themselves in this situation. 
 
Agamben may well be right that so long as we continue to see life as the 
only source of politics and law we will not be able to escape the problems that 
have plagued human rights politics since its inception.  However, Arendt 
provides one way to think about this through her conception of politics as 
primarily concerned with the world that houses our collective lives.  By 
reaffirming the importance of our shared artificial world and of maintain our 
relation to it and by seeing rights as an effect of a proper relation of individuals 
to their world, we may be able to find remedies for the consequences of the 
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periodic destruction of shared worlds by wars, famines and, perhaps 
increasingly, environmental disasters. 
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Chapter 2:  Natural Rights vs. Human Rights 
 
Many contemporary human rights thinkers will not agree with my claim that 
contemporary human rights theory and practice do not take the political 
conditions of rights seriously enough.  A good many of them, inspired by the 
work of John Rawls, explicitly view their approach as constituting a political 
understanding of rights and justice.   They reject the Arendtian critique of 
human rights because they believe that the paradoxes that she identifies in 
the doctrine of the Rights of Man have nothing to do with human rights 
practice as it exists today.  They see her critique, if it had any value at all, as 
applying to a philosophical tradition of human rights that was part of the 
Enlightenment conception of reason that inspired the French Revolution and 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man.  They argue that contemporary human 
rights theory and practice can and should be disconnected from that 
philosophical tradition.  In this chapter, I will argue that liberal attempts to 
distance themselves from what they see as the metaphysical grounding of 
human rights do not address the perplexities of human rights.  The problem 
that Arendt was concerned with had nothing to do with philosophical 
justification (Arendt was never particularly interested in philosophical 
justifications of political arguments) but instead pointed to the political 
consequences of a doctrine of right that never seriously challenged the idea of 
sovereignty and instead merely shifted it from the state or the nation to the 
individual.   
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Many contemporary human rights thinkers, drawing on John Rawls, 
advocate separating the question of what rights we have from the question of 
why we have them.  Authors such as Charles Beitz, Joshua Cohen and 
Michael Ignatieff advocate ‘practical’ conceptions of human rights which would 
“treat the justification of human rights as a distinct problem from that of their 
content.”1  Practical conceptions of rights are contrasted with ‘orthodox’ 
conceptions which “treat the justification of international human rights as 
internal to the conception of a human right.”2  The first derives the content of a 
human rights doctrine from a consideration of the way they function in 
international politics using philosophical argumentation to help to see how they 
can best fill that role.  The second starts with a philosophical idea of what 
rights a human being has and then applies that idea to the international 
political world in which they operate. Advocates of the first ‘practical’ approach 
argue that persons holding different conceptions of the good life could agree 
about the content of a human rights doctrine but disagree about the 
justification and that we should not allow disagreement about the latter 
interfere with potential agreement about the former.    
 
Without denying this last claim, I will argue in this paper that advocates of 
‘practical’ approaches fail to justify the separation of these conceptions 
because they fail to acknowledge that the content of a human rights doctrine is 
related to its justification by the question of definition.  Since the paradoxes we 
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are concerned with have to do with the role human rights play in international 
politics, we must understand what human rights are by the political role that 
they do indeed play. In short, one cannot have a conception of human rights 
without explaining what a human right is and one cannot explain what a 
human right is without explaining why we have them.  Advocates of practical 
conceptions are certainly right that persons may indeed disagree about the 
justification and agree about the content but the range of disagreements about 
content may be limited by the role. 
 
The primary reason that moral philosophers seek to separate justification 
from content is that they see this as subscribing to a metaphysical argument.  
They are concerned with separating the idea of human rights from the natural 
rights tradition which is itself embedded in the philosophical and political 
history of Western Europe.  They are, quite rightly, worried that if human rights 
are too closely tied to that tradition, it may difficult for persons not raised in that 
tradition (or indeed, hostile to that tradition) to see them as anything but a new 
form of cultural imperialism.  Thus, unwilling to give up on human rights 
altogether, they seek, in the interest of toleration and pluralism, to find a 
conception that could be supported by persons who do not share the 
philosophical history and traditions of Western European states.   
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John Rawls initiated this line of argumentation 20 years ago in his 
justification of liberal justice as ‘political, not metaphysical.’3   But because, at 
the time, his theory of Justice as Fairness dealt only with liberal states, this 
was a philosophical problem rather than a practical one.  It became a practical 
problem when he attempted to extend the theory to non-liberal states in his 
‘Law of Peoples.’4  The problem of human rights, for those inspired by Rawls,  
is to make them acceptable to persons who do not belong to the political and 
philosophical tradition of liberal rights.  The most significant consequence of 
this approach, at least for Beitz, is to reject any limitation on what might count 
as human rights that derives from a philosophical conception of what human 
rights really are (such as understanding them as purely as Lockean negative 
rights, as Maurice Cranston argued).5 
 
I argue in this chapter that a practical conception of human rights, based 
on Rawls’ approach – is not really a political approach.  Any political 
conception of human rights must address not only the content of a human 
rights doctrine (in the sense of what rights human being ought to have) but 
also the question of what a right is, at least in the sense of their political 
function.  Beitz’s rejection of any a priori limit on what may count as a right is 
not a necessary consequence of abandoning a metaphysical justification for 
rights.  For example, if the concept of a right requires that there be someone 
or some institution capable of providing a remedy in cases of violations then 
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this would impose certain limitations on what could be understood as a right.  
The right to breathe clean air may be an example of a right that might be 
excluded in such a conception.  This requirement – that every right have a 
corresponding remedy – is not obviously metaphysical.   
 
2.1 Human Rights – Political, Not Metaphysical 
 
Many contemporary liberal human rights thinkers, inspired by John Rawls’ 
ideas of Justice as Fairness and the Law of Peoples, understand their 
conception of justice as political and their understanding of human rights as a 
part of this conception.  When Rawls claimed that he espoused a political 
conception of justice, he specifically opposed it to a metaphysical claim.  The 
purpose was to avoid the charge that he was advancing an account of Justice 
in the Platonic sense.  His project was to show that it is possible to arrive at a 
political system that allows persons holding different conceptions of the good 
life to work together in a system of social cooperation.  Rather than base his 
normative theory on a universalist understanding of human rationality, Rawls 
tried to base his conception of justice on an overlapping consensus between 
these, individually held, reasonable conceptions of the good life.  Rawls’s 
understanding of politics is determined by its relationship to ‘metaphysics.’  
Rawls denied that there should be a direct link between one’s fundamental 
personal beliefs and the political system of which one is a part.  If you are a 
Catholic living in a society made up of many religions, you have no right to 
expect that the state should be a Catholic state.  You would be willing to 
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accept the separation of church and state in order to ensure that political 
power would not be wielded against you by a rival group. 
 
In reconsidering his idea of ‘Justice as Fairness’ subsequent to the 
publication of a Theory of Justice, Rawls claimed that ‘Justice as Fairness’ 
operated in the context of the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’.  Rather than base 
his normative theory on a universalist understanding of human rationality, as in 
a Theory of Justice, Rawls bases his conception of justice on an “overlapping 
consensus”6 between multiple, individually held, reasonable conceptions of the 
good life.  He assumes that individuals have some idea of the good life they 
wish to pursue.  It is then possible to imagine a political system as a system of 
social cooperation that allows each individual to pursue his/her conception of 
the good life according to a shared conception of political justice.  This is the 
basis for his original position in which parties choose the principles that govern 
their society behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing 
anything about their particular conception of the good or their economic well-
being.  This mechanism yields his well-known two principles of Justice.  The 
principle of equal liberty and the difference principle:  a redistributive principle 
that ensures that all economic inequalities must be to the benefit the least 
advantaged members of society.7 
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In the Law of Peoples, Rawls takes states rather than individuals to be the 
parties in an international original position.  He starts with an agreement 
between liberal states.  Behind a veil of ignorance, they choose a set of 
principles to govern relations between them.  According to Rawls, they would 
arrive at eight principles which cover most of the standard beliefs about what 
sovereign states owe each other in the international system.  They include the 
principles of non-intervention, prohibition against aggressive war, and 
honouring human rights.  These principles correspond roughly to the principle 
of equal liberty in the domestic sphere.  They guarantee the physical integrity 
and independence of states.  Rawls does not include an international 
equivalent of the difference principle resisting the path taken by thinkers such 
as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. 
 
The next stage in his theory is the extension of the law of peoples to 
‘decent’ non-liberal states.  Rawls describes such societies as follows: 
 
(A) decent people must honor the laws of peace; its system of 
law must be such as to respect human rights and to impose 
duties and obligations on all persons in its territory.  Its system of 
law must follow a common good idea of justice that takes into 
account what it sees as the fundamental interests of everyone in 
society.  And, finally, there must be a sincere and not 
unreasonable belief on the part of judges and officials that the 
law is indeed guided by a common good idea of justice.8  
 
Included in the ‘system of law that must follow a common good idea of 
justice’ is the respect for human rights.  Rawls has in mind here a hierarchical 
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society based on a widely held conception of the good (such as a state 
religion), which nevertheless respects minority rights and provides some form 
of political access to all its citizens.  These states must also be non-aggressive 
internationally.   
 
Rawls assumes that, if such ‘decent’ hierarchical societies were to be 
included with liberal states in the original position, they too would endorse the 
principles of the Law of Peoples.   Rawls wants to include them because of the 
liberal value of toleration arguing that “if all states were required to be liberal, 
then the idea of political liberalism would fail to express due toleration for other 
acceptable ways (if such there are, as I assume) of ordering society.”9   He is 
concerned that, if they could not co-exist with ‘decent’ non-liberal states, liberal 
societies would be asserting that theirs is the only just way to organise 
societies and this contradicts their own deeply held value of toleration.  Since 
political liberalism is largely dependent on the value of toleration, it seems 
contradictory for them to resist tolerating alternative conceptions of the proper 
ordering of society.  Moreover, since Rawls is treating states as moral agents, 
it would be unreasonable for liberal societies not to tolerate these alternative 
conceptions.  Thus, the concept of ‘reasonableness’ undergoes a change from 
the domestic to the international sphere.  In the domestic sphere, ‘reasonable’ 
individuals were those who could cooperate with other individuals with 
different conceptions of the good life in a system governed by the principles of 
political liberalism.  In the international sphere, ‘reasonable’ is characterised by 
being able to co-exist according to the principles of the law of peoples.  The 
                                            
9 Ibid. p. 59. 
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individual’s comprehensive conception of the good has the same status as a 
people’s conception of legitimate organisation of state power. 
 
The role of human rights in Rawls’ conception is to help set the boundaries 
of decency and therefore of sovereignty.  States are decent if they respect 
human rights and, for this reason, they gain the right of non-interference into 
their affairs.  States that do not respect human rights are labeled ‘outlaw 
states’ and are subject to whatever interference is both feasible and prudent to 
protect the rights of its citizens.  For Rawls, human rights are included with 
other conditions in order to set the standards of decency.  Beitz and Cohen 
ultimately roll these conditions into their understanding of human rights such 
that their role is to set the boundaries of decency - understood as the 
conditions that states must follow in order to enjoy the right of non-interference 
in their affairs. 
 
Thus contemporary liberalism seems to have escaped the paradox that 
Arendt pointed out.  Since the human rights that limit intervention 
internationally are not the same as the idea of justice as fairness that justifies 
political coercion internally, it can be said that individual rights and state power 
are not being derived from the same source.  It should therefore be possible to 




2.2 Human Rights as a Common Concern 
 
In a series of articles, Beitz has developed his own conception of human 
rights which he understands as a based on Rawls’ practical conception of 
rights in The Law of Peoples.  He argues for a conception of human rights split 
off from their roots in theories of natural rights.  His argument is based on a 
Rawlsian understanding of the relationship between politics and metaphysics.   
He argues that human rights, thus conceived, can indeed function as the 
language of global justice.  They are the best candidate for this role for two 
primary reasons.  First, at this time, human rights discourse is the only 
candidate to fulfill that role.  There are a number of treaties and declarations in 
effect that have already secured the explicit endorsement of a strong majority 
of the world’s governments. Second, Beitz believes that human rights as they 
are outlined in various international declarations and treaties, can function as a 
‘common concern’ for individuals holding different, conflicting, reasonable 
conceptions of the good life, and as such can attain some degree of legitimacy 
among many or all of the various cultures that make up the world. 
 
Beitz’s idea of a ‘common concern’ is modeled on Rawls’s conception of an 
‘overlapping consensus’ but with important differences.  Whereas an 
overlapping consensus suggests an already existing, though latent, 
agreement between agents holding different fundamental beliefs, a ‘common 
concern’ suggests only an agreement that a question (in this case human 
rights) is of compelling interest to these agents.  This is important because it 
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requires much less actual philosophical agreement while simultaneously 
allowing for a wider conception of human rights.  Less philosophical 
agreement is necessary because justifications need not converge between 
different groups – they may agree on a conception of human rights for different 
reasons.  A more expansive understanding of human rights is possible 
because the content need not map directly onto the justification – human 
rights as a common concern may be understood as a jumping-off point for a 
discussion of human rights the scope of which is potentially unlimited.  It need 
not be restricted by a pre-existing zone of commonality between groups. 
 
The upshot of this is that Beitz endorses a wide conception of human 
rights.  He resists the idea that human rights can and should be reduced to an 
authentic core which should then be defended more vigourously than other, 
less fundamental, rights.  He endorses a view that has been called 
‘justificatory minimalism’ by Joshua Cohen.  The idea is to use a modest set of 
philosophical assumptions to generate a conception of human rights that 
nevertheless advocates for the implementation of a broad list of rights.  Beitz 
resists the ‘substantive minimalism’ of Michael Ignatieff, arguing that modest 
philosophical assumptions do not imply a narrow list of human rights.  The 
difference turns the role we expect rights to play.  Ignatieff sees them as 
emergency measures, designed to motivate Western powers to action in 
particularly dire circumstances.  Beitz would like them to serve in broader but 
less dramatic ways, much as they already do in setting the terms for 
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international aid.  He sees them as important components of a global theory of 
justice.10  
 
Beitz’s distinction between ‘practical’ and ‘orthodox’ conceptions of human 
rights serves to clarify his point that human rights need not rely on natural 
rights.  “The distinguishing feature of (the orthodox) conception is the idea that 
human rights have an existence in the moral order that is independent of their 
expression in international doctrine.”11  That is to say it attempts to use 
philosophy to generate a list of ‘genuine’ human rights and a justification for 
them.  As a result, these conceptions tend to present a much more restricted 
list of rights.  Practical conceptions look at the role human rights actually play 
in the international sphere and use that as a basis for a conception of rights.  
Beitz claims that the orthodox view carries with it a hidden dogmatism 
because it relies on a specific historical tradition in political thought to criticise 
the actual political practices of states and human rights organisations.  He 
argues that human rights play a far more expansive role than the one 
proponents of the orthodox view would allow.   
 
If natural rights are about guaranteeing individual liberty against 
infringement by the state, human rights are about this and more: 
to put it extravagantly, though I think not wrongly, international 
human rights, taken as a package, are about establishing social 
conditions conducive to the living of dignified human lives.12 
 
                                            
10 C. Beitz, “Human Rights as a Common Concern”, American Political Science Review (95:2, 
June 2001), p. 281 
11 C. Beitz, “Human Rights and the Law of Peoples,” p. 5  
12 Ibid. p. 41 
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Beitz has three objections to the orthodox conception of human rights.  Human 
rights, according natural rights theory, are supposed to be pre-institutional, 
timeless and inherent in the human person.  This conception is derived from 
17th English contractarianism.  Rights are pre-institutional in that they originate 
in a state of nature, where the individual is conceived of as prior to political 
and social organisation.  For early natural rights theorists like Locke, the 
purpose of a social contract is to ensure that everyone’s rights can be enjoyed 
without conflict.  They were conceived of as inherent in the human person 
because they were seen as properties of the person in himself or herself, prior 
to any form of society.  They belong to human beings either naturally or as a 
result of God’s creation.  Since rights inhered in human nature, which is 
usually understood as unchangeable by definition, they were also seen as 
timeless.  Beitz claims that none of these elements of classical rights theory 
apply to contemporary human rights practice.  Moreover, to the extent that 
they might indeed rely on an explicitly metaphysical understanding of human 
nature, they are necessarily incompatible with reasonable pluralism if they are 
imposed on people who do not share the idea that all human beings were born 
free and equal and with inalienable rights. 
 
These three components of ‘dogmatic’ human rights doctrines relate 
differently to the political role played by human rights.  It is true that, for Kant, 
Right is timeless, pre-institutional and inherent in the human person (though, 
as is often pointed out, there are hazards in directly translating Kantian Right 
into individual rights – for Kant, it is the justification for Right that is 
individualized (because human beings are ends in themselves) not the content 
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(since Kant admits no right of rebellion against a monarch who violates the 
law)).  However, if we are to believe Edward Andrew (1988), Locke was more 
interested in individualizing the Right in order to distinguish Rights from 
Christian charity, than he was in providing a metaphysical justification for the 
Rights he attributes to human beings in the state of nature.  Indeed, many 
interpreters of Locke (such as Leo Strauss or C.B. MacPherson) argue that all 
of his professed belief in natural law was little more than a smokescreen to 
ensure that his justification of individual acquisitiveness was not taken to be 
simply a more palatable version of Hobbist atheism13. 
 
The content of Locke’s religious conviction or lack thereof is an old 
controversy that we need not revisit here in any detail.  Regardless of whether 
we think Locke took the idea of natural law seriously, it is clear that, for him, 
the pre-institutional character of rights was simply a feature of the role that 
rights were intended to play in his thought.  He was making the argument that 
in order to be legitimate, all political societies had to respect the rights and the 
property of its citizens as well as refrain from anything that might interfere with 
the accumulation of wealth.  This last part included both the idea of toleration 
(because free commerce cares little about the beliefs of those with whom one 
trades) and the idea that the state should discourage charity because people 
need the incentive to work.  The same can be said of the inherence of rights in 
the human person.  Regardless of whether we believe, as Locke claimed to, 
that human beings were, by virtue of their divine origins, born with inalienable 
                                            
13 See C.B. Macpherson,  The political theory of possessive individualism : Hobbes to Locke, 
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1962), Strauss, Leo.  Natural right and history (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1959) 
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human rights, the point of the argument is that rights are things that human 
beings hold against their governments and not by virtue of them.  Inherence in 
the human person is simply another way of stating that there is a difference 
between human rights and the rights that are granted by states in positive law.  
It reflects the idea, fully operative in contemporary human rights discourse, 
that human rights are something more than the positive laws of states.14  Even 
if we remain agnostic on the question of the metaphysical origins of human 
rights, to the extent that we believe human rights to be claims that individuals 
can make against their own states, we act as if they were inherent in the 
human person. 
 
All of this implies that the distinction between orthodox and practical 
approaches to human rights is difficult to hold.  Even if we regard human rights 
as reflective of a larger sense of justice, this does not mean that the orthodox 
view does not remain part and parcel of both human rights theory and 
practice.  Even Rawls, whom Beitz presents as a theorist of the practical 
approach to human rights, establishes priorities between ‘liberties’.  The rights 
espoused by minimalists as the only ‘real’ human rights receive highest priority 
(the lexical priority of the 1st principle of justice over the 2nd principle) in his 
domestic theory and the prioritisation of ‘urgent rights’ in his law of peoples.  In 
international practice as well, it is only egregious violations, violations that are 
inevitably of the rights held by the minimalists to be fundamental, that trigger 
interventions.  While other considerations may trigger interference, these are 
                                            
14 J. Cohen, “Is there a Human Right to Democracy?” in Sypnowich, Christine, ed.  The 
Egalitarian Conscience: Esays in Honour of G.A. Cohen (Oxford University Press, Oxford:  
2006), p. 230 
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not always considerations of rights (such as economic adjustments required 
by the World Bank and the IMF). 
 
This points to a residual ‘orthodoxy’ in all ‘practical’ approaches to human 
rights.  In my view, this stems from the fact that a distinction must be made 
between the principles of a global theory of justice and human rights 
themselves.  Historically, it has been the case that this distinction has not 
always been made and some ideas that are perhaps not best expressed in the 
language of rights end up entrenched in Human Rights resolutions.  This is not 
to say that these principles are not really human rights but rather that they are 
not best pursued through rights discourse.  The reason for pointing this out is 
not to somehow restrict access to rights discourse only to minimalist 
conceptions but to recognise is that expressing a claim in the language of 
human rights has practical as well as theoretical import.  We cannot ignore the 
fact that rights language carries with it the baggage of natural right theory even 
if we limit our understanding of human rights to the political role that we expect 
them to play internationally.  It relies on a conception of legitimate political 
authority that has its roots in Locke, Rousseau, Kant and others of the liberal 
tradition.  
 
Beitz and Cohen and others who try to extract philosophical consistency 
from international human rights documents and practice are engaged in a 
difficult project.  The primary obstacle is the fact that the Universal Declaration 
as well as the other similar documents seemed to be designed to create 
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confusion around their content.  The expression of rights as aspirations in the 
Declarations was clearly designed to make it harder for them to have any 
significant effect on the political structure of the non-liberal democratic states 
and, for the Eastern bloc states, reflect the idea (as expressed in Marx’s The 
Jewish Question) that rights are only features of non-ideal societies.  None of 
this diminishes the importance of the documents or the accomplishments of 
international human rights in the 60 years since the Universal Declaration.  
However, it raises questions about the applicability of any kind of philosophical 
rigour to the interpretation of the document.   
 
At one level, making a virtue out of the declarations necessary ambiguity is 
an interesting project.  The rights outlined in the various treaties that make up 
the human rights regime have been publicly agreed to by the majority of the 
states on the planet and, insofar as these states can be said to represent the 
cultures of the world, the commitments found therein have been supported by 
a large percentage of the cultures in the world.  Moreover, human rights, as 
they have been laid out in the various Declarations have become integrated 
international human rights practice, have become incentives for international 
aid and loans as well as barriers to normal trading relationships.  Thomas 
Risse and Katherine Sikkink have shown how human rights can alter the 
internal makeup of a state (their identity) in order to make them into rights-
respecting members of international society.15   
                                            
15 T. Risse, and K. Sikkink, “The socialization of international human rights norms into 
domestic practices: introduction.” in T. Risse, S. C Kopp and K. Sikkink (eds), The Power of 
Human Rights:  International Norms and Domestic Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) p 1-38. 
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But none of this answers the question of what is at stake in recognizing 
current international norms as human rights.  Beitz at times seems to argue as 
though this doesn’t matter at all.  It is of no importance whether human rights 
are rights in the same sense as civil rights, so long as they improve the lives of 
individuals around the world in accordance with the aspirations of the 
Declarations.  In this account, the justification of human rights is radically 
separated from their content as though these two questions belonged to 
separate language games.  At other times, the separation is not quite 
complete. 
 
2.3 Sovereignty as Right to do Wrong 
 
A productive way to understand the way in which state sovereignty and 
human rights are connected as a political matter is to think of both as different 
versions of the right to do wrong.  Human rights represent an individual right to 
do wrong – the right to lead one’s life according to one’s own conception of the 
good life or even to fail to live up to one’s own conception of the good life as 
the case may be.  State sovereignty, on the other hand, represents a state 
level right to do wrong.  The rule of non-interference suggests that state 
actions towards their own people are its own business.  The state has the right 
to mistreat its own people without external interference.  This is the ‘barbarism 
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of pristine sovereignty’16 that enrages human rights activists.  If we accept this 
description then we can see that human rights mark the boundary between an 
internationally recognised individual right to do wrong and an internationally 
recognized collective right to do wrong.  Decent regimes are wrong, from a 
liberal point of view, because they don’t follow the precepts of liberal justice: 
full equality, equal participation, not favouring any single conception of the 
good life etc.  However, their deviations from liberal justice are acceptable 
because they still recognize basic human rights.  To put it another way, under 
practical conceptions of rights human rights simply mark the barrier between 
individual and collective sovereignty.  As such, despite having jettisoned the 
natural law justification of human rights, contemporary human rights cannot 
escape the problems that Arendt raised in the Origins of Totalitarianism. 
 
Edward Andrew, in Shylock’s Rights, makes the argument that ‘the right to 
do wrong is the moral core of liberalism’.  He makes the case that liberal rights 
theory emerged as a counterpoint to the Thomistic idea of Christian charity.  It 
effectively ‘personalised and relativised’17 the Right as it was outlined in 
Thomistic natural law.  Christian charity was anathema to early rights theorists 
for two reasons.  On the one hand, it placed limits on property rights by 
demanding that the needs of the poor be attended to by the wealthy and by 
preventing the lending of money with interest.  On the other hand, by enjoining 
Christians to convert non-Christians, it made it difficult for commerce to 
flourish between people of different religions.  In short, Rights were conceived 
                                            
16 J. Donelly, op. cit. p. 15-16. 
17 E. Andrew, Shylocke’s Rights,( Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988),  p.7 
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against Christian charity as the “means to express a tolerant market 
morality.”18  The liberalism of Locke sought to carve out a space of individual 
autonomy – a right to do wrong that permitted the individual to dispose of his 
property as he/she sought fit (whether by selling his labour or lending with 
interest) and to worship as he/she sought fit. 
 
This idea of sovereignty as a recognized right to do wrong permeates both 
practical and orthodox conceptions of human rights (to use Beitz’s distinction).  
It does so because it is a feature of liberal toleration.  The point of establishing 
a distinction between liberal regimes and decent regimes is to try to establish 
a list of human rights that would be acceptable to certain non-liberal states.  
The sovereign right to do wrong, on this approach, can be understood as the 
gap between liberal Justice and Human Rights.  This gap exists regardless of 
the way we might justify human rights.  For human rights minimalists, it is the 
gap between international human rights (or basic rights, however conceived) 
and domestic civil rights.  For practical human rights theorists, it is the gap 
between human rights and full liberal justice.  This gap is mandated by a 
commitment to liberal justice. 
 
Now it is clear that, within liberal states, the limit of the right to do wrong is 
protected by constitutional rights.  The state may pass the laws it wants, 
provided they do not violate the constitutional rights of its citizens.  The 
domestic collective right to do wrong is limited by the constitutionally protected 
                                            
18 Ibid. p. 21 
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individual right to do wrong.  The proper relationship between the two is set 
out according to the principles of liberal justice.   Liberal justice is a matter of 
establishing the proper balance between an individual and a state right to do 
wrong.  International human rights operate the same way except that the 
principle of toleration applies differently.  Domestically we tolerate different 
conceptions of the good life.  Internationally, we tolerate deviations from liberal 
principles. 
 
The upshot of this is that the ‘decent’ regime’s right to do wrong 
necessarily comes at the expense of the individual right to do wrong of the 
citizens within its borders.  This brings back the zero sum game between 
sovereignty and human rights that is at the heart of Arendt’s critique of human 
rights.  Regardless of the justification provided for human rights, they remain 
connected to sovereignty by way of the relationship between competing ‘rights 
to do wrong’.  That is to say that even though human rights may not share the 
philosophical justification with natural rights, they share a political function.  It 




I have argued in this chapter that contemporary liberal attempts to separate 
human rights from natural rights do not succeed in insulating them from the 
perplexities that Arendt raised.  Even if we set aside the question of 
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metaphysical justification and define rights by the role we expect them to play, 
it is not clear that we have moved very far from Lockean origins.  To be sure, 
the role of rights for Locke was to emancipate the use of property from the 
constraints of Christian charity, but it did so by safeguarding a zone of 
discretion where individuals could claim to do as they pleased and not have to 
answer to a morality external to their own.  In Beitz’s account, this amounts to 
the conditions conducive to living a dignified life.  But the important point is 
that to lead a dignified life, one’s rights must be recognized. 
 
Furthermore, in shedding the metaphysical justification, they do not shed 
the understanding of human rights as rights – as the relativisation of right.  
Human Rights fulfill whatever aspirations we may have in international politics 
by conferring claims instead of say, seeking to reduce suffering.  The role they 
play is, at least in part, concerned with protecting an individual right to do 
wrong from the state’s right to do wrong.  In short, it attempts to set up a 
balance between individual and state sovereignty. 
 
However, the balance that they strike does nothing to counteract the 
problems Arendt raised.  As long as individual rights feed into state 
sovereignty by providing the legitimacy for it, then human rights become 
collapsed into state sovereignty.  They are effective only to the extent that they 
are entrenched in the positive law of a state that recognizes one’s 
membership.  In the next chapter, I will show why  liberalism cannot  
accommodate a right to membership to meet this challenge.  To address this 
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problem, in subsequent chapters, I will return to Arendt’s thought, moving 
beyond rights discourse in order to understand what rightlessness really 
means – the loss of a place in a shared human world.  
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Chapter 3:  Is There a Basic Right to Political Membership? 
 
I have argued thus far that Hannah Arendt identified a problem with the 
liberal conception of human rights that continues to plague human rights 
discourse into its contemporary understandings.  According to Arendt, human 
right theory does not account for the worldly, political conditions that make the 
enjoyment of rights possible.  In the second chapter, I argued that the 
contemporary shift to a political conception of justice does not address the 
problem that Arendt raised.  The issue is not primarily with the justification of 
rights themselves but their function as legitmizers of political authority.  In this 
chapter, I consider a possible liberal approach to the problem of rightlessness 
– the idea of a human right to political membership.   
 
The most common and straightforward understanding of Arendt’s idea of a 
‘right to have rights’ takes the form of the idea of a right to political 
membership.  This seems straightforward because Arendt identified the loss of 
human rights as being concurrent with the loss of a political community.  
Those who were cast out of the society of nations found themselves without 
any institution to guarantee their rights.  It seems natural to go from her 
negative claim – the absence of membership in a national state led to the loss 
of human rights, to the positive claim – the right to have rights is the right to 
membership in a political community.  Many thinkers have interpreted Arendt’s 
reflections on rights according to some form of this logic.  Frank Michelman 
claims that though ungroundable, Arendt’s formulation points to a right to 
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inclusion within a political system1.  Peg Birmingham takes it a step further, 
arguing that Arendt’s idea of a right to have rights amounts to an endorsement 
of a right to a very thick conception of membership and that this right is 
grounded in the human condition of natality2.  Seyla Benhabib puts the 
problem precisely in terms of the relationship between the positive right and 
the negative interdiction: “ Is there a human right to membership? I want to 
argue that there is and that this right is the obverse of the interdiction against 
denaturalization.”3 
 
The problem of membership is not unknown to liberal thinkers.  Many 
liberals have wrestled with the question of nationality and immigration which 
necessarily entail, to some degree, the question of the terms of inclusion in a 
liberal state.  Moreover, the Universal Declaration recognises the right to a 
nationality and the right to self-determination, though there is some question 
as to what this may mean.  Most liberal thought along these lines has turned 
on the questions of what kind of obligations we might have towards our co-
nationals and how those obligations may or may not differ from those we may 
have to non-nationals.   The right to membership moves beyond these 
questions by putting pressure on the distinction between national and non-
nationals.  The urgency of this question lies in the existence of a large number 
of people in the world who can be said to belong to no state.  This ranges from 
                                            
1 F. Michalman, 'Parsing 'A Right to Have Rights.' Constellations: An International Journal of 
Critical and Democratic Theory 3:2 (October 1996). p. 205 
2 P.Birmingham,. Hannah Arendt and Human Rights. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
2006). 
3 S. Benhabib,The Rights of Others. Aliens, Citizens and Residents,(Cambridge University 
Press, 2004).p. 128 
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the officially stateless Palestinians and Tibetans to all those living in refugee 
camps because they cannot return to their ‘national’ state of origin for fear of 
persecution. 
 
Given the potential misery of living under the condition of statelessness, it 
is certainly reasonable to argue that the right to membership ought to be 
included as one of the ‘basic rights’ that may be the condition for enjoying any 
other rights whatsoever.  Henry Shue’s argument that subsistence rights ought 
to be considered as basic did not deal directly with questions of membership 
but the logic of his approach applies just as easily to political membership.  
Arendt's reflections present a good case that no rights can be enjoyed unless 
one’s membership within a community is secure.  Shue argues that basic 
rights are those rights that cannot be denied without preventing the enjoyment 
of all other rights4.  Membership fits this condition at least as convincingly as 
subsistence rights.  To the extent that Justice implies compensation for the 
‘lottery of birth’ which grants some people comfortable lives and some lives of 
want based on the state into which one is born, there is a temptation to argue 
that it must address membership.  Surely there is nothing more arbitrary than 
the political society into which one is born.   
 
I will argue that if there are any basic rights, then we must understand 
the right to political membership as one of them. However, recognizing the 
importance of political membership has the effect of denying the logic at the 
                                            
4 H. Shue, Basic Rights, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980),,p. 19 
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heart of the claim to basic rights.  The distinction between member and non-
member is not something that can be determined a priori.  Though it cannot 
help but be arbitrary from a moral point of view, membership cannot be 
considered a matter of Justice or Rights.  Rights do rely on membership but 
membership relies on a much more complex set of political relations than can 
be guaranteed by rights. The arbitrariness of membership is an inherent in our 
political existence.  It is something that liberal-democratic theory must contend 
with without attempting to overcome. In short, the difficulties surrounding 
membership point to an irreducible boundedness in the enjoyment of rights.  
This prevents us from understanding human rights as the bedrock upon which 
our other rights are based.   In order to show this,  I will start by examining the 
logic of basic rights in order to show that political membership must be 
considered to be among them. Next I will consider the boundary paradox in 
democratic theory in order to highlight the similarities to the paradoxes of 
human rights raised by Arendt.   I will show that rights cannot provide the basis 
for their own political foundations and must refer to political structures outside 
of themselves to establish the criteria of membership necessary for their own 
existence.  Since membership is a requirement for having rights of any kind 
(even subsistence rights), it cannot be conferred by way of rights discourse.  
The only alternative is to recognize the central importance of membership 





3.1 The Logic of Basic Rights 
 
Henry Shue’s idea of Basic Rights was originally conceived as a 
counterpoint to the position, commonly associated with Maurice Cranston, that 
human rights could only be negative rights.  Cranston argued that the 
expansion of rights in the Universal Declaration to include ‘social rights’ was 
philosophically incoherent5 (Cranston 1983).  Shue makes the argument that 
certain social rights, specifically the right to the necessities of life, are 
necessary for the enjoyment of the negative rights that Cranston espoused.  
According to Shue, it is these ‘basic rights’ that should be accorded first 
priority in any morally just foreign policy. 
 
Basic rights… are everyone’s minimum reasonable demands 
upon the rest of humanity.  They are the rational basis for 
justified demands the denial of which no self-respecting person 
can reasonably be expected to accept.  Why should anything be 
so important?  The reason is that rights are basic in the sense 
used here only if the enjoyment of them is essential to the 
enjoyment of all other rights.  This is what is distinctive about a 
basic right.  When a right is genuinely basic, any attempt to enjoy 
any other right by sacrificing the basic right would be quite 
literally self-defeating, cutting the ground from beneath itself.6  
 
 
So if we believe that rights are important, Shue argues, then we must 
accept that certain basic rights, in this case, the right to personal security and 
to sustenance, must first be guaranteed because without these rights, none of 
the others could be reliably enjoyed.    The right to free speech is of little value 
                                            
5 M. Cranston, What are Human Rights?, (Bodley Head, London, 1973). 
6 H. Shue, op cit. p. 19 
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to an individual if that person is unable to procure enough food and water to 
stay alive.  Shue therefore cautions against a purely formal conception of 
rights that doesn't take into account the social and economic conditions of 
their enjoyment. 
 
A similar logic can be seen at play in Arendt’s description of a Right to 
have Rights.  Rights are important, but there are some things that are required 
for rights to be enjoyed. As Frank Michalman puts it, “The fundamental 
Arendtian right is the right of political inclusion...Why is the right to inclusion 
fundamental – ‘much more fundamental,’ indeed, than ‘freedom and justice?’  
Because from it flows the very possibility of having (further) rights.”7  Once one 
is stripped of membership within a political group, rights as they have 
traditionally been conceived are revealed as relying upon this status of 
belonging to a political community.  When this belonging has been called into 
question, all other rights cease to be reliable.  One may have freedom of 
movement, freedom of thought or freedom of expression, but these rights no 
longer have the proper context in which they can be exercised.  As a result, 
they are susceptible to being taken away at any time for any reason.  In short, 
the ‘ground has been cut beneath them,’ they have ceased to be rights at all. 
 
This is not say that Shue and Arendt are making the same claim.  Shue is 
making an argument about the nature of rights themselves.  For him, rights are 
                                            
7 F. Michalman, op cit. p. 205-206 
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a fundamental component to the dignified treatment of human beings.8  Arendt 
was concerned with the historical circumstance in which the rights of 
individuals were tied to a nation-state system that was breaking down under 
the onslaught of totalitarianism.  It is the difference between the negative 
assertion: that when certain claims are denied that all rights cease to be 
effective, and the positive assertion: that these claims must therefore make up 
the basis for a more fundamental set of rights.  
 
Basic rights establish a building block approach to political justification.  
There are fundamental human rights, to which every human being is entitled, 
at the base.  If a state is able to protect those rights, other deviations from 
liberal justice may be tolerated.  These are justifiable both on the grounds of 
practical applicability, liberal states can't go around remaking other states in 
their image without causing more damage than they might repair, and because 
it is consistent with the liberal value of toleration.  Just as liberal states tolerate 
different conceptions of the good life in their domestic conception of Justice, 
they need to be able to tolerate some plurality in the way communities 
organize their political systems.  The role of human rights in this approach is to 
set the limits to liberal toleration in the international system.  When basic 
human rights are violated a good case can be made for international 
intervention to protect the people at risk. 
 
The practical consequence of the idea of basic rights is that a more 
                                            
8 H. Shue, op. cit. p. 14 
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restricted list of fundamental rights that must be defended internationally while 
a more expansive set of rights apply within liberal states.  This approach can 
be seen in other liberal human rights thinkers such as John Rawls and Michael 
Ignatieff.  Rawls considers human rights as a special class of ‘urgent rights’ 
that define the limits of toleration within international politics.  Those states that 
violate human rights forfeit the right of non-interference in their affairs by 
‘decent’ states that respect human rights.9  Other liberal thinkers such as 
Charles Beitz and Joshua Cohen have developed more detailed approaches 
based on Rawls's thinking.  Ignatieff defends a ‘minimalist’ conception of rights 
on practical grounds, arguing that a more restricted list is easier to defend and 
has a better chance of achieving agreement from people coming from different 
cultures and political traditions.10  Both these thinkers establish a prioritisation 
of rights with basic human rights at the base and other rights resting on the 
support provided by them.  There may be dispute over which rights should be 
prioritised and why, but the structure is the same. 
 
For the most part, none of these thinkers can be said to explicitly include 
membership among the basic rights to which they believe everyone is entitled.  
However, it seems that most believe that once basic human rights are 
guaranteed, the recognition of political membership will already be 
guaranteed.  Their approach is to establish a certain set of rights using 
philosophical argumentation and then argue that these are the rights that 
should be defended internationally.  The political conditions under which they 
                                            
9 See J, Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1999) 
10 See M. Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ, 2001) 
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might be attained are not explicitly considered.  The suggestion is that if the 
current international system is not capable of supporting these basic rights, 
then efforts should be directed at reforming it until it does.  
 
3.2 Liberal Conceptions of a Right to Membership 
 
In an article entitled “Is Democracy a human right?”  Cohen argues that 
though the full set of rights accorded by a liberal democratic state should not 
be all understood as human rights.  However, in denying that democracy is 
itself a human right, he argues that political membership is.  Human rights, for 
Cohen, are “entitlements that serve to ensure the bases of membership.”11  In 
his view, they exist to ensure that human beings are treated as members by 
the communities to which they belong.  The set of rights required to ensure the 
bases of membership is greater than the minimalist version that Shue 
advances – personal security and basic subsistence – but they are less 
extensive than full rights to democracy which he sees as being roughly 
equivalent to justice as fairness in Rawls’ account.   
 
Like, Rawls and Ignatieff, Cohen understands human rights as a “proper 
subset”12 of the full political rights protected in just democratic states.  The 
idea behind human rights as a subset of the full set of rights required by 
                                            
11  J. Cohen 'Is there a Human Right to Democracy?' in C. Sypnowich ed.  The Egalitarian 
Conscience, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) p. 226. 
12 Ibid. p. 226. 
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democracy is that there is a distinction between the rights accorded by a fully 
just state and those rights that must be respected in order for a state to be 
regarded as legitimate.  To use Rawls’ language, human rights set the 
standards for ‘decency’, and, like Rawls and Charles Beitz13, respecting these 
rights is what gives the state its claim to non-interference in its internal affairs.  
In short, human rights set the limits of a state’s ‘right to do wrong’14 – its right 
to deviate from principles of democracy or liberal justice in the name of local 
cultural concerns.  “(T)he point is that a political society can, within limits, be 
unjust but beyond reproach.”15  
 
Cohen envisages such a ‘decent’ state to be one that generally treats its 
citizens well but may not be willing to grant full equality to all its citizens.  For 
instance, it might want to establish a state religion and reserve certain official 
posts or even full voting rights to members of that religion.  Cohen argues that 
such a state, though clearly unjust from a liberal point of view, might still be 
regarded as respecting human rights as long as it took the interests of 
minorities into consideration, respected their right to worship and allowed for 
public dissent.  He sees there being three elements to conception of human 
rights as a subset of liberal justice.  First, there is the idea of self-
determination.  A state must ensure that the interests of its people be taken 
into account in the governing of the state.  This requires that there be some 
consultation, that political decisions be made publicly and that there be a right 
                                            
13 See J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 80. 
14 H. Shue, “Limiting Sovereignty”, J. Welsh ed. Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) p. 12 
15 J. Cohen, op cit. p. 235 
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to dissent publicly.  Second, there is an idea of political obligation.  Liberal 
thought has long recognized that one might at times be obligated to follow an 
unjust law.  This has implications for human rights because “(s)urely it is 
impermissible for outsiders to forcibly intervene to change arrangements with 
which members themselves are obliged to comply.”16 Lastly, there is an idea 
of toleration, which allows for differences between the standards of justice to 
which liberal states hold themselves and those to which they hold other 
societies in order to accommodate different political traditions.  
 
Human rights therefore represent a lesser political standard that is not fully 
just, but is sufficiently concerned for all citizens that it would not be justified for 
liberal states to seek to alter its political makeup.  Significantly, Cohen 
recognizes that the list of things that are required in order to guarantee 
membership is rather extensive.  He emphasizes that his position is certainly 
not minimalist.17  Each of the elements discussed above mitigates against 
minimalism.  Cohen does not specifically speak of a human right to 
membership, but it is directly implied in his argument.  In denying a human 
right to democracy on the grounds that human rights do not require the full 
enjoyment of liberal democracy, Cohen is arguing that the lesser requirements 
that guarantee the bases of membership are indeed guaranteed by a theory of 
human rights.  In saying that there is not a human right to democracy because 
human rights represent a ‘proper subset’ of the rights guaranteed by 
democracy and that that ‘proper subset’ are those rights associated with a 
                                            
16 Ibid. p. 234 
17 Ibid p. 232-235 
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particular view of political membership, Cohen is arguing for a human right to 
political membership.  Cohen does not want to say that it isn’t possible to live a 
dignified life if one doesn’t live in a liberal democratic state.  But he does argue 
that it isn’t possible to live a dignified life in a state where one’s political 
membership is not recognized. 
 
Human Rights claims… identify goods that are socially important 
because they are requirements of membership.  Failing to give 
due consideration to the good of members by ensuring that 
access to these goods is tantamount to treating them as 
outsiders, persons whose good can simply be dismissed in 
making laws and policies: no-counts, with no part to play in the 
political society.18 
 
Cohen is wrestling with the issues of membership that Arendt raised in the 
terms Shue established in Basic Rights.  He tries to ground human rights on a 
basic human need to belong to a political community.  To be treated as a no-
count is more than a violation of Justice.  It is a violation of a principle of 
humanity that every state may be held to.  The terms of basic membership – 
the content of a human rights doctrine – may be up for debate within the forum 
of global public reason, but the idea that every state ought to treat its citizens 
as members is a matter of basic human rights.   Though Shue's concern is not 
for membership, he is similarly concerned that the denial of basic rights is an 
affront to human decency.  It is because people's fundamental needs are not 
seen as rights, in Shue's account, that they are no-counts.  “It is only because 
rights may lead to demands and not something weaker that having rights is 
tied as closely as it is to human dignity.”19 Indeed it is as a language through 
                                            
18 Ibid p. 238-239 
19 H. Shue, Basic Rights, p. 14. 
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which the least well-off be able to exert a demand upon the affluent that Basic 
Rights generates its moral force.   
 
3.3 The Problems with a Right to Membership 
 
The trouble this type of approach is that it derives the existence of a human 
right to political membership from the observation that the enjoyment of human 
rights depends on the recognition of membership claims within a state.  In 
Ignatieff's words, “we know from historical experience that when human 
beings have defensible rights – when their agency as individuals is protected 
and enhanced – they are less likely to be abused and oppressed.”20  The 
trouble is that equating human rights and membership is that it immediately 
raises without resolving the paradox that Arendt described:  an individual who 
is stripped of his/her political membership finds him/herself in a position of a 
'no-count', i.e. one who has no rights.  
 
The first indication that the idea of right to membership is too simple a 
solution to the problem is that this relationship only works in one direction.  
While it can certainly be said that in order to have rights one must be a 
member of a polity, it is clearly not true that in order to have political 
membership one must have rights.  There have existed many states and other 
political organisations that recognise membership without recognising rights.  
                                            
20 M. Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001) p. 4 
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Thus, though the logic of basic rights implies that if there are any basic rights, 
membership must be one of them, any attempt to conceive of such a right 
simply reinforces the paradoxes associated with human rights.  It ends up 
showing that political membership is more important to the enjoyment of rights 
than human rights can ever be to ensuring political membership.  Membership 
is the basis for rights, but rights do not exhaust the conditions that establish 
political membership.  As Arendt said, “Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called 
Rights of Man without losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity.  
Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity.”21 We can lose all our 
rights without losing our polity, but not the reverse.   
 
A further difficulty arises when we attempt to determine who is responsible 
for protecting basic rights in an international system with multiple sovereign 
states. In some of his work subsequent to Basic Rights, Henry Shue 
distinguished between primary duties and secondary duties to protect human 
rights.  The national state of origin would bear the primary responsibility to 
protect the rights of its citizens.  It is only when a state fails to do so (or 
indeed, is the one violating the rights of its citizens) that the responsibility falls 
to an institution outside the state, whether that be another state or an 
international organisation such as NATO or the UN.  Shue calls this secondary 
responsibility a default duty22.  A duty to assist when the primary agent is 
unable or unwilling to do so.  He attempts to establish the groundwork for 
 
                                            
21 OT p. 297 
22 H. Shue, “Limiting Sovereignty”, J. Welsh ed. Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) p. 16 
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a limited and carefully specified duty to contribute to the 
protection of a basic right, like the right not to be killed, for non-
compatriots would constitute one important piece of a sense that, 
besides national societies, there is also an international society 




What is interesting here is that seeing the protection of human rights as a 
default duty corresponds precisely to Arendt's paradox in that they exist as a 
supplement to the rights of citizens.  It accords civil rights practical priority over 
human rights.  The rights that are most fundamental are exactly the rights that 
are most fragile.  Shue is not unaware of the problem.  It is because of it that 
he begins by trying to defend the minimal position that a state's right to 
sovereign non-interference is limited by the individual right not to be killed.24  
In part, this is a concession to the world in which we live.  The nation-state 
continues to be a fundamental part of the international system and it makes 
sense that we design our humanitarian institutions with that in mind.  There 
are also good moral reasons.  Responsibility for everyone everywhere is too 
much for anyone to bear and requires, at the very least, some coordination.  
Moreover, state boundaries do correspond to certain shared histories, cultures 
etc. that may make the national state reasonably well-adapted to serving as a 
locus of political responsibility, at least in the first instance.  Shue is simply 
arguing that if there is to be an international society, there needs to be some 
recognition of a duty to prevent the slaughter of innocent human beings.  But 
the logic of Shue's argument restates the paradox almost precisely as Arendt 
constructs it: universal human rights (or basic rights)  which are theoretically 
primary (they are the condition of the enjoyment of further rights) set the 
                                            
23 Ibid. p. 27 
24 Ibid. p. 18 
89 
normative ground for an international system that organises rights on a 
particularist basis and themselves retreat to (at most) a supplementary role – a 
default protection which, historically, has been practically near-impossible to 
enact. 
 
3.4 The Boundary Problem 
 
The difficulties that liberal theory has in establishing the basis for a right to 
political membership point to a relationship between the paradox of human 
rights and what has been called the 'boundary problem'25 in democratic theory.   
As Frederick Whalen and others have pointed out,26 the boundaries of a 
democracy cannot be established democratically.  That is to say, in order to be 
able to make a democratic decision on who may be a member of the demos, 
one has to know who has a right to vote.  This produces an infinite regress.  
The ideal of democracy is that the people participate, in some form, in the 
important political decisions of the community.  Given the consequences of 
being either in or out, it is important that this fundamental decision be made in 
a manner consistent with democratic principles.  However, this is precisely 
what cannot be done. “Democracy is advanced by its advocates as the sole 
legitimate method for making political decisions... Boundaries comprise a 
problem, however, that is insoluble within the framework of democratic 
                                            
25 Robert Goodin refers to it as the problem of 'constituting the demos.' See R. Goodin, 
'Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, (35:1, 
2007), p. 40 
26 F. Whelan, '“Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem”, in Liberal Democracy, eds. J. 
Pennock and J. Chapman, (New York UP, 1983) 
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theory.”27 Democratic theorists tend to believe that political communities 
should be constituted in a manner consistent with democratic principles but it 
turns out that there must be a pre-existing political community before any 
democratic decision can be made.  
 
The boundary problem is a simpler and more basic than the one raised by 
Arendt.  In Robert Goodin's words, “Constituting the demos is the first step in 
constructing a democracy. That is true temporally. Until we have an electorate 
we cannot have an election. That is not just a temporal observation; it is a 
logical truth.”28  If we believe that it is necessary that the political entity be 
constituted in accordance with a democratic decision, this problem is 
unavoidable.   The problem of constituting the demos is a problem for 
democratic thinkers because of the central importance they attach to full 
participation.  The connection to the paradox of human rights comes from the 
fact that both try to derive the principle that governs inclusion in the system 
from the same principle that defines the terms to be included.  In this case, 
one can't decide the set of democratic decision makers by means of a 
democratic decision.  Similarly, one can't decide the set of rights holders on 
the basis of individual rights.   
 
Since liberal human rights theory is not primarily concerned with 
constituting a political space, there is no necessary circularity inherent in it.  It 
                                            
27 Ibid. p. 16 
28 R. Goodin, op. cit, p. 43 
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can, and often does, take the political entities as given and then simply 
attempts to establish the terms of cooperation between them. The boundary 
problem appears in human rights theory when we recognise that membership 
is required in order that rights might be exercised and then try to imagine how 
we might guarantee a right to membership.  Membership is a form of 
exclusion.  Members need to be distinguished from non-members.  “A 
boundary has two sides, and the inclusion of some means the exclusion of 
others, all of whom are, by this fact, affected by its existence.”29 Politics has 
exclusionary elements to it that can't be argued away by reference to universal 
rights.  The establishment of political boundaries is not something that can be 
dealt with in terms of human rights.  It is impossible to universalise a general 
right to exclude others.  
 
Once we recognise that there is a need for something like a basic human 
right to membership, we effectively import the boundary problem in democratic 
theory into the core of our conception of human rights.  Whelan argues that 
the boundary problem is particularly acute in democratic theory because we 
think that the most important decisions should be made according to our most 
fundamental principles, i.e. they should be made democratically.  But that is 
precisely what cannot happen. He suggests instead that we need to recognise 
that their may be arbitrary elements involved in the constitution of a political 
space and that “acknowledgment of this may have the beneficial effect of 
moderating the sometimes excessive claims that are made in its name.”30 
                                            
29 F. Whelan op. cit.p.22 
30 F. Whelan, op.cit. p.42 
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Like the idea of democracy for political theory, human rights have come to 
occupy a central position in liberal moral philosophy.  I would argue that the 
problems of a right to membership suggest a similar, unavoidable arbitrariness 
at the heart of human rights theory and that, following Whelan on democratic 
theory, we may need to moderate our expectations regarding what human 
rights can accomplish.   
 
3.5 Political Membership Without Human Rights 
 
While Cohen is correct to point to a connection between membership and 
rights, his account also falls victim to the temptation of generating a positive 
claim out of a negative one.  While it may be right to say that to be deprived of 
political membership put one in a situation of rightlessness, it is possible to be 
deprived of rights without being deprived of political membership.  In some 
sense, this is obvious. Rights are modern phenomena. They have a history, 
appearing in Western Europe in the 17th century likely as a response to the 
emerging capitalist system as well as the catastrophic religious wars of that 
period.  It goes without saying that political communities existed prior to that 
time.   These communities, however constituted, had norms governing 
membership – ways of counting and not-counting to use Cohen’s phrase – 
that had nothing to do with rights.  Membership is the basis for rights, but 
rights do not exhaust the conditions that establish political membership.  As 
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Arendt said, “Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without 
losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity.  Only the loss of a polity 
itself expels him from humanity.”31  We can lose all our rights without losing 
our polity, but not the reverse.   
 
To illustrate this, it is helpful to return to a distinction made in the first 
chapter between a violation and a denial of rights.  A violation of rights is an 
political act that contravenes any of the rights listed in the various declarations 
while a denial is an attempt to deprive an individual or, usually, a group of 
individuals of the political basis for making a claim.  The crackdown against 
student and opposition activists in Iran are examples of rights violations.  The 
political leadership does not  imprison and intimidate rivals because it does not 
recognize that the opposition is part of the political community, but because it 
wishes to remain in control of the state apparatus.  In this case rights can 
violated – up to and including the right to life – without political membership 
ever being questioned at all.  In the case of a state attempting to assassinate 
an opposition leader in exile, one can even say that the recognition of political 
membership is the basis for the violation of rights.  A denial of rights, by 
constrast, is the attempt to eliminate a claim to rights and the claim to 
membership that is tied up in that claim, by eliminating to potential carriers of 
those rights – through either genocide or ethnic cleansing. In this case, it is 
true that the non-recognition of rights and the non-recognition of political 
membership go hand-in-hand. 
                                            
31 OT p. 297 
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This is why refugees are central to Arendt’s concerns about human rights.  
Many of the possible remedies for rightlessness –such as asylum, work well 
for individual cases but break down when they have to deal with entire 
population groups.  The only solution we have managed to come up with to 
deal with large groups of people who have been driven out of their political 
community is refugee camps.  These camps attend to the basic needs of 
these people (or try to) without conferring political membership.  In Shue’s 
language, they provide basic needs without providing them as basic rights.  
The difference turns on the absence of any form of political membership.  The 
problem of refugee camps is that there existence is predicated on the denial of 
the political claims of the refugees.  Refugee camps are located in already 
existing states.   The host states are unlikely to allow them to continue if there 
is a chance that the mere presence of these camps is likely to crystalise into a 
durable political claim.  It isn’t so much that refugee camps don’t provide the 
bases for membership that are themselves the bases for rights.  It is rather 
that they can’t do so without jeopardizing the conditions of their own existence.   
Refugee camps are predicated on not allowing a world to form in-between the 
refugees (to use Arendt’s language) – that is, in keeping them in a state of 







The argument of this chapter has been that though membership is integral 
to any enjoyment of human rights, it cannot be a right itself.  As Arendt’s 
reflections on human rights showed, membership is the condition of having 
rights at all.  Cohen’s argument, that human rights are concerned with 
providing the bases for political membership, on the grounds that a right to 
guarantee membership can be required of states without violating a principle 
of international toleration is the closest that liberal theory can come to 
addressing the ‘right to have rights’ – the idea that membership is required in 
order for rights to be enjoyed at all.  Cohen argues that to deny human rights 
claims is tantamount to denying membership, but he has it the wrong way. It is 
the denial of membership that is tantamount to the denial of human rights.  
One can deny all kinds of human rights claims without denying membership.   
 
The question of political membership illustrates the difficulties that the 
building block approach to human rights inevitably encounters.  Liberal 
thinkers tend to think of rights as the starting point for legitimate politics.  
There are fundamental rights (security, sustenance or membership) upon 
which other rights are built (voting rights, education, etc).  Political society 
exists primarily to safeguard these rights.  This is the core of the Basic Rights 
approach that Shue advances, as well as those, such as Beitz and Cohen, 
who follow the Rawlsian tradition.  Human rights are those rights that everyone 
ought to have regardless of the community to which they belong.  Their 
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community may guarantee further rights, but human rights represent the 
minimum set that liberal states can demand of other states.  As a result, these 
basic human rights set the standards that govern a state's claim to 
noninterference - they set the boundaries within which states can operate 
legitimately, i.e. without threat of intervention.   
 
The disagreements between liberal thinkers turn on where to draw the line 
that tells us where the minimum lies.  Ignatieff draws the line at the standard 
set of ‘negative rights’, as does Rawls with his 'urgent rights'.32  Shue argues 
that the line should be drawn at personal security and sustenance.  For 
Cohen, the basic set of rights refer to those necessary to guarantee 
membership.  In making this point, he draws attention to the importance of 
membership to the enjoyment of other rights.  At the same time, by 
emphasising the more extensive (non-minimalist) conception of rights required 
to guarantee membership, Cohen points to the fundamental problem inherent 
in the basic rights approach – that rights require membership but that 
membership requires more than can be provided by rights. 
 
Political membership poses problems for the basic rights approach 
because, according to its own logic, it is clear that if there are any basic rights, 
the right to political membership must be among them.  However, it is just as 
immediately clear that political membership cannot fit within the building block 
model.  Political membership simply requires too much to be basic.  Moreover, 
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it can and often is expressed in ways other than rights. As I argued earlier, it 
was possible to be a member of a political community prior to the historical 
emergence of modern rights theory.  It is more accurate to say that political 
membership is enacted and recognised in numerous and various different 
ways in different communities. 
 
When liberal human rights theorists base political authority on human 
rights, they effectively import the boundary problem into human rights theory.  
A universalist conception of rights runs into difficulties justifying a particularist 
approach to political power and responsibility.  Given the modern (liberal-
democratic) tendency towards an individualist justification for political theory it 
is not surprising that this problem should repeatedly make appearances in the 
history of political thought from Rousseau to Rawls.  The upshot of this 
paradox is that, in practice, it is always resolved in one direction or the other.   
In international politics, which is primarily concerned security, it is resolved in 
favour of the state through the idea of sovereignty.  As citizens, we have the 
rights conferred upon us by the state to which we belong.  In moral theory, 
which is primarily concerned with justification, it is resolved in favour of 
universal rights.  We have the rights we have regardless of whether our 
nominal state of birth happens to recognise them.     
 
If we accept the notion that rights are based on political membership but 
that membership cannot be a right itself, we need to look into what is involved 
in producing this relationship between human beings and their political 
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communities.  For this it is helpful to revisit Arendt’s later, more developed 
conception of politics.  She understood all too well the complications involved 
in the relationship between human beings and their shared political world and 
its importance for the enjoyment of rights.  She described rightlessness as 
being cut off from our shared world.  It is therefore worth investigating what 
this idea of the ‘world’ meant to Arendt, in the hopes that it might shed some 
light on the conditions surrounding the enjoyment of human rights while 
avoiding the pitfalls of the building block approach of those who seek to finally 
identify our fundamental human rights upon which everything else should be 
based. 
 
As Arendt argued, it is refugees that serve to highlight the problem with 
both the idea of basic rights and with understanding membership as one of 
them.  The refugee can have all of his/her basic needs met, all of the things 
required in order for the enjoyment of rights, without actually having any rights.  
This would seem to support the argument that membership is a basic right 
(perhaps even the only one).  However it actually serves to highlight the extent 
to which rights are embedded within political structures and thereby makes it 
difficult to see how membership could be understood as a right. 
 
To sum up the argument of the dissertation thus far.   The paradoxes 
surrounding human rights cannot be avoided by stripping them of their 
metaphysical content as contemporary liberals attempt.  Human rights are 
indeed connected to political membership in that it is a condition of their 
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enjoyment.  As Arendt argued, political membership is the basis of the right to 
have rights.  But, though human rights are intimately connected to political 
membership, it does not make sense to imagine that the right to have rights 
can be expressed as a right to political membership.  It turns out that 
membership cannot be guaranteed by the rights that it authorizes.  It is not 
simply a matter of legal recognition.  It is embedded in a relationship between 
human beings and their shared world.  What this means is still not fully clear.  
We need a more detailed account of Hannah Arendt’s understanding of the 
world.  This will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4:  Arendt's Concept of 'World' 
 
Thus far, I have argued that human rights pose problems for both liberal 
theory and the practice of international morality that is ostensibly based upon 
it.  Hannah Arendt identified these problems as related to a paradoxical form 
of political organization – one in which the law was based on a sovereign 
conception of political power and where rights were based on an abstract 
conception of the Rights of Man rather than anchored in a relationship to a 
shared human world.  In the second chapter, I addressed the inadequacy of 
liberal theory to deal with the first aspect of this paradox – arguing that human 
rights need to be related to political organization and cannot be separated 
from their political function of legitimating state power.  Chapter 3 argued that 
liberal theory is unable to meet the challenge of the right to have rights 
because it is unable to coherently account for a ‘human right to membership’ - 
something which it must address, at a minimum, if it is to answer the challenge 
of a right to have rights.  If liberalism can’t account for the terms of 
membership that are the condition of the enjoyment of rights, then  it may be 
worthwhile to turn back to Arendt who raised this problem and identified the 
problem of rightlessness with the loss of a place in the world. 
 
Arendt’s concept of the world will be the subject of this chapter.  I will start 
by laying it out as Arendt does in the Human Condition.  I will then work back 
to the Origins of Totalitarianism with the idea that the world can eventually 
be connected to the problem of human rights as she discussed in that book.  
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There are at least two elements of Arendt's thought that intersect at the 
question of the 'world'.  The first, emphasised by Margaret Canovan, is a 
response to the more 'traditionally' political question of what to do about the 
threat of totalitarianism. For Canovan, Arendt's 'world' is the source of stability 
in human existence and is therefore our best defense against the threat of 
totalitarianism which Arendt views as sweeping away all durable human 
institutions in a kind of constant, frenzied motion. The second element is the 
more phenomenological side of Arendt's thought in which she views the world 
primarily as the horizon for meaning in human existence and human action as 
speech that illuminates our everyday existence.  Dana Villa emphasises this 
aspect of Arendt in his interpretation of her thought.1   He argues persuasively 
along these lines that Arendt's thought cannot be understood except in light of 
Heidegger’s distinction between authentic and inauthentic modes of being.   
 
Broadly speaking, like Canovan, I understand Arendt's work subsequent to 
the Origins of Totalitarianism as rooted in the problems posed by that book.   
“Not only is The Human Condition itself much more closely related to The 
Origins of Totalitarianism than it appears to be, but virtually the entire agenda 
of Arendt's political thought was set by her reflections on the political 
catastrophes of the mid-century.”2  Moreover, it is equally important to 
understand how this fits with Arendt's phenomenological influences.  Drawing 
on both Canovan and Villa, I will show how Arendt's concept of 'world' is 
                                            
1 See M. Canovan,  Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), D. Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995)   
2 M. Canovan,  op. cit, p. 7. 
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crucial to understanding how the more performative aspects of Arendt's 
thought, those laid out in the Human Condition and some of the essays in 
Between Past and Future, respond to the very practical and historical 
problems raised not just by totalitarianism itself, but by all of the elements that 
eventually “crystallised” into the phenomenon of totalitarianism.3  Given that 
Arendt was clearly responding to very practical political concerns in her 
examination of totalitarianism, it is important to keep in mind the question of 
the practical import of freedom as performance, of action as beginning and of 
human  plurality.  The importance of these agonistic elements of her thought 
becomes clearer when politics is understood as a form of care for our shared 
world.  Though Arendt did not fully elaborate her concept of the 'world' until the 
Human Condition, I will argue that it already had an important role in the 
Origins of Totalitarianism.  Moreover, it was directly related to the paradoxes 
surrounding human rights which she elaborated in that book.  In her words, 
“the fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all 
in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and 
actions effective.”4 
 
It is not yet fully clear what it was that was lost when the rightless lost their 
place in the world, but it is clear that it is of primary importance.  In Arendt’s 
understanding, the relationship between human beings and their shared world 
is the basis of politics. “Strictly speaking, politics is not so much about human 
beings as it is about the world that comes into being between them and 
                                            
3 H. Arendt, 'Reply to Eric Voegelin' in Essays in Understanding (New York, NY: Schocken 
Books 1994), p .405. 
4 OT p. 296 
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endures beyond them.”5  Rights are effects of this relationship.  She rejects 
the liberal priority of the individual, not in favour of a cultural community as 
with communitarianism, but in favour of the common world inhabited by a 
plurality of human beings. For Arendt, “the artificial public space shared by 
citizens of a republic does not have to be based on or coincide with any 
natural community of race, ethnicity or religion.”6  The fact that she believes 
that the political community is based on this relationship to an artificial world is 
what distinguishes her critique of liberalism from that of the communitarians.  
In Dana Villa’s words, “(w)hat needs strengthening, in her view, is not our 
sense of membership or a common moral vocabulary, but rather our 
commitment to the world.”7 
 
For her, plurality consists in the relationships of many differently positioned 
human beings to a shared world which they have built, but which has an 
existence independent of them.  Politics, and therefore rights, refer to 
something outside of and between individuals.  In this chapter, I will attempt to 
explain Arendt’s understanding of the world.  I will show its importance to 
understanding the right to have rights as well as its place in Arendt’s thought 
more generally. I will attempt to understand what it is that tethers human 
beings to their world such that they might be able to engage in political action 
with other human beings, and to enjoy political rights.   
 
                                            
5 H. Arendt, 'Introduction into Politics' in The Promise of Politics (New York, NY: Schocken 
Books, 2005), p. 175. 
6  M. Canovan, op. cit. p. 244. 
7  D. Villa, op. cit. p. 52 
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One point that unites many interpreters of the idea of a right to have rights 
is the idea that this implies a right to political participation. James Ingram 
brings several of Arendt's interpreters together to make the claim that the right 
to have rights amounts to a human “right to politics.”8 To put it more precisely,  
 
On this view, the politics of human rights is a creative, 
democratic politics of contestation, challenging particular 
exclusions and inequalities in the name of the open-ended 
principle of equal freedom, which acquires its particular contours 
only through this contestation.9 
 
 
The idea of right to politics has an immediate plausibility because it aligns 
with Arendt’s more familiar critique of liberalism as worldless and anti-political.  
Arendt was critical of liberalism on a number of levels.  In the Human 
Condition, she argued that the modern age has been marked by the rise of 
world-alienation – human beings, having lost the reassurance of belief in a 
religious authority were thrown back upon themselves.  Liberalism contributed 
to this both by putting the protection and maintenance of life at the centre of 
political concerns and by defining freedom as a kind of ‘freedom from 
politics’10 that is to say, by subsuming the demands of the public realm to the 
private lives of individuals.    Ingram is right to highlight the performative, 
contested and, most especially, public conception of freedom and politics that 
Arendt opposes to liberalism.  Understanding the right to have rights as a right 
to politics situates the problem of rightlessness squarely within the familiar 
Arendtian critique of liberalism.   
                                            
8 J. Ingram, 'Three Images of the Politics of Human Rights' in American Political Science 
Review (102: 4, Nov. 2008), p. 410 
9 ibid. p. 413. 
10 H. Arendt, On Revolution, (New York: Penguin Books, 1990) p. 280 
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However, I will be arguing in this chapter that the idea of a human rights to 
politics is, for Arendt, a contradiction in terms.  It is certainly the case that a 
global politics consistent with Arendt's thought would look something like what 
Ingram describes.  However, the right to have rights does not refer to global 
politics.  It refers to something much more basic than that.  It refers to a 
fundamental connection to a shared common world which makes political 
action possible.  For Arendt, having a connection to the world is the condition 
for having a political life at all.  To revisit the terminology of Giorgio Agamben, 
it is that connection, (rather than the sovereign decision as it is for Agamben) 
that marks the threshold between zoe (political life) and bios (natural life).  
 
An examination of Arendt's concept of 'world' reveals that it is at most as a 
possible condition for political action that we must understand rights.  Rights 
are the product of human artifice and their use occurs within that context, 
whether or not this it is in the performance of free political activity.  What 
matters is not what they are used for, but that they are used.  The connection 
to the human world is complex but it is a condition of political action rather 
than its product.  The right to have rights is therefore not a right to political 
action.  It is more like the ‘right’ to the conditions under which one might 
perform political action.  But the important point is that this cannot be 
understood as a matter of rights – they are simply too closely tied to 
sovereignty to function as a foundation for Arendtian politics.  Under certain 
conditions, rights may be part of a stable relationship between human beings 
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and the world such that political action can emerge. However, they are neither 
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for political action in Arendt’s sense.  
They are not sufficient because having rights does not mean that one will 
necessarily act politically. They are not necessary because political action can 
occur and has occurred under conditions in which rights were not secure or 
even recognised. 
 
This chapter argues that the primary connection to the world, that is the 
basis for the right to have rights, is instrumental and productive rather than 
linguistic or participatory.  On its face, this is a surprising and counter-intuitive 
claim, Arendt famously argued that politics was itself performative and had to 
be protected from both the biological compulsion of the life process (labour) 
and the instrumental reason inherent in man's activity as a working being, 
homo faber.  Nevertheless, I will argue that, for Arendt, politics requires a 
physical space to appear and it is that space that is the necessary condition 
for the practical enjoyment of rights in Arendt's thought.  This will be shown by 
following Dana Villa in examining the importance of Heidegger’s influence on 
Arendt's conception of the world.  I will then go back to the Origins of 
Totalitarianism to show that this instrumental conception of the world was 
operating in that book and that it is directly connected to her thoughts on the 
paradoxes of human rights.  Furthermore, it is this basic, instrumental 
conception of the world that is the basis for the narrative of world-alienation 
that Arendt describes more fully in the Human Condition.  Finally, I will look at 
how critiques of Arendt's understanding of human rights by Jacques Ranciere 
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as well as Agamben both miss the mark, precisely because they don't properly 
recognise the importance of the world to the problem of rightlessness. 
  
However, this interpretation of Arendt’s thoughts on rights is not 
unproblematic.  Arguing that the right to have rights is based on a connection 
to an artificial, human built world requires confronting one of the most troubling 
aspects of Arendt’s thought – her contention that those who had not built an 
artificial world for themselves were somehow not quite human.  Arendt takes 
the distinction between civilization and barbarism quite seriously and the line 
between the civilized and the barbarians is precisely the one between those 
who have built a world for themselves and those who have not.  This is both 
troublesome and problematic for an author who so eloquently defended the 
principle of common humanity.  The last section of this chapter will be a 
discussion of this problem and how the idea of our common humanity might be 
expressed without invoking human rights. 
 
4.1 The World 
 
Human beings, build, inhabit and act within a shared world.  This concept 
is central to Arendt’s thinking and influences every element of it.  In this 
section, I lay out how it fits together with the various aspects of Arendt’s 
thought. I will begin with a straightforward, uncritical explanation of this 
concept as it appears in the Human Condition in order to set up the 
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relationship between political action and the world that is the condition for 
human plurality.  Drawing on Dana Villa's work, I will show the importance of 
the productive relationship between human beings and the world that they 
build for themselves.  I will then retrace this relationship to see how it operates 
in the Origins of Totalitarianism. This will allow me to show, in subsequent 
sections, the importance of the world to the problems surrounding human 
rights that Arendt advances in the Origins. 
 
For Arendt, the world is the artificial home built by and lived in by human 
beings.  The World is distinguished from the Earth.  The latter is our natural 
home while the former is our artificial home.11  As such, the distinction 
between Earth and World parallels the more familiar distinction between 
Nature and Culture.  To the extent that we are natural beings, we exist on the 
Earth.  To the extent that we are artificial beings who construct a home for 
ourselves, we inhabit a World.  As our artificial home, the world depends on 
the work of human beings to build and maintain it.   
 
The world sets the terms for the core distinctions that characterise Arendt’s 
thought.  Notably, Arendt’s famous separation between public and private – 
which has generated so much attention among feminist interpretations and 
criticisms of her thought12 – exists within the world.  The private realm is the 
household – that part of the world in which we take care of the necessities of 
                                            
11 HC, p. 52 
12 For example, see H. Pitkin, 'Justice: On Relating Public to Private' in Political Theory, (9/3 
1981), p. 338 
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life.  This is separate from the public realm, the part of the world where we go 
to discuss and argue about our collective fate.   
 
(T)he term “public” signifies the world itself, in so far as it is 
common to all of us and distinguished for our privately owned 
place in it.  This world, however is not identical with the earth or 
with nature, as the limited space for the movement of men and 
the general condition of organic life.  It is related, rather, to the 
human artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to 
affairs which go on among those who inhabit the man-made 
world together.  To live together in the world means essentially 
that a world of things is between those who have it in common, 
as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, 




The private realm, where we take care of the biological part of our lives, 
appears as an artificial, worldly space.  Therefore, human beings, for Arendt, 
create an artificial world for themselves and then assign a space within it to 
deal with the part of them that remains ‘natural’ – the biological.  The private 
realm is therefore the place where human beings provide the sustenance for 
life, and where they reproduce.  But it is more than that. Arendt understands 
the private realm historically as literally a place in the world, i.e. one’s property. 
“Originally, property meant no more or less than to have one's location in a 
particular part of the world.”14  One’s property was the place which one could 
own and occupy as a shelter against the hazards of human existence and the 
publicity of our communal life.  As private, this is a hidden and obscure part of 
the world, as opposed to the brightness of the public realm.  The public realm 
is where we appear to each other through our actions.  It is there that we can 
                                            
13 HC, p. 52. 
14 HC, p. 61 
110 
confer meaning upon our collective existence.  In short, the world provides the 
framework for all aspects of our active life – the ‘vita activa’. 
 
The vita activa, human life in so far as it is actively engaged in 
doing something, is always rooted in a world of men and of man-
made things which it never leaves or altogether transcends.  
Things and men form the environment for each of man’s 
activities, which would be pointless without such location; yet this 
environment, the world into which we are born, would not exist 
without the human activity which produced it, as in the case of 
fabricated things; which takes care of it, as in the case of 
cultivated land; or which established it through organization, as 
in the case of the body politic.15 
 
 
The world therefore also provides the framework and the location for 
Arendt’s tripartite division of human activity: Labour, Work and Action.    
Labour, or our ‘metabolism with nature.’16  is a consequence of our existence 
as living beings.  It represents the production and consumption of that which is 
physically necessary to sustain the human world. However, in Arendt’s 
account, labour produces nothing durable and can be saved from its inherent 
futility only by work. Work, the development of human mastery of the natural 
world, is necessary to build a common artificial world.  The creation of artificial 
things out of nature – reification – is an exercise in productive activity – the 
calculation of means to achieve a given end.  The activity of work, though 
necessary, suffers from an inherent meaninglessness.  Instrumental rationality 
can tell you how to achieve a given end, but it can’t tell which ends are worth 
being pursued, nor can it prevent such an end, once achieved, from being 
                                            
15 HC, p. 22 
16 HC, p. 96 
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degraded into a means to yet another end.17   The meaningless that is 
inherent in the human condition of work can only be overcome through Action.   
 
As much as the world is a product of human artifice, it is simultaneously the 
condition for strictly ‘human’ existence.  To be human, for Arendt, is to be born 
and to live together with others in an artificial world of our own creation.    We 
do not choose the world into which we are born.  It precedes us and it will 
continue to exist after we are gone.  In a sense, it presents the only possibility 
for secular immortality.  Human beings cannot live forever, but they can 
construct and maintain a world that could theoretically continue to exist 
forever. 
 
This means that, like Heidegger before her, Arendt sees human beings as 
‘thrown’ into and dwelling within the world.  The horizon for our action as 
human beings is set by the world into which we are born.  It is the condition for 
our common, plural existence.  For Arendt, unlike Heidegger, this is a question 
that human beings have to contend with plurally rather than individually.  But 
both conceive of human action as fundamentally ungrounded.  Since the world 
is the place in which human beings dwell, human beings are themselves 
constituted by the world in which they live.  Just as for Heidegger, Dasein 
exists as being-in-the-world, for Arendt, human beings can only really be 
human within a world and the specific way in which they are human is 
constituted by their relationship to the world. 
                                            
17 HC, p. 229 
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When a plurality of human beings come together and form a public realm in 
a world where they are recognized as equals, the potential for freedom 
appears.  Freedom, for Arendt, is the ability to start anew – to bring a new 
chain of events into being by persuading one’s peers of the proper goals of 
their shared community.  Like Kant, Arendt’s idea of free human action must 
be insulated from elements that might determine it, such as the necessities of 
life or individual self-interest.  Unlike Kant, these elements of necessity are not 
located in the phenomenal as opposed to the noumenal realm but rather in the 
private realm.  For Arendt, heteronomy (as Kant would call it) is not an effect 
of the laws of nature that compel us as physical beings, but rather of the sheer 
compulsion produced by our needs as biological beings.  These biological 
forces contaminate the public realm when they are allowed to appear in it 
because human action in the service of our physical needs is not self-
generating.  It is a response to a biological imperative.   “Action, to be free, 
must be free from motive on one side, from its intended goal as a predictable 
effect on the other.”18  For Arendt, action, in its pure form, is a kind of free 
performance where the individual publicly attempt to persuade his/her peers of 




                                            
18 'What is Freedom,' p. 151 
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4.2 Heidegger, Plurality and the World of Work 
 
In Arendt and Heidegger, Dana Villa examines in detail the Heideggerian 
influences on Arendt's thought.  Three insights emerge from his considerations 
that can help us to understand the importance of the concept of 'world' is so 
that we may then understand what it means to be cut off from it.  The first is 
the importance of the Heideggerian influence on Arendt's 'world', most notably, 
that, in the first instance, interaction with the world is equipmental and 
productive.  The second is that the world in its equipmental aspect sets the 
conditions for the possibility of human action, which, for Arendt, is what 
confers meaning on human existence.  Relatedly, the world is a necessary 
condition for the plurality of human existence that allows for opinion to emerge 
in Arendt's thought.  It is only in relation to a common object – the world – that 
we are constituted as plural beings and that we develop separate perspectives 
and opinions about the world, owing to our different locations within it. Villa's 
intent is to show how Heidegger's thought was reappropriated and made 
'political' by Arendt, specifically in the Human Condition.  My concern is to 
show how Heidegger's concept of 'world' was already exerting an influence in 
the Origins of Totalitarianism in order to show its importance to 
understanding rightlessness and the right to have rights. 
 
Arendt specifically referred to Heidegger’s conception of the world in order 
to understand how to conceive of the way in which human beings relate to one 
another that avoids the philosophical pitfalls of  language, communication or 
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reason.  In a lecture given prior to the publication of the Human Condition, 
and therefore prior to her full elaboration of her concept of 'world', Arendt 
argued that to base political philosophy on language or communication (which 
she associates with the philosophy of Karl Jaspers) leaves one unable to 
account for the plurality of political experience.   
 
(I)t seems rather obvious that 'communication'... has its roots not 
the public political sphere, but in the personal encounter of the I 
and Thou.  This relationship of pure dialogue is closer to the 
original experience of thinking – the dialogue of one with oneself 
in solitude – than to any other.  By the same token, it contains 
less specifically political experience than almost any relationship 
in our average everyday lives. 
“It may be... that Heidegger’s concept of 'world,'... constitutes a 
step out of this difficulty.   At any rate, because Heidegger 
defines human existence as being-in-the-world, he insists on 
giving philosophic significance to structures of everyday life that 
are completely incomprehensible if man is not primarily 
understood as being together with others.19 
 
 
Arendt's reliance on Heidegger rather than Jaspers in this passage helps 
us to contextualise her use of the concept of world that is central to the 
Human Condition and, as I will show in the next section, is also important in 
the Origins of Totalitarianism.  Politics, for Arendt, is not constituted by 
communication because this too easily allows philosophy to reduce politics to 
a relationship between the human being and him/her self.  Human plurality 
and the world are mutually constitutive. “(M)en, no matter what they do, are 
always conditioned beings. Whatever enters the human world of its own 
accord or is drawn into it by human effort becomes part of the human 
                                            
19 H. Arendt, 'Concern With Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought,' in J. Kohn, 
ed. Essays in Understanding, (New York, Schoken Books, 1994), p. 443. 
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condition.”20 Arendt worries about basing political life on a form of 
understanding that is too easily reduced to one perspective.  It is for this 
reason that she eschews communication as the basis for political association 
and it is this point that distinguishes her approach most clearly from 
Habermas’s approach of generating agreement through rational discourse.  As 
Canovan argues, for Arendt, “(f)ree people do not share common convictions 
or a common will.”21 I will take up Arendt’s rejection of the will as a source of 
political obligation in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
Arendt argues that plurality can only be accounted for if the relationship 
between people is mediated by a shared world.  What is communicated 
between people is their different perspectives on the world which has inserted 
itself between them.   
 
The reality of the public realm relies on the simultaneous 
presence of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the 
common world presents itself and for which no common 
measurement or denominator can ever be devised.  For though 
the common world is the common meeting ground of all, those 
who are present have different locations in it, and the location of 
one can no more coincide with the location of another than the 
location of two objects.22  
 
These varying perspectives can never be reduced to a singular one in the 
way that she attributes to those approaches that base politics on 
communication.  Since Arendt levelled the same charge (of disparaging 
                                            
20 HC, p. 9 
21 M. Canovan, “A Case of Distorted Communication: A Note on Habermas and Arendt,” 
Political Theory,  (11:1, 1983), p 111  
22 HC, p 57. 
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human plurality) against Heidegger23, it is clear that Heidegger's thought had 
to be altered significantly to fit with Arendt's thought.  Villa argues that we 
need to understand Arendt as externalising and spatialising Heidegger's 
distinction between authentic and inauthentic modes of being.  Whereas 
overcoming our absorption in everyday concerns is an individual struggle for 
Heidegger, for Arendt, it is a collective, public and therefore plural effort.  For 
her, the world is both the context in which authentic political discussion takes 
place it is also that which is illuminated in authentic political speech.  “In 
Arendt’s view, it is the nature of opinion to express perspective.  Every opinion 
is relative to one’s position in the world, and as such it formulates in speech 
what dokei moi, what appears to me.”24 
 
But while the world is important in order to understand what it is that 
human beings speak about in their political action – it is the source of opinions 
– the Heideggerian influences allow us to see that our initial interaction with 
our shared world is not through speaking about it but is productive – in our 
building it and using it as equipment.  In Being and Time, Heidegger 
understands the primary relationship between human beings and their 
surroundings as one of 'circumspective concern'25 – that is, as a series of in-
order-to relationships which allow Dasein to accomplish its various projects.  
These relationships constitute the objects as the things that they are.  To 
repeat a well-known example, the hammer is only a hammer because it is part 
                                            
23 H. Arendt, 'What is Existential Philosophy?' in J. Kohn, ed. Essays in Understanding, (New 
York, Schoken Books, 1994), p. 176-182. 
24 D. Villa, op. cit., p. 94. 
25 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Mcquarrie and Edward Robinson.  (London: 
SCM Press, 1962), pp 98-106 
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of a larger set of objects and relations (nails, boards etc.) that together allow 
for the hammer to function as a hammer.  Objects only appear as abstract 
things (as 'present-at-hand') when there is a breakdown in the equipmental 
relations such that items cease to function as they should.  It is only when the 
hammer breaks that we become aware of it as a hammer.  This short 
description of the everyday world in Heidegger’s thought is important because 
it is this concept of the world that Arendt appropriates in her thought.  As Villa 
claims,“the ‘work world’ described by Heidegger, with its pervasive 
instrumentality and teleology (the for the sake of), clearly sets the pattern for 
Arendt’s description of the ‘world’ created and manipulated by homo faber.”26 
 
That instrumentality should be so important to Arendt's understanding of 
world and, as we shall see, to the enjoyment of rights, is somewhat surprising 
because we usually associate rights with politics and, for Arendt, politics 
relates to action, speech and opinion.  In fact, she is well-known for 
disconnecting politics from instrumentality, arguing that the confusion of 
politics with the pursuit of ends is one of the oldest and most dangerous 
philosophical prejudices.27  Nevertheless, the human connection to the world 
which provides the basis for rights is to be found as much in the world 
produced by human 'work'  as it is by the one illuminated by human speech or 
'action'.  It is less surprising when we consider that, for Arendt, action needs a 
space to appear, objects to discuss and a structure to endure through time. 
The world confers permanence and durability on our collective action, it is our 
                                            
26 D. Villa, op. cit. p. 122. 
27 HC. p. 220. 
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separate and many locations within the world that allows for the existence of 
differing opinions and it is the relationship between that permanent and 
durable world that allows human beings to be seen as equals.  For Heidegger, 
the world represents that into which Dasein is thrown and it is the 
everydayness of the world to which authentic Dasein must respond through 
resoluteness.  Villa argues that, for Arendt, a similar relationship of 
everydayness and transcendence is at play. 
 
This brings us to the possibility of transcending the world as 
Zeug, as equipment or use objects.  For Heidegger, an 
“immanent” transcendence of this “dimmed down” world hinges 
upon the breaking away from concernful absorption and the 
recovery of a higher mode of sight and activity, one undertaken 
for its own sake.  In Arendt, the possibility of transcendence is 
concertized through the entry into the public realm that, as 
“space of appearances,” provides the site for authentically 
disclosive action and speech.28 
 
The artificial world built by human work can only be saved from its inherent 
meaningless by human action.  The world is the condition of transcendence in 
at least two senses for Arendt.  It is both the context in which transcendence 
takes place and that which is to be transcended through action.  Moreover, 
since transcendence is always momentary and temporary for Arendt, its 




                                            
28 ibid. p. 138. 
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4.3 The World in the Origins of Totalitarianism 
 
Despite the fact that the concept of the 'world' is not outlined in detail in the 
Origins of Totalitarianism, it remains central to the arguments of that book. It 
appears frequently as the basis for stable political life - a basis that is swept 
away by totalitarianism as well as proto-totalitarian systems of rule, most 
notably imperialism. As Margaret Canovan agues, much of Arendt’s later 
thought can be understood as an attempt see how the world can best be 
protected from the world-destroying tendencies of totalitarianism.29  My 
argument in this chapter is that, despite that fact that the 'world' is not 
explained in detail in the Origins of Totalitarianism, understanding it in light 
of Heidegger's version of the same concept allows us to see it operating in 
important ways in that book.  Moreover, it allows us to understand its 
importance to the problem of rightlessness and therefore provides insight into 
the question of a right to have rights. 
 
As we have seen, Arendt's concept of 'world' was not fully articulated until 
after the Origins of Totalitarianism.  However, in the section on imperialism 
in that book, she already understood rightlessness as losing a connection to 
human artifice, but had not yet distinguished between work, the building of the 
world, and labour, the maintenance of life within it. “Regardless of the 
treatment, independent of liberties or oppression, justice or injustice, they (the 
rightless) have lost all those parts of the world and all those aspects of human 
                                            
29M. Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought. p. 201. 
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existence which are the result of our common labor, the outcome of human 
artifice.”30 This distinction, fundamental to her understanding of the world, 
arose after the Origins of Totalitarianism as she tried to understand how the 
Marxist tradition contributed to the emergence of totalitarianism.31 
 
Arendt provides several examples in the Origins of Totalitarianism that 
help us to understand exactly what it means for human beings to be cut off 
from the world.  Together, these examples show that the enjoyment of rights 
cannot, for Arendt, be understood as a natural feature of being human.  
Together, they make it clear that what is required for the enjoyment and 
recognition of rights is a connection to a shared human world.  First is the 
concept of superfluity – those elements of our collective life which have 
become disconnected from their useful functioning within society and therefore 
became both separated from and ultimately destructive of worldly 
relationships.  Second is the relationship between the Europeans and the 
native populations they encountered in the imperialist adventures. On one 
side, there is the aloofness of the imperial bureaucrat, who, though not 
motivated by selfish ends, still treated subject populations as though they did 
not belong to the same world.  On the other side of this relationship, the native 
African population whom the imperialist adventurers were unable or unwilling 
(Arendt is not clear here) to see as human, in part because, she claims, they 
had not built a human world for themselves.  Third is her description of 
institutionalised slavery, which she characterises as a crime against humanity 
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but not as a situation of rightlessness.    Put together, all these examples 
reinforce the claim that the right to have rights – the threshold between 
political life and biological life – between those who can claim to have the right 
to have rights and those who can't – is a relationship to a shared world which 
is  primarily instrumental or productive.    
 
Despite the fact that Arendt had not yet explicitly made the distinction 
between labour and work, some of the core elements of this distinction can be 
seen in Arendt's treatment of the question of nature and the human-built world.  
Most notably, the distinction is apparent in her idea of 'superfluity'.  Arendt 
applies the term 'superfluous' to a number of different things throughout the 
Origins of Totalitarianism.   Superfluity, for Arendt, represents a human 
production of uselessness.  In a sense, like rightlessness, it represents the 
reappearance of nature within civilization and as such, prefigures the social as 
the public appearance of those natural parts of human existence that ought to 
remain in private.  More importantly however, superfluity represents the 
distinction between the human and the biological and, furthermore, specifically 
relates this distinction to usefulness.  As we saw, worldliness for Arendt is 
intimately tied up in productive connections to the world.  Imperialism was 
particularly troublesome because, fuelled by superfluous men and superfluous 
wealth, it was a movement radically separated from the world of means and 
ends.  As such, its excesses went beyond oppression and exploitation and 
attained a greater level of cruelty and indifference to consequences than a 
simple relationship of oppression would likely produce. 
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The South African Gold Rush is described by Arendt as being the result of 
the “superfluity of men and capital” produced by capitalism.32  Gold is itself a 
superfluous form of wealth which “in its uselessness in industrial production it 
bears an ironical resemblance to the superfluous money that financed the 
digging of gold and to the superfluous men who did the digging.”33  She 
describes the South African Boers as 'superfluous' human beings who had 
renounced their connection to the world and, lacking the power to transform 
their environment “could discover no value higher than themselves” - a 
formulation that suggests the description in the Human Condition of the 
'social' tendency to organise political life around the maintenance of the life 
process.  Arendt characterised their willful refusal to settle into a space and 
build a world as a “regression” that prevented them from establishing a 
common world.34 
 
Another instance of worldlessness is the African population that was 
encountered by the European colonizers in the imperial age.  According to 
Arendt, they had not built an artificial human world for themselves and, for this 
reason, were not recognised as fully human by the Europeans who 
encountered them.    
 
What made them different from other human beings was not at 
all the color of their skin but the fact that they behaved like a part 
of nature, that they treated nature as their undisputed master, 
                                            
32 OT, p. 189. 
33 OT, p. 188. 
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that they had not created a human world, a human reality, and 
that therefore nature had remained in all its majesty, the only 
overwhelming reality – compared to which they appeared to be 
phantoms, unreal and ghostlike.  They were, as it were ‘natural’ 
human beings who lacked the specifically human character, the 
specifically human reality, so that when European men 
massacred them they somehow were not aware that they had 
committed murder.35 
 
This example is particularly striking for the question of rightlessness 
because not only had the African natives not built a world for themselves 
(according to Arendt) but the absence of that world was what made it possible 
not to see them as fully human.  It becomes clear from this example that, for 
Arendt, usefulness or productivity must be visible and apparent in order for 
human beings to be seen as human.   Heidegger's phenomenological 
influences are apparent here.  Utility in her sense refers to a visible connection 
to the world, rather than some underlying social function. 
 
The flip side of the worldlessness of the subject populations is the 
aloofness of the imperial bureaucrat.  That the native populations were 
mistreated by the superfluous dregs of Europe was not particular surprising.  
What was more alarming was the brutality inflicted by the imperial 
bureaucrats, who were characterized by Arendt as the made up of those 
elements of European society with the greatest integrity and sense of 
responsibility. 
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The imperial bureaucrat was cut off from the world in two senses. He was 
cut off from the political life of his home country – viewing the political 
resistance and legal restrictions to his administration as interference with his 
expertise. He was also cut off from the world of his ‘subjects’; scarcely 
inhabiting the same world as those who were affected by his decisions.  His 
complete disinterest in the people he managed meant that he did not even 
seek to exploit them.   
 
Integrity and aloofness were symbols for an absolute division of 
interests to the point where they are not even permitted to 
conflict.  In comparison, exploitation, oppression, or corruption 
look like safeguards of human dignity, because exploiter and 
exploited, oppressor and oppressed, corruptor and corrupted still 
live in the same world, still share the same goals, fight each 
other for the possession of the same things; and it is this tertium 
comparationis which aloofness destroys.36 
 
Looking at these examples, it is clear that being disconnected from the 
world, in the Origins of Totalitarianism means being cut off from the common 
human world either by being useless (superfluity), by not inhabiting a world 
that one has built oneself (the African peoples encountered by Europeans) or 
by not sharing similar interests with those with whom one lives (aloofness).  
What all these examples have in common is that they have to with the 
productive aspect of human existence.  Drawing on Heidegger's influence, we 
can see that superfluity is dangerous because it means being cut off from the 
separation from the sedimentation of human purposiveness that constitutes 
the world. For Arendt, 'living in the same world' meant sharing a common 
network of interests and goals – even if these were shared in a negative or 
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exploitative manner.  The importance of this insight is that the condition of not 
having the 'right to have rights' is, in the first instance, the absence of an 
instrumental rather than a purely discursive relationship to the world. 
 
4.4 The World as Threshold Between zoe and bios 
 
The importance of understanding the world as the threshold between 
biological life and political life to the question of human rights becomes clearer 
if one looks at a couple of the ways in which Arendt's thought on this question 
has been appropriated and criticised.  Giorgio Agamben, in Homo Sacer37, 
picks up Arendt's idea of rightlessness and identifies it with a problematic 
ancient Roman legal category which he argues is central to the Western 
political tradition.  For Agamben, drawing on Carl Schmitt, the distinction 
between zoe and bios is established by way of the sovereign decision.  For 
Agamben, the problem of rightlessness and sovereignty are inherently 
intertwined. Jacques Ranciere, in an article entitled, “Who is the Subject of the 
Rights of Man?”38 criticises both Agamben and Arendt on their construction of 
this problem.  In this section, I will argue that both Agamben and Ranciere 
mischaracterise Arendt's construction of the problem of rightlessness.  The 
difficulties with both these treatments of Arendt's thought is that neither 
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accounts for the importance of the world as the basis for the distinction 
between political and non-political life. 
 
Agamben revisits Arendt’s description of the death camps and relates them 
to the increasing management of the life process in the past 150 years of 
Western History.  He argues that this situation is the culmination of a logic 
embedded in the western conception of sovereignty which he traces back, 
through the Roman tradition to early Greek thought.  His argument is that the 
Western political tradition is based on an original inclusive exclusion of ‘bare 
life’ into the political community.  To summarise his argument briefly, the 
western tradition constitutes political life (the life of the citizen – bios) by 
excluding the biological life of human beings (zoe) from the polis.  Sovereignty 
represents the political boundary between these two forms of life.  Historically, 
the boundary has been represented by the figure of homo sacer – a Roman 
legal category that designates one who may be killed but not sacrificed – i.e. 
whose death does not constitute a crime.39  Drawing on Arendt and Michel 
Foucault, Agamben argues that in the modern era, the distinction between 
bios and zoe have become increasingly blurred.  This can be seen in the 
increased management of the life process described by Arendt and in the 
development of bio-power described by Foucault.  The upshot of Agamben’s 
argument is that the camp has become the paradigm of the western political 
tradition, that, as the state has increasingly managed populations according 
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bio-political logic, our political life has blurred with the biological, that, 
increasingly, we are all being treated as homo sacer. 
 
The difficulties posed by the distinction between man and citizen are at the 
heart of the human rights tradition and the paradoxes that led Arendt to talk 
about the right to have rights.  Agamben argues that the problems of 
international human rights derive from the inability to deal with the implications 
of the political relationship that produce the problems associated with homo 
sacer.  “A humanitarianism separated from politics cannot fail to reproduce the 
isolation of the sacred life at the basis of sovereignty, and the camp – which is 
to say, the pure space of exception – is the biopolitical paradigm that it cannot 
master.”40  
 
Despite Agamben's explicit references to Arendt, it is the Schmittian 
sovereign decision that marks the line between zoe and bios in his thought.  “It 
can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original 
activity of sovereign power.  In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the 
sovereign exception.”41  As we saw in chapter 1, Arendt's characterisation of 
sovereignty as anti-political means that Agamben diverges from her on this 
question.  Drawing on both Villa's reading of the Heideggerian influences on 
Arendt's conception of the world and Arendt's treatment of worldlessness and 
superfluity in the Origins of Totalitarianism I have endeavoured to show that it 
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is the world in its equipmental sense that marks the primary distinction 
between zoe and bios for Arendt.  In the Human Condition, this is clear in her 
use of the latin terms to describe human beings in their different activities.  As 
a worker – builder of the world – the human being is homo faber.  In labour, 
human beings are simply beings that maintain and reproduce the life of the 
species, ‘man’ is animal laborans.  The point is that, for Arendt, the threshold 
between zoe and bios is not the sovereign decision as Agamben argues, nor 
even is it  the unreliable, contingent and heroic appearance of political action.  
Rather, that threshold is the physical, objective home that human beings 
construct for themselves.  As Dana Villa argues,  
 
For Arendt, the worldliness of human existence first becomes 
manifest in the activity of work – man as animal laborans being a 
specifically worldless creature... 
If labor… is predisclosive, the same cannot be said of work.  
According to Arendt, it is precisely the activity of work that gives 
us a world, an artificial, durable 'home' that removes us 
somewhat from the immediacy of the natural and destructive 
cycle of production and consumption.  This world, the world of 
homo faber, is a more or less stable structure whose being 
consists in its reified quality and whose meaning is circumscribed 
in terms of instrumentality.42 
 
For Arendt, the threshold between zoe and bios is established by a 
connection to a shared world of objects.  Agamben's construction of the 
problem of rightlessness is helpful because it highlights the close connection 
between rights and sovereignty.  The problem with conceiving of rights in the 
liberal fashion is that they either tilt towards sovereignty – by positing 
individual will and sovereignty against one another (the collective versus the 
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individual right to do wrong) or they separate the human being from political 
life altogether, by considering him/her only as a life separated from politics 
(bare life).  Maintaining a proper relationship to a shared, artificial world offers 
the possibility of escaping that paradox.  Moreover, the connection between 
rights and sovereignty is the reason why is does not make sense to speak of 
an Arendtian 'right to politics'.  The practical importance of action and speech 
(Arendtian politics) to rights is not to establish the distinction between zoe and 
bios but rather to prevent political power from falling under the dictates of the 
sovereign will. It is because of the importance of the world that Arendt can 
simultaneously repudiate sovereignty and emphasise the importance of limited 
political communities – that she can reject both sovereignty and 
cosmopolitanism. 
 
The importance of the world to the question of rightlessness is further 
illustrated in Jacques Ranciere's critique of Arendt's concept in his article 
“Who is the subject of the Rights of Man”.  Ranciere takes the worldly 
relegation of the biological aspects of human life to the private sphere to be 
the source of the problem of rightlessness.  He then claims that Arendt's 
characterisation of the 'Rights of Man' as the “rights of those who have no 
rights” is a “deceptive trick”43  because she fails to see how the language of 
human rights may be used by those who have been denied rights in being 
relegated to the private sphere.  He offers up the language of human rights as 
a means of producing a 'dissensus' - a rupture in 'common sense' that could 
be used by disadvantaged groups that had been denied rights.  He gives the 
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example of Olympe de Gouge during the French Revolution who articulated 
her claim to political participation in terms of the Rights of Man (“if women are 
entitled to go to the scaffold, they are entitled to go to the assembly”) despite 
the fact that these claims could not be heard within then prevailing 
understandings of human rights.44    
 
Ranciere's reading of Arendt's account of rightlessness as relegation to the 
private realm45 turns precisely on his missing the importance of the world to 
the 'right to have rights'.  As we saw earlier, the division between public and 
private, for Arendt, takes place within the artificial world.  The private is already 
a part of the world.  Relegating certain classes of people (women, slaves) is 
certainly oppressive, but the point of Arendt's critique is that rightlessness is 
not the same as oppression.  “Their (the rightless) plight is not that they are 
not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they are 
oppressed but that nobody wants even to oppress them.”46  The very act of 
making that claim constitutes political action is Arendt's sense.  The rightless, 
who belong to neither the public nor the private realm (because separated 
from the world), are unable to make this claim at all.  Arendt's discussion of 
slavery highlights this point quite well.  Though oppressed, slaves were not 
worldless in Arendt's account.  This is not to minimise the crime of slavery.  
Saying that slavery is not the same as rightlessness is not meant to justify or 
mitigate the institution of slavery but to make a distinction – a distinction which 
makes clear that the right to have rights is not really a matter of rights at all. 
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“Slavery's crime against humanity did not begin one people 
defeated and enslaved its enemies... but when slavery became 
an institution in which some men were 'born' free and others 
slaves, when it was forgotten that it was man who had deprived 
his fellow-men of freedom, and when the sanction for the crime 
was attributed to nature.  Yet in light of recent events it is 
possible to say that even slaves still belonged to some sort of 
human community; their labor was needed, used, and exploited, 
and this kept them within the pale of humanity.  To be a slave 
was after all to have a distinctive character, a place in society – 
more than the abstract nakedness of being human and nothing 
but human.”47  
 
Ranciere never acknowledges the problem as Arendt sees it and thus 
never gets at what she means when she says that the rightless are beyond 
'the pale of humanity.’  This is a difficult and troubling argument.  In the last 
section, I will look at the difficulties that emerge when we begin to consider 
human beings that are not 'fully human' because they do not seem to have a 
connection to a world that they have built for themselves.  This leads to some 
of the more problematic of Arendt's arguments.  But it may be that the problem 
itself is unavoidable.  It may be that what makes politics so important is that it 
is the place where the question of membership can be dealt with publicly.  It 
suggests that dealing with this question is our most fundamental political 
responsibility and that arguing it away by stating that everyone has basic 
human rights constitutes an avoidance of the very real question of what 




                                            




Understanding Arendt's concept of 'world' as it relates to human rights is 
important for a number of reasons.  First, it highlights the instrumental aspects 
of her understanding of politics and the world and thereby mitigates against 
the tendency to see Arendt as dismissing the world of work as only an aspect 
of a larger critique of the domination of instrumental reason in the modern 
political thought since Machiavelli.  Rather obviously, it highlights the 
importance of the world to her story of emergence of world-alienation. Her 
emphasis on politics as performance has led many to see her as having little 
good to say about representative liberal-democracy.  While there is much to 
this critique, the importance of the world both to protecting against the worst 
forms of human organisation and also to understanding how institutional 
protection for human beings comes about, suggest a more profound 
engagement with politics as it is practiced rather than a philosophical critique 
of modern political thought.  Given Arendt's clear desire to engage with 
actually existing politics, this seems to be a productive way to approach her 
thought.   
 
Second, it allows us to see the enjoyment of rights as dependent on a 
reality outside of and between human beings.  It is a characteristic of liberal 
rights theory to put human beings at the centre of politics.  The importance of 
understanding rights in the way suggested by Arendt's thought is that we can 
see that it is the relationship between human beings and the world they inhabit 
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that is of primary importance.  Arendt, drawing to some degree on Burke, 
shows the importance of communal life and our shared institutions to the 
existence of rights.  While she rejects the anti-egalitarian elements of Burke's 
thought, she recognises the importance of a stable set of institutions and 
traditions to the enjoyment of rights.  She also recognised that human rights, 
separated from a durable, shared world, were, in Ranciere's words, the 'rights 
of those who had no rights'.   
 
The important thing to understand from the perspective of international 
morality is that rights need to be seen as demonstrating an instrumental 
connection to the world.  Rights are institutional creations that can endure, can 
be used without being consumed and are used as equipment in order to 
advance ends.  To be sure, they can also be used to advance political goals. 
But in this they are no different from the agora or a parliament building.  
Clearly, rights can be used in purely instrumental fashion as when I enforce a 
property claim in a commercial transaction (right to property).  They can also 
be used in political action as when I run for office or protest against an unjust 
war.  The point is that a right is an institutional object that exists as a part of an 
equipmental relationship (what Heidegger would call a 'functionality 
contexture').  It is either used or it is not.  One may make the political claim 
that everyone ought to live in a society where one’s rights are respected.  
Though Arendt would doubtless have endorsed such a principle, it does not 
constitute the grounding of a ‘right to have rights’.   Since they are but one 
possible way of demonstrating a connection human beings to the world, rights 
cannot be understood as necessary or sufficient conditions for political action.  
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To view them as more than that, to view them as a foundation for politics, is to 
immediately encounter the paradoxes and problems associated with 
sovereignty. 
 
It is the argument of this thesis that we must take the human rights 
skepticism Arendt laid out in the Origins of Totalitarianism as consistent with 
Arendt's thought more generally and that she identified some fundamental 
problems with basing politics on rights.  The question at this point is what is 
left of human rights politics if we take this skepticism seriously.  It remains to 
be seen how it might be possible to express the idea of humanity in 
international politics without invoking human rights.  Ingram,   Birmingham and 
those who identify the right to have rights with some form of an internationally 
recognised right to politics are certainly right that Arendt took the ideal of 
humanity seriously.  When Arendt describes the Dreyfus Affair in the Origins 
of Totalitarianism, Clemenceau is the hero because he claimed that the 
rights of all Frenchmen were under threat by the anti-dreyfusards.  But he is 
the hero because his actions were inspired by the principle of humanity and 
embedded within the context of the French nation-state (his “struggle for 
justice as the foundation of the state”48) not because he correctly articulated a 
theory of human rights.   
 
If rights are entrenched in a political system through laws, if they are  
human artefacts – things – then the connection between the individual and the 
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collectivity, to the extent that it relates to rights, consists in their use as 
equipment.  One only has rights to the extent that one uses them.  As such 
they must be understood as institutional tools, not as features of the self.  It is 
not, as most contemporary human rights thinkers would have it, that human 
beings have universal rights which are then either respected or not by the 
political community in which they live.  It is rather the reverse.  Citizens 
exercise rights and it is only to the extent that one may make the claim that 
everyone ought to have these rights that one can be said to be advancing 
human rights.  The important point is that this assertion – that everyone ought 
to have the rights of Americans or Brits or whichever constitution one takes as 
example – is not a philosophical point but rather a political claim – a particular 
version of the idea of humanity – that we are all part of the same world and 
that we therefore bear a common responsibility for it and, through it, for each 
other.  This is how Arendt understood the Declaration of Independence. 
 
What they (the American Revolutionaries) were saying and 
proclaiming was in fact that those rights which up until now had 
been enjoyed only by Englishmen should be enjoyed in the 
future by all men – in other words, all men should live under 
constitutional, 'limited' government.49 
 
One can look at the Declaration of Independence and see in it the ideal of 
a society of equals (with some historically specific shortcomings) and that of 
limited government – an example that might be applied in a different form in 
other contexts as well.  But, this is not the way international relations scholars 
and many contemporary human rights thinkers see them operating.  As we 
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saw in chapter 2, they see them as a set of standards which delimit a state’s 
claim to non-interference in its internal affairs.   
 
There is clearly a potential tension at play when we try to connect the idea 
of humanity with the concept of the world.  The world in Arendt's sense in 
inseparable from ideas of civilization and its mirror image – barbarism.  The 
worst elements of this connection are visible in Arendt's apparent excusing of 
those who treated the African populations as non-human.  That Arendt did not 
believe that these populations had built up a human world for themselves is 
made even more clear in her condemnation of the mistreatment of Indian and 
Chinese subjects by imperialist governments. 
 
The difference (between the domination of Africans and the 
domination of Chinese and Indian subjects) was only that there 
could be no excuse and no humanly comprehensible reason for 
treating Indians and Chinese as though they were not human 
beings.  In a certain sense, it is only here that the real crime 
began, because here everyone ought to have known what he 
was doing.50 
 
It is hard to know how much work the phrase 'in a certain sense' is doing here 
to mitigate Arendt's justification of European imperialists' crimes against 
African peoples, but one can't miss the dark side of Arendt's 'idea of humanity' 
in that construction.  If a relationship to a human world that one builds and 
maintains is the necessary condition for being considered human – that is, if 
having relationship to a shared world is the barrier between bios and zoe – 
then how do we think about those people who do not seem to have that 
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relationship?  Arendt explicitly regards the problem of rightlessness as a 
situation of barbarism, though in this case it is a barbarism produced by 
civilization. “The danger is that a global, universally interrelated civilization 
may produce barbarians from its own midst by forcing millions of people into 
conditions which, despite all appearances, are the conditions of savages.”51 
 
The point of the argument thus far is that it is beyond the capacity of 
human rights discourse to guarantee that everyone will be regarded as 'fully' 
human – that this is an inescapably political problem.  Recognising it as such 
does not guarantee that no one will ever again be cast out of the 'pale of 
humanity'.  But understanding it as a political problem in the way Arendt 
describes offer some original ways of thinking about the problem.  First, 
viewing the transition from zoe to bios as emerging out of an instrumental 
relationship with the world suggests that Agamben's purely legal construction 
of the problem is incomplete. Arendt offers us the hope that the relationship 
between political life and 'mere life' is not necessarily destructive as Agamben 
suggests.  Since the emergence of political life comes out of a connection to 
an artificial world, Arendt suggests that it can emerge on its own if it is given 
the chance. “(E)very political structure, new or old, left to itself develops 
stabilizing forces which stand in the way constant transformation and 
expansion.”52 This means that if, as Agamben suggests, current humanitarian 
efforts are only capable of dealing with life in its bare form, then perhaps that 
problem lies in the humanitarian approach and is not inseparable from the 
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Western political tradition.  Arendt's thought suggests that the goal ought to be 
to rebuilding political and legal institutions for refugees.  That this is difficult 
and problematic is a result of the way in which rights and legitimacy are 
constructed in contemporary international politics.  However, it does pose 
rightlessness as a practical problem and not a consequence of an ‘original sin’ 
of western politics.  If relationships between people and their world can be 
rebuilt, then rights can be restored or established.  Despite my claim that this 
form of politics is not best expressed as 'human rights', it is clear that much of 
this is already being performed by both governmental and non-governmental 
organizations under the rubric of human rights. 
 
In this chapter I investigated Arendt's concept of the shared human world 
in order to show that it is, in the first instance, connected to an instrumental 
relationship to the physical world of things that human beings build for 
themselves.  This is important because Arendt understands rights as a part of 
this artificial world and because it shows that the problem of human rights is 
not a matter of coming up with the proper list of human rights which ought to 
be protected but rather of establishing the conditions which allow human 
beings to have an active relationship to the world they inhabit.  It suggests that 
human rights language may not always be the best way to create the 
conditions for human beings to have the 'right to have rights'. 
 
In the next chapter, I will look at the political consequences of viewing 
rights in the way that I argue Arendt's 'right to have rights' implied.  More 
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specifically, I will look at the consequences of basing rights on a relationship to 
an entity – the world – which has a moral content that is more than the sum of 
the individual claims of its inhabitants. I will look at the concept of collective 
responsibility in Arendt's thought to begin to get at the relationship between 
citizens and the political world that they share.  
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Chapter 5:  Collective Responsibility 
 
I argued last chapter that, for Arendt, the relationship between human 
beings and their shared world is, in an important way, based on a productive 
connection to human artifice.  This was a counter-intuitive claim because 
Arendt herself identifies politics with non-instrumental, performative action.  
Just as Kant identified the moral with non-instrumental action (action derived 
from a categorical rather than a hypothetical imperative), Arendt identified 
authentic political action with non-purposive activity “Action, to be free, must 
be free from motive on one side, from its intended goal as a predictable effect 
on the other.”1  However, even though the right to have rights is, to a greater 
extent than is usually acknowledged, a matter of having a connection to a 
shared world of our own making, this isn't the whole story.  The world is made 
up of both an objective component built by human beings in their work and a 
subjective component that is generated by being talked about – the world is 
both the object of human discourse and the product of that discourse.  
 
I have also argued that the paradoxes of human rights emerge because of 
their connection to sovereignty.  This provides another connection to Arendt's 
thought since, for her, human rights and sovereignty can both be understood 
as a manifestation of the will in politics.  She regarded both individual and 
collective sovereignty as incompatible with human freedom because they both 
sought to eliminate the indeterminacy that she saw as inseparable from 
                                            
1 H. Arendt, 'What is Freedom,' in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political 
Thought (New York, Penguin Books, 1993), p. 151  
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freedom.  In short, sovereignty, based on a politics of the will, is incompatible 
with the plurality inherent in Arendt’s conception of the world.  If we are to 
understand the problem of rightlessness in Arendt's, we must therefore 
understand how she conceived of a proper relationship between human 
beings and the world – that is to say, a relationship that is consistent with 
human plurality.    
 
In this chapter I will discuss Arendt's conception of political responsibility as 
a relationship between human beings and their shared world that is consistent 
with the plurality necessary for politics to appear.   Moreover, I will show how 
this responsibility is crucial to having a place in the world and therefore to 
having the right to have rights. Arendt herself makes the connection explicit. 
 
(T)he twentieth century has created a category of men who were 
truly outcasts, belonging to no internationally recognizable 
community whatever, the refugees and the stateless people, who 
indeed cannot be held politically responsible for anything.  
Politically, regardless of their group or individual character, they 
are the absolutely innocent ones; and it is precisely this absolute 
innocence that condemns them to a position outside, as it were, 
of mankind as a whole...  Actually, they are the only totally 
nonresponsible people; and while we usually think of 
responsibility, especially collective responsibility, as  a burden 
and even as a kind of punishment, I think it can be shown that 
the price paid for collective non-responsibility is considerably 
higher.2 
 
                                            
2 'Collective Responsibility', Responsibility and Judgment, ed. J. Kohn. (New York, NY: 
Schocken Books, 2003) p. 150 
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For Arendt, not being responsible is a sign of not being part of the world.  It 
is therefore related to the problem of rightlessness.  Against Peg Birmingham, 
who argues that an Arendtian conception of human rights is anchored in her 
idea of common responsibility for the entire world3, I argue that rights are 
related to Arendt's idea of collective responsibility, which is itself related to the 
specific limited political spaces to which we belong.  
 
To understand what this means requires a closer look at Arendt's concept 
of responsibility and how it relates to the question of human rights.  I will argue 
that a better understanding of political responsibility further demonstrates the 
importance of the world to the enjoyment of rights and the incompatibility of 
liberal human rights discourse with Arendt’s understanding of politics.  Political 
or collective responsibility (Arendt uses the terms interchangeably) is derived 
from political actors' relationship to the world.4   It is an acknowledgement of 
the demands that our collective life makes upon us – whether we like it our 
not.  “(W)e are always held responsible for the sins of our fathers as we reap 
the rewards of their merits.”5  When a person acts politically, he or she acts 
within the context of his/her responsibility for his/her shared world.  As 
Patchen Markell has argued, though Arendt emphasizes action as initiating a 
new beginning, it does not come from nowhere.  Rather, Arendt’s concept of 
action is best understood as responding to events arising within the world.6  
                                            
3 P. Birmingham,. Hannah Arendt and Human Rights. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
2006) 
4 'Collective Responsibility' p. 151 
5 Ibid. p. 150 
6 P. Markell, "The Rule of the People: Arendt, Archê, and Democracy." The American Political 
Science Review 100, no. 1 (February 2006): 1-14 
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Following that thought, I would argue that responsibility, for Arendt, is not the 
passive reception of the burdens of collective life but rather an active 
assumption of those burdens.   
 
Arendt does not attribute political obligation to a consequence of individual 
choice or consent, be it actual or tacit. By contrast, liberalism places consent 
at the centre of the political relationship between the citizen and the state.  The 
state derives its power and legitimacy from the consent of the individuals that 
make up the state. For Arendt, the relationship is more complicated, stemming 
from the relationship between people and their shared world. 
 
The immediate consequence of understanding rights as relying on a 
connection to a shared world is that the world acquires a moral content that is 
distinct from the claims of the human beings who belong to it.  As such, it 
establishes the basis for political as opposed to individual claims.  The liberal 
tradition, on the other hand, views human rights as the basis of international 
morality.  Arendt's approach challenges this in two ways.  First, it distinguishes 
between individual morality and political concerns.  “In the centre of moral 
considerations of human conduct stands the self; in the centre of political 
considerations of conduct stands the world.”7  Second, as I have argued, to 
the extent that Arendt is concerned with rights, she sees them as related to the 
latter rather than the former.  Thus, for Arendt, it isn't that rights aren't 
important, but she doesn't see them as foundational.  They are, as I argued 
                                            
7 Ibid. p. 153 
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last chapter, a possible effect of a relationship between human beings and 
their shared world.  However, while Arendt's conception of the world points to 
a political claim that stands outside individuals, it is also not a form of 
subjection to the sovereign or collective will, as Seyla Benhabib claims.8  
Arendt espouses a limited conception of politics while attempting to stay clear 
of the anti-political (i.e. plurality-denying) structure of command and obedience 
that she identifies with sovereignty.  Arendt's thought is an attempt to allow an 
individual to exist as a part of a world that is shared with others. If a shared 
world is important to Arendt’s thoughts on rights, we must understand it in its 
worldliness (as I did last chapter) and in its sharedness.  Collective 
responsibility points to the manner in which a world is shared between a 
plurality of persons.  
 
In order to do this, I will outline the difference between personal and 
collective responsibility in Arendt's thought.  I will then discuss the idea of 
common responsibility as Birmingham advances it as an Arendtian ground for 
human rights.  I will argue that rights cannot be anchored in common 
responsibility but are rather a product of the relationship between human 
beings and their world which is best characterised by Arendt's idea of 
collective responsibility. I will contrast Arendt's idea of political obligation with 
the idea of liberal consent in order to illustrate the difference between an 
Arendtian approach to obligation.  The difficulty with the liberal conception of 
obligation is that it is rooted in a relationship of command and obedience that 
                                            
8 S. Benhabib, The Rights of Others. Aliens, Citizens and Residents, (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p. 131. 
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is associated with the human will.  Arendt's concept of obligation is far more 
complicated.  In fact, it is because we are responsible beings that we can 
make meaningful promises.  Our relationship to the world is the basis of the 
practice of promising which is so important to Arendt's conception of action. 
 
5.1 Responsibility in Arendt's Thought 
 
Like the world, the concept of responsibility has been an important part of 
Arendt's thought since the Origins of Totalitarianism. Already in that book, she 
regards it as a sign of a visible relationship with the world.  Its persistence 
throughout her work is further testimony to the importance of the world in the 
Origins of Totalitarianism that I argued last chapter.  In that book, responsibility 
appears in two forms:  first, it appears in opposition to her concept of 
superfluity discussed last chapter – those who could demonstrate a 
responsibility for actions occurring in the world, even negative ones, were 
more difficult to treat as superfluous, that is, to be treated as rightless. Second, 
it appears as the negative response to the growing realisation that humanity 
had become “an inescapable fact.”9  The technological unification of the planet 
was such that everyone had to accept the fact that we are all ultimately 
responsible for everything that happens on the world that we share.  Arendt 
argued that the emergence of racial doctrines at the end of the 19th century 
was an attempt to retreat from this responsibility which many could not bear.  
                                            
9 OT p. 298. 
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“Tribalism and racism are the very realistic, if very destructive, ways of 
escaping this predicament of common responsibility.”10  
 
In the Human Condition, the idea of responsibility reappears in the idea of 
‘irreversibility’ and the human capacity for promising and forgiveness.  Human 
action occurs within the web of human relationships and, as such, the 
consequences of all our actions escape us.  One is “unable to undo what one 
has done though one did not, and could not, have known what he was 
doing.”11  And yet, by acting in the world, we are nevertheless responsible for 
them.  Arendt argued that this responsibility might also be too much to bear 
and suggests the human capacity for forgiveness as a possible remedy.  
“Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have 
done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed 
from which we could never recover; we would remain the victims of its 
consequences forever.”12 Similarly, promising allows us to bind ourselves – 
create obligations – that allows us to plan, to some degree for the future.  We 
need to be able to create responsibility in order to plan for the future and we 
need to be able to absolve people of responsibility (through forgiveness) so 
that we can break the hold of past actions and 'start again'. 
 
Arendt returns once again to the problems of responsibility in a number of 
essays written after and inspired, at least to some degree, by the Eichmann 
                                            
10 OT p. 236 
11 HC p. 237 
12 HC p. 237 
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trial.  The question was raised in her reflections on Eichmann's defense that 
he was merely doing his job in carrying out the Final Solution.  This led Arendt 
to reflect on the different kinds of responsibility and to make the distinction 
between personal and collective responsibility.   
 
The idea of responsibility is also central to Peg Birmingham's universalist 
reading of Arendt's thoughts on rights.  She anchors the right to have rights in 
the common responsibility that we all share for the Earth as a result of the 
emergence of one-world.  It is because of this shared responsibility for the 
entire world and everything that happens in it that Birmingham believes that 
Arendt was arguing for a robust conception of human rights.  I argue in this 
chapter that Arendt's later distinction between personal and collective 
responsibility leads to the conclusion that a universalist reading of her 
thoughts on rights is mistaken.  By associating the problems of statelessness 
with collective responsibility rather than personal responsibility, Arendt 
reaffirms the importance of a relationship to a limited political space to the 







5.2 Personal and Collective Responsibility 
 
Responsibility takes two primary forms in Arendt's later thought – personal 
and collective.13   Personal responsibility concerns the obligations that I incur 
through my actions.  Collective responsibility concerns obligations that I come 
to have as part of a group and therefore derives from things that I have not 
done.   Both are important to Arendt's conception of politics because they are 
intimately related to human plurality.  Personal responsibility is a consequence 
of individual plurality.  Since I live in the world with others, I incur responsibility 
for the results of those actions on the world that I share with them.  Ultimately 
it relates to questions of legal or moral blame or guilt.  Because it related 
primarily to the self (my responsibility) Arendt considers it to have political 
implications (in the sense that individual actions can have effects on the 
group) but that it is not itself political.  Collective responsibility is a 
consequence of the plurality of political groups.  As such, it is political through 
and through.   Since I live in the world as a part of a collectivity, I acquire a 
responsibility for the actions of that group, regardless of the part I may have 
played in those actions (i.e. even if I personally opposed them).   
Responsibility is, I will argue, along with worldliness, a condition of free 
political action – as such it is intimately related with the human faculties of 
promising and forgiveness.  Without responsibility, an actor would not be able 
to remain connected to his/her actions. In that sense, responsibility is a 
condition for Arendt's conception of politics and agency.  
                                            
13 This distinction is drawn primarily from two articles: “Personal Responsibility Under 
Dictatorship” and “Collective Responsibility,” both published in H. Arendt, Responsibility and 
Judgement, ed. J. Kohn. . (New York, NY: Schocken Books, 2003) 
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5.3 Personal Responsibility 
 
Arendt's reflections on personal responsibility seemed to be inspired by her 
coverage of the trial of Adolf Eichmann.  Eichmann's self-understanding as a 
cog in the Nazi machinery appeared to Arendt as an unwillingness to accept 
responsibility for the consequences of his participation.  Arendt famously 
argued that Eichmann must account for why he allowed himself to become 
such a cog.14   
 
Arendt identifies personal responsibility with legal and moral, as opposed 
to political, accountability.  Laws, both moral and legal, serve to hold us 
accountable for our actions.  In so doing, they recognise us as free, 
responsible beings.  For Arendt, morality concerns the two-in-one relationship 
that each of us has with ourselves.  Because we are thinking beings, we have 
the capacity to engage in a dialogue with ourselves.  Conscience, for Arendt is 
an effect of our internal duality.  It is because I don't want to live with a 
murderer that I don't commit murder.  Arendt believed that it is this experience 
of living with oneself that led Socrates to identify the moral code with being in 
harmony (consistent) with oneself. “If I do wrong I am condemned to live 
together with a wrongdoer in an unbearable intimacy; I can never get rid of 
him.”15  
                                            
14 'Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship', p. 31 
15 H. Arendt, 'Some Questions of Moral Philosphy', Responsibility and Judgment, ed. J. Kohn. 
(New York, NY: Schocken Books, 2003) p. 90 
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According to Arendt, Kant took this principle of non-contradiction and 
formalised it into the categorical imperative.16  However, this duality remains 
internal.  Moral responsibility is individualising.  Similarly, in the legal context, 
though a defendant in court may claim that he or she did what she did 
because of membership in a group – that he/she was merely a cog in a giant 
machine (as Eichmann did), “(i)t is the grandeur of court proceedings that 
even a cog can become a person again.”17  It is the function of the court to 
pass judgement and assign responsibility.   
 
Both conscience and the law serve to assign personal responsibility for our 
individual conduct.  However, as we saw, for Arendt politics concerns the 
world rather than the self.  Personal responsibility becomes political only in 
extreme cases, such as Nazi Germany, when continuing to obey the laws 
might actually constitutes support of a criminal regime.  In those 
circumstances, conscientious withdrawal from political life becomes political, 
possibly even heroic.  “At these moments, thinking ceases to be a marginal 
affair in political matters.  When everybody is swept away unthinkingly by what 
everybody else does and believes in, those who think are drawn out of hiding 
because their refusal to join is conspicuous and thereby becomes a kind of 
action.”18 
 
                                            
16 H. Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Volume II: Willing (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
1977) p 63 
17 'Collective Responsibility' p. 148 
18 'Thinking and Moral Considerations', Responsibility and Judgment, ed. J. Kohn. (New York, 
NY: Schocken Books, 2003) p. 188 
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The issue political aspect of individual (personal) responsibility emerges 
because of what Arendt calls ‘action’s predicaments.’19  The predicaments of 
the other aspects of the Human Condition, the lack of durability inherent in 
labour and the meaningless inherent in work, are resolved by appealing to 
other aspects of the vita activa (work creates a durable world for the repetitive 
activity of labour, action confers meaning on the world built by human being's 
instrumental work).  The predicaments raised by action can only be addressed 
with other forms of action.  Specifically, the irreversibility of human action can 
be dispelled by the faculty of forgiveness which releases the actor from 
responsibility for his/her actions.  Since we cannot undo what we have done, 
forgiveness is required in order for us to start anew – so that, “unlike the 
sorcerer’s apprentice who lacked the magic formula to break the spell,”20 we 
are not trapped in the endless consequences of each and every one of our 
actions. Similarly, the unpredictability of action can be dispelled (again, only 
partially) through the faculty of promising.  By promising, human beings can 
create zones of relative stability in the flux of time.   
 
Thus, despite the fact that Arendt generally tries to divide political from 
moral considerations, promising and forgiving represent, for her, a form of 
morality that is also political.  This is true for three related reasons: because it 
is tied up with plurality (“no one can forgive himself and no one can feel bound 
by a promise by a promise made only to himself”21), because it is a form of 
action and because, ultimately it allows for a stable political realm to emerge 
                                            
19 HC  p. 236 
20 HC p. 237 
21 HC  p. 237 
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between us in the world that we have built for ourselves.  Arendt goes so far 
as to say that the only strictly moral dutiesof the citizen is that they make and 
keep promises.22  Promising has different forms though.  There is the general 
day-to-day promising that occurs between people.  This helps to stabilise our 
identities through time and to establish the basis for our actions as responsible 
agent.  This is not necessarily political action in the purist sense of 
performance in a public space; it is simply the day-to-day stabilisation that 
makes possible our collective existence, even in the instrumental sense 
described last chapter.  “(B)inding oneself through promises, serves to set up 
in the ocean of uncertainty, which the future is by definition, islands of security 
without which not even continuity, let alone durability of any kind, would be 
possible in the relationships between men.”23 There is also the idea of the 
foundational promise – the original agreement that establishes a political 
community and the authority that goes with it.  Arendt has several examples of 
these, from the Mayflower compact to the United States Constitution.  These 
foundational promises raise questions about the authority of those who make 
the promise, but the point is that for Arendt the social contract is a specific 
agreement, an “act of mutual promise (that) is by definition enacted in the 




                                            
22 H. Arendt, “Civil Disobedience”, in Crises of the Republic, (New York, Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1972), p 92. 
23 HC p. 237. 
24 OR p. 171. 
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5.4 Collective Responsibility 
 
It is the world rather than the self that is at issue in Arendt's understanding 
of collective responsibility.  It refers to an obligation we have to take care of 
the world that we inherit with other members of our political community.   
Unlike personal responsibility, it is not incurred through our action and it is not 
a feature of a good will or a clear conscience.  Rather it is based on our 
relationship to an objective thing – a world – that we share with others.  The 
distinction between personal and collective responsibility turns on the 
existence of a world which stands outside of us and in which all our collective 
affairs take place.  We enter into this responsibility either through our birth into 
that community (what Arendt calls internal immigration25 or by leaving another 
community – in effect, trading one collective responsibility for another. 
 
Two conditions have to be present for collective responsibility: I 
must be held responsible for something I have not done, and the 
reason for my responsibility must be my membership in a group 
(a collective) which no voluntary act of mine can dissolve, that is, 
a membership which is utterly unlike a business partnership 
which I can dissolve at will.26 
 
Furthermore, as we saw last chapter human plurality for Arendt is 
constituted by our different perspectives on a shared world.  She is therefore 
referring to the responsibilities imposed by our belonging to a shared world – a 
belonging is independent of an individual or collective will.  It is independent of 
                                            
25 ‘Civil Disobedience’  p. 88 
26 'Collective Responsibility'  p. 149 
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the individual will in that we bear it regardless of any voluntary choice we 
might have made.  We are responsible for our political world whether or not we 
have chosen to be a part of it.  In fact, it is accurate to say that we are 
responsible, as opposed to guilty, because our membership is not a matter of 
choice, since it is the result of an inherited membership in a group.  It is 
independent of anything like collective will because it is mediated by the 
shared, objective world that exists between us.  The world is a shared 
responsibility because our different place in the world means that we each 
have a different perspective on it.  These perspectives, for Arendt, can never 
be reduced to one ‘collective’ perspective, without sacrificing the freedom of 
the people who make up the community. 
 
Political responsibility is related to the question plurality, and it highlights an 
important distinction between the plurality of human beings and the plurality of 
human groups.  This is a consequence of Arendt’s conception of politics as 
relating to a specific, delimited space in the world.  “Freedom, wherever it 
existed as a tangible reality, has always been spatially limited… the borders of 
national territory or the walls of the city-state comprehended and protected a 
space in which men could move freely.”27 
 
The importance of the existence of plural groups to our political life is 
revealed in Arendt's condemnation of the crime of genocide. 
 
                                            
27 OR p. 275 
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If a people of a nation, or even just some specific human group, 
which offers a unique view of the world arising from its particular 
position in the world – a position that, however it came about, 
cannot be readily duplicated – is annihilated, it is not merely that 
a people or a nation or a given number of individuals perishes, 
but rather that a portion of our common world is destroyed, an 
aspect of the world that has revealed itself to us until now but 
can never reveal itself again.28 
 
This means that it is not simply the plurality of individuals which stands in 
relation to the world but also a plurality of collective groupings.  For Arendt, 
each of these groupings constitutes a perspective on the world.   Furthermore, 
they represent an enduring political constitution that aspires to immortality.  
“Violence is applied here not only to things that have been produced... but also 
to a historical and political reality housed in this world of products, a reality that 
cannot be rebuilt.”29 The plurality of political units implies that political 
obligation, for Arendt, shouldn't be understood in general terms.  It is always 
the result of a specific relationship to a specific political entity.  
 
It is important to note that Arendt is not referring here to the responsibilities 
of a collective in a communitarian sense.  As many commentators, such as 
Ronald Beiner as well as Canovan have pointed out, Arendt had little time for 
nationalist claims.30  Hers was a “non-communal conception of citizenship.”31  
Arendt was famously critical of the subordination of the political to the cultural 
demands of the nation.  One of the elements in the decline of the nation-state 
                                            
28 'Introduction into Politics', in The Promise of Politics, edited by J. Kohn. (New York, NY: 
Schocken Books, 2005) p. 175 
29 Ibid p. 161. 
30 See M. Canovan, op cit. p. 243-249, and R. Beiner, ‘Arendt and Nationalism,’ in The 
Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt,ed. D. Villa, (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000), pp. 44-62. 
31 M. Canovan, op. cit. p. 245 
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is what she called “the transformation of the state from an instrument of the 
law into an instrument of the nation.”32  She is critical of the pan-movements of 
Eastern Europe in particular who “had not the slightest idea of the meaning of 
patria and patriotism, not the vaguest notion of responsibility for a common, 
limited community.”33  For Arendt, it is not that national communities exist and 
that, on the basis of self-determination, they have a claim to a political entity 
that corresponds to their community as communitarians such as Michael 
Walzer, have argued.   
 
Michael Walzer’s conception of a political community, also inspired by 
Edmund Burke34, seems closer and is therefore helpful in order to highlight 
what is distinctive about Arendt’s approach.  For Walzer, “the idea of 
community integrity derives its moral and political force from the rights of 
contemporary men and women to live as members of a historic community 
and to express their inherited culture through political forms worked out 
amongst themselves.”35 Walzer derives the political claims of communities 
from the rights of its individuals to belong to and express their inherited 
culture.  For Arendt, as I have been arguing, the political relationship precedes 
and constitutes the rights of individuals.  In this sense, her rejection of the idea 
that politics emerges as the expression of prior claims, either individual or 
collective, applies to both liberalism and communitarianism. 
                                            
32 OT p. 275 
33 OT p. 232 
34 M. Walzer, ‘The Moral Standing of States’, in C. Beitz, M Cohen, T. Scanlon, and A 
Simmons, International Ethics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1985), p. 219.  
35 Ibid. p. 219.  
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5.5 Common Responsibility 
 
In her book, Hannah Arendt and Human Rights, Peg Birmingham 
describes a third form of responsibility – common responsibility- which she 
argues should be understood as the “guarantor of our right to have rights.”36  
Common responsibility stems from the fact that we now all belong to a world 
where any of our actions could conceivably affect others anywhere in the 
world.  We, as members of humanity, all bear a responsibility for the world 
which houses us all.  Arendt argued that racism, in its modern form, emerged 
as a reaction against the common responsibility that we all have for the whole 
world.  Birmingham argues that Arendt’s thought ought to be understood as a 
call to take up that responsibility through a renewed human rights politics, 
specifically practices surrounding citizenship and the ‘right to active political 
participation.’37 
 
Common responsibility relates to collective responsibility because it 
concerns our existing in what has become ‘one world.’  Since the imperialist 
era, we have inherited a world where an action on one side of the world can 
have an effect anywhere else in the world.38  This creates a 'common present' 
and a ‘negative' responsibility to prevent the destruction of the space in 
between all of us.39   It is connected to the problem of personal responsibility 
                                            
36 Hannah Arendt and Human Rights  p. 131. 
37  P. Birmingham, op. cit. p. 142 
38 OT p. 297 
39 H. Arendt, 'Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World,' in Men in Dark Times, (New York, Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich), p. 83 
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in that the irreversibility and umpredictability inherent in human action now 
extend to the entire planet.  It is related to personal responsibility in that it 
concerns the (potential) effects of our actions.  It is related to collective 
responsibility in that it concerns our membership in an externally constituted 
group – a group constituted by the historical emergence of a global world.   
 
Peg Birmingham's reading of Arendt's thoughts on rights is based on our 
acceptance of our common responsibility for the world.  Since we now inhabit 
'one world', our actions are capable of affecting everyone, everywhere.  As 
such we all have acquired a common responsibility for the common world we 
all inhabit.   Arendt feared that this might be too much for most to bear.  The 
most frequent reaction was to retreat in horror at the idea of humanity, a 
reaction that revealed itself in modern nationalist movements.40     But it is 
clear that Arendt believed that this was a responsibility that we had no choice 
but to assume.  To attempt to ground human rights in Arendt's ideas of 
common responsibility, as Birmingham does, is a tempting interpretive position 
because it allows us to see the problem of humanity in terms that can be 
aligned with the individualizing character of rights discourse.   Common 
responsibility is personal responsibility writ large.  We are all born into this 
world.  All our actions can potentially affect every single person in the world.  
Therefore we all assume responsibility for everything that goes on within that 
world.  “The ideal of humanity purged of all sentimentality, demands that 
human beings assume political responsibility for all crimes and evils committed 
                                            
40 OT 235-236 
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by human beings.”41    Birmingham can then look to the situation of common 
responsibility for the entire human world as part of the grounding for a human 
rights discourse consistent with Arendt’s thought. 
 
5.6 Collective vs. Common Responsibility 
 
However, common responsibility differs from collective responsibility in that 
it does not take into account the collective plurality of the human condition.  
Human beings belong to limited political communities which themselves 
constitute the plurality of the human species.  There is a temptation to 
associate rights with common responsibility, which would allow for something 
like universal human rights, instead of with collective responsibility which is 
always located within a specific limited community.  My contention is that this 
is inconsistent with Arendt’s thought – that she identifies ‘the right to have 
rights’ with belonging to a specific limited community constituted by a shared, 
collective responsibility. 
 
Arendt is clear that, though collective responsibility is not determined by my 
actions or my will, it can nevertheless be repudiated.  One can leave a 
community and join another.  “We can escape this political and strictly 
collective responsibility only by leaving the community, and since no man can 
live without belonging to some community, this would simply mean to 
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exchange one community for another, and hence one kind of responsibility for 
another.”42   Political responsibility refers to a specific place in the world.  This 
means that collective responsibility cannot be extended to the entire planet 
simply because we happen to share a common interest in its well-being and 
the capacity to affect almost all aspects of it.  The spatial limits of Arendt’s 
conception of political responsibility are a consequence of her spatially limited 
conception of politics and freedom. “Freedom in a positive sense is possible 
only among equals, and equality itself is by no means a universally valid 
principle but, again, applicable only within limitations and even within spatial 
limits.”43  
 
Arendt’s conception of politics as conditioned by a relationship to a 
spatially limited world of our own construction is the reason that common 
responsibility cannot simply be a form of collective responsibility for the entire 
planet.  Political responsibility, like promising, is not a consequence of our 
general obligation but rather of specific relationships to other people, 
meditated by a space that exists between them.  To put it simply, there is that 
there is no one to whom we, as humankind, could be responsible.  There is no 
one to whom we can make promises, no one to forgive.  “Both faculties… 
depend on plurality, on the presence and acting of others, for no one can 
forgive himself and no one can feel bound to a promise made only to 
himself.”44 Human beings in a specific place can generate politics by acting 
together.  Polities can engage in politics by making promises (treaties).  But 
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even here, responsibility for a limited space is preserved. “Treaties and 
international guarantees provide an extension of this territorially bound 
freedom for citizens outside their own country, but even under these modern 
conditions the elementary coincidence of freedom and limited space remains 
manifest.” 45  
 
Humankind cannot be a political agent because it has no peers.  Common 
responsibility ultimately turns human beings back upon themselves.  It 
grounds politics in morality and therefore does not take our concern for the 
world seriously enough.  Though after the Eichmann trial, Arendt was more 
open to the importance of truly moral thinking in allowing people to inoculate 
themselves against a moral breakdown on a large scale like the one that 
occurred in Nazi Germany, it remains ultimately concerned with the self and 
not with the world. The consequence of making common responsibility the 
basis for international political action is that without the plurality of human 
groupings, it is again possible to see global politics on the model of a 
relationship to the self.  This is why common responsibility cannot serve as an 
anchor for human rights in the way Birmingham would like.  It does not 
recognise the limited and spatial and multiple character of Arendt's 
understanding of the world.  In short, it does not preserve the plurality which is 
central to Arendt's conception of politics. 
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Instead, Arendt specifically links collective responsibility to the enjoyment 
of rights.  It is our concern for the shared, limited world that we inherit, that 
makes it possible for us to act politically.  Thus, unlike liberalism which is 
concerned with generating political obligation in the abstract, Arendt’s 
approach to politics, and therefore to rights, is concerned with specific 
obligations.  This is why she connects rights to collective, rather than common, 
responsibility.  In the next section, I will illustrate this by contrasting Arendt’s 
conception of political responsibility as specific and limited with liberalism’s 
understanding of political obligation as derived from an alignment of individual 
wills.  For liberalism, a hypothetical consent generates obligation whereas for 
Arendt, it is only because human beings belong to a shared political world that 
they can make promises at all.  
 
5.7 Promising, Consent and Obedience 
 
For both Arendt and the liberal tradition, the theory and practice of 
promising is central to the idea of obligation.  However, as we will see, the 
relationship between promising and obligation is quite different.  For both 
liberalism and, ultimately for Birmingham as well, human rights turn on a 
relationship to the self rather than to the world.  They attempt to derive political 
principles from an understanding of personal responsibility. When we compare 
these approaches with Arendt's thoughts on collective responsibility we can 
see that it is as politically responsible beings that we make promises.  Political 
responsibility precedes promising and it is for that reason that, as a form of 
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connection to the world, it is necessary for the enjoyment of rights.  And since 
political responsibility is always related to a specific limited community, it is 
clear that for Arendt, the right to have rights cannot refer to something outside 
of the political space that gives it content. 
 
At first glance, the importance that Arendt places on promising, especially 
with respect to the founding and stability of political communities seems to 
suggest affinities with liberal social contract theory.  However, the role of 
promising is different in each case.  Even though modern liberals don’t 
emphasise the original contract in the same way that Hobbes or Locke did, the 
idea that political obligation is based on a kind of agreement remains prevalent 
in contemporary liberal thought.  Contemporary liberals, like Rawls and those 
that draw inspiration from his thought, inherit the problem of political obligation 
from Rousseau and Kant: how to align our obedience to the law with our free 
will.  Though post-metaphysical liberalism may have dispensed with any 
reference to a free will, it is still guided by the idea that legitimate laws – laws 
that should be obeyed – are laws to which those subject to them have 
contributed or that any reasonable person would support.  Contemporary 
liberalism remains voluntaristic in the sense that consent is tied to legitimacy 
which is itself tied to obedience. It is ultimately based on a hypothetical 
agreement between reasonable, rational persons.  Governments that have the 
support of reasonable, rational persons are legitimate and, therefore, the laws 
of these governments should be obeyed.  The importance of this idea of 
agreement carries over into liberal thought on human rights.  For both 
approaches, promising is necessary for us to have any kind of free political 
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existence.  However, the differences between them help to illustrate the 
importance of responsibility to Arendt as a way of conceiving of politics in a 
way that does not rely on the will or on conscience. 
 
5.8 Liberal Approaches to Political Obligation 
 
As we saw in chapters 2 and 3, liberal human rights thinkers, inspired by 
Rawls, establish a set of principles that constitute full liberal justice and a 
subset of basic human rights that justify rebellion internally or intervention 
externally.  For minimalists like Michael Ignatieff or Maurice Cranston, this 
subset refers only to negative liberties, basic protections of personal security 
and freedom of conscience.  There are various approaches that defend a 
more extensive set of rights, from Henry Shue's Basic Rights to Joshua 
Cohen's ideas concerning political membership.  The point of all of these 
conceptions is that they link human rights with political legitimacy.  In this next 
section, I will show that for liberalism, legitimacy is ultimately a matter of 
aligning individual wills with a set of principles in order to establish what kind of 
institutions should be obeyed.  For liberals, even post-metaphysical liberals, 
legitimacy is a matter of coordinating the wills of free individuals in order that 
they may obey the laws without compromising their liberty. 
 
In Rawls’ political liberalism, the central issue of promising is taken up in 
his concept of the two moral powers that he ascribes to persons.  Persons, for 
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Rawls, are both rational and reasonable.46  They are rational in that they have 
ends or life-plans that they want to achieve.  They are reasonable in that they 
are willing to coordinate with others in a fair social structure in order to achieve 
those ends.  The importance of the idea of promising comes up in the concept 
of the reasonable. 
 
The first basic aspect of the reasonable, then, is the willingness 
to propose fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them 
provided others do.  The second basic aspect… is the 
willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept 
their consequences for the use of public reason in directing the 
legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime.47   
 
 
Rawls' efforts to separate justice from its metaphysical or philosophical 
roots in Kant or Rousseau (his refusal to “derive the reasonable from the 
rational”48) make his approach an interesting comparison for Arendt's idea of 
responsibility that generates obligation without reference to the will.  It is likely 
that Rawls would not agree that political liberalism is based on a specific 
philosophical conception of the will.  However, his 'Kantian constructivism' is 
based on the intuition that a theory of justice ought to derive its principles of 
justice from the choices, real or potential, of its members.  The idea, common 
to liberal theory even in its post-metaphysical form, is that a legitimate 
government is one that is supported by all of its people or at least should be 
supported by all members.  “It is only by affirming a constructivist conception – 
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one that is political and not metaphysical – that citizens generally can expect 
to find principles that all can accept.”49 
 
5.9 Obligation, Consent and Obedience 
 
This account of liberal obligation was outlined by Hanna Pitkin in a pair of 
articles “Obligation and Consent.”50  She argued that liberalism from Locke to 
the present had to rely on some form of hypothetical consent to generate 
legitimacy.  A legitimate government is, in her view, one to which we ought to 
consent.  She then went on to make the claim that this idea obligation was 
built into the meaning of legitimacy itself. 
 
That legitimate government authority is such that one ought to 
consent to it, is a precept built into English grammar, into the 
meanings of these terms...  Someone might undertake to argue, 
for example, that a government is legitimate only to the extent 
that it fosters high culture, or to the extent that it promotes the 
evolution of a master race.  That would be to reject majority 
consent as any sort of criterion for assessing a government.  But 
the doctrine of hypothetical consent holds even for someone 
taking such an unorthodox position; even for him, a legitimate 
government would be one that deserves consent, to which 
everyone ought to consent.51 
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For Pitkin herself, the character of a government that one ought to consent 
to is more extensive than in traditional liberal theory.  However, her point is 
that legitimacy and consent are grammatically connected.  According to Pitkin, 
to speak of an obligation to obey a government to which one ought not 
consent is nonsense.  And, put in those terms, it is.  To the extent that 
legitimate government is one which must be aligned with the wills of the 
members of the society it governs, consent is indeed built into the 'grammar' of 
legitimacy.  Rawls himself explicitly refers to and accepts the 'essentials' of 
Pitkin's account of obligation in his Theory of Justice.52 
 
For Arendt, in contrast to liberalism, the point of the social contract is not to 
establish the obligation to obey the law in general.  Instead it always points to 
real event – a foundation.  The Mayflower Compact, the United States 
Constitution and her other examples of 'original promises' are actions that 
create a beginning that inspires future action within a community. “(I)t is an 
event rather than a theory or a tradition we are confronted with, an event of the 
greatest magnitude and the greatest import for the future, enacted on the spur 
of time and circumstances.”53   Arendt's view of the contract is a rupture in 
time.  To the extent that it creates a political obligation, it is a specific 
obligation rather than political obligation in general.  By promising, I make a 
commitment to this community, this group of people in this place.  In so doing, 
I establish a public realm that takes on a meaning of its own and imposes 
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obligations of its own – obligations that will then be passed on to future 
citizens. 
 
Just as promises and agreements deal with the future and 
provide stability in the ocean of future uncertainty where the 
unpredictable may break in from all sides, so the constituting, 
founding, and world-building capacities of man concern always 
not so much ourselves and our own time on earth as our 
‘successor’,  and ‘posterities’.54 
 
By contrast, in liberal contract theory, the metaphor of the promise must 
first establish political obligation in general. It establishes a liberal state which 
we ought to obey because it is in our interest.   This is why liberal theory often 
incorporates some idea of hypothetical consent.  The important point is to 
establish the reason why anyone should obey anything.  By contrast, for 
Arendt, obedience is merely one aspect of our political and social lives.  It 
does not exhaust our political relationships. 
 
This We arises wherever men live together; its primal form is the 
family; and it can be constituted in many different ways, all of 
which rest ultimately on some form of consent, of which 
obedience is only the most common mode, just as disobedience 
is the most common and least harmful mode of dissent.  Consent 
entails the recognition that no man can act alone, that men if 
they wish to achieve something in the world must act in 
concert.55 
 
This contrast is illustrated in Arendt's discussion in Crises of the Republic 
of civil disobedience as it appeared in the late 1960's.  Arendt noted the public, 
plural character of the acts of civil disobedience and argued that they were 
“nothing but the latest form of voluntary association” described by Toqueville 
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over 100 years earlier.56  Her criticism of the debates around how the state 
should respond was directed at the way that the legal system treated civil 
disobedients as individuals – as though they were just a contingent number of 
people who happened to disobey the law at the same time.  They failed to take 
into account that these were citizens, acting in concert to persuade their fellow 
citizens of the injustice of the laws or actions of their common political 
community. “In contrast to the conscientious objector, the civil disobedient is a 
member of a group, and this group, whether we like it or not, is formed in 
accordance with the same spirit that has informed voluntary associations.”57  
In a sense, it was a quintessential example of her idea of acting in concert.  
Groups of citizens acted to attempt to persuade their peers and their political 
leaders to put an end to an action (the Vietnam war) that they rejected but 
were nevertheless responsible for, by virtue of being American citizens. 
 
5.10 Obedience, Consent and the Will 
 
Liberal consent, in Arendt's view, relies too heavily on an internal 
relationship between the individual and his/herself.  She does not understand 
obligation to be necessarily linked to consent in the same way.  In fact, one of 
her primary objection to liberal understandings of obligation turns on resisting 
the articulation of the relationship between the state and its citizens in terms of 
obedience based on consent. 
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The citizen’s moral obligation to obey the laws has traditionally 
been derived from the assumption that he either consented to 
them or actually was his own legislator; that under the rule of law 
men are not subject to an alien will but obey only themselves – 
with the result, of course, that every person is at the same time 
his own master and his own slave, and that what is seen as the 
original conflict between the citizen, concerned with the public 
good, and the self, pursuing his private happiness, is 
internalized.  This is, in essence, the Rousseauan-Kantian 
solution to the problem of obligation, and its defect, from my 
point of view, is that it turns again on conscience – on the 
relation between me and myself.58  
 
 
The idea of legitimacy as related to obedience is problematic in two ways.  
Arendt rejects Kant's transcendental solution to the famous paradox of finding 
a place for human freedom in a world governed by natural laws for two 
reasons. In the first place, it is based on a relation between me and myself and 
is, in that sense, unworldly.   We must obey the dictates of the moral law which 
each of us has because we are free beings, ends-in-ourselves. For Arendt, 
freedom is always in the world, dealing with humans as acting beings, 
whereas the will or conscience concern humans as thinking beings, capable of 
removing themselves, at least temporarily from the immediate concerns of this 
world. Secondly, it returns the question of political freedom to the domain of 
sovereignty, which, for her imports relationships of command and obedience 
into politics.   Her emphasis on the importance of politics is in large part an 
attempt to protect from the attitudes of philosophers who are more interested 
in the life of the mind.  “Action insofar as it is free is neither under the guidance 
of the intellect nor under the dictate of the will.”59 
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For Arendt, the structure of command and obedience is built into the 
political appearance of the human faculty of the will. The difficulty with the 
liberal approach to politics is that its emphasis on obedience as the primary 
political problem means that the relationship between the citizen and the self is 
'internalised.'  We have already seen that Birmingham's reading of Arendt still 
tends in that direction by basing human rights on the common responsibility 
that we all have for humanity as a whole.  However, Arendt also argues that 
the will has dangerous consequences when it is deployed politically.  Arendt 
believed that the modern tendency to equate freedom with the will had the 
effect of pushing aside a conception of politics that is based on the plurality of 
human beings. 
 
For Arendt, when we will, unlike when we think, our divided self cannot be 
kept in harmony.  The will, as a faculty, Arendt argued, emerged from a 
specifically Christian problem of wanting to be good but failing.  Early 
Christians, specifically Paul, noted the internal struggle within the will itself 
which wants to do good but also resists itself.  Because of this internal 
struggle, the primary experience of the will has to do with powerlessness.60   
As the tradition in political thought began to be taken up by Christian thinkers 
who valued care of the soul over care of the world, freedom increasingly came 
to be seen as an internal matter rather than relating to our action within the 
world.   Because it is internally divided, constantly frustrated by its inability to 
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do what it wills, it seeks obedience and control rather than persuasion when it 
is forced to act in the world.  When, at the beginning of the modern era, 
thinkers again began to turn their attention to the political realm, they brought 
the Christian identification of freedom and the will with them.  In a sense, they 
imported the anti-political tradition of Christianity into the secular public realm.  
For Arendt, the political manifestation of the will occurs in the idea of 
sovereignty.  The writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the “absurdities”61 
at which it arrived are, for Arendt, a prime example of the dangers that arise 
when the will in equated with political freedom.  For Arendt this identification of 
politics with command and obedience is antithetical freedom under conditions 
of plurality. 
 
The famous sovereignty of political bodies has always been an 
illusion, which, moreover, can be maintained only by the 
instruments of violence, that is, with essentially non-political 
means. Under human conditions, which are determined by the 
fact that not man but men live on the earth, freedom and 




Though contemporary liberal thought has distanced itself from a 
conception of freedom that is directly tied to a philosophical conception of the 
will, liberalism still follows this logic to some degree in that it continues to see 
political legitimacy as tied to justifications of obedience.  The problem is then 
transferred to liberal human rights theory to the extent that the protection of 
human rights is understood as a condition of state sovereignty. I argued in the 
first chapter that the paradoxes of human rights occur in part because of their 
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entanglement with sovereignty. The idea of collective responsibility allows 
Arendt to establish a connection between human beings and political authority 
that does not rely on the will or on conscience. 
 
Arendt does not put much stake in the promise as a means of creating 
obligation or responsibility.  She simply states that it is our primary moral 
obligation as citizens is to make and keep promises.   “Every organisation of 
men, be it social or political, ultimately relies on man’s capacity for making 
promises and keeping them.”63 As a means of producing the stability 
necessary for political life, the making of promises is as important as the 
keeping of them.  It is this that distinguishes most clearly Arendt’s thoughts on 
promising from liberal versions of consent.  One of the primary questions for 
the liberal tradition concerns how one can generate the obligation to obey the 
law.  The making of a promise is a solution to the problem of how it is that we 
are obliged at all.  For Arendt, promising is not the foundation of political 
obligation.  This can be shown by looking at the problems that emerge when 
we look at Arendt's use of promising to found a new political entity. 
 
5.11 The Importance of the World to Promising  
 
The importance of the world to promising can be seen by looking at the 
work of some of Arendt's commentators on her theories of promising and 
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foundations.  When we take the world into consideration, it becomes clear that 
it is political responsibility for the world that sets the conditions for promising.  
This is why non-responsibility is so closely tied to rightlessness.  Without 
responsibility for a shared world, we lack the conditions necessary to make 
durable promises which are among the conditions for having rights. 
 
Both Alan Keenan and Bonnie Honig have pointed out the aporias that 
emerge in her understanding of promising and political foundations.  They 
claim that Arendt does not succeed in solving the difficulties inherent in 
founding a new community.  They argue that the founding promise, by itself, 
cannot found a community without reference to violence or to an absolute.  
Honig, citing an argument made by Jacques Derrida, argues that an absolute 
is needed because the signers of the declaration don't have the authority to 
sign until they have actually signed.64  Honig argues that the invocation of the 
absolute, which Arendt seems to view as a failure of nerve on the part of the 
founders, is necessary to constitute the signers of the Declaration as 
signers.65  Similarly, Keenan argues that promises require interpretation which 
means that a (sovereign) decision must be made at some point to establish 
what the promise means in a given circumstance.  Keenan argues that 
promising exists for Arendt to establish and maintain a political space in a 
manner that does not require violence.  He claims that Arendt puts too much 
stake in promising as a means to maintain the political realm and that, to 
become effective, there must always be a moment, necessarily violent (in the 
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form of a sovereign decision) in which the promise becomes actualised in 
political life.66  In order to preserve freedom it must limit freedom and that 
limitation requires that it violate that law of freedom (that actions should be 
undetermined). “What the promise promises is the establishment and 
continuation of a realm of politics: both the space of appearance (of freedom) 
and the power generated by common action.  For that to be the case, the 
promise in fact only promises itself.”67 
 
Both Keenan and Honig emphasise the logical presuppositions that 
underpin Arendt's idea of promising.  Honig focuses on the necessity of the 
pre-existence of a linguistic practice of promising.68  Keenan, for his part, 
starts from the claim that Arendtian promises must be free – that they can't be 
determined by pre-existing conditions – and then goes on to show what 
conditions are actually at play.  What is missing from both these analyses is 
the importance of the world to Arendt's understanding of freedom.  Keenan 
and Honig drive too sharp a wedge between the artificial world that houses 
human beings and the free action that can take place within that world.  To be 
sure, the Arendtian promise founds a political community which is responsible 
for the world that is thereby in its care.  But there are limitations on the form 
that this foundation can take which are not themselves purely related to that 
founding promise.  These limitations derive from the relationship to that world.  
All action is related to the world in which it takes place in the same way that all 
                                            
66 A. Keenan, “Promises, Promises: The Abyss of Freedom and the Loss of the Political in the 
Work of Hannah Arendt,” Political Theory, (Vol 22, No. 2, 1994), p. 316. 
67 Ibid  p. 308. 
68 B. Honig. op. cit. p. 103 
176 
opinion derives from our multiple positions in the world.  As Patchen Markell 
argues,  
 
Arendt’s account of beginning… shows us that action, as a 
response to events, is… always a second step rather than a first: 
if we can never quite lose our capacity to act altogether… this is 
because there never ceases to be a fund of doings and 
happenings –beginnings – in the world to which we might 
respond.69 
 
Thus, thus happenings and circumstances in the world can provide the 
context and possibility for free, spontaneous action, without these actions 
being specifically dependent upon them.  Arendt's point is that free action is 
undetermined, not that it is disconnected from the world.  Political action is far 
more 'mundane' since it constantly refers to, and is therefore conditioned by 
our shared world.  Moreover, it is conditioned by the fact that it shared and by 
the people with whom it is shared.  In short, it is conditioned by the collective 
responsibility of those members of a community who have inherited the care of 
their public space either through birth into the community or through 
emigration. 
 
For Arendt, the relationship between promising and obligation is not based 
on the promise creating the terms of political obligation in the way that 
liberalism bases political obligation on consent. Rather, it is because we are 
responsible beings that we have the capacity for action, one element of which 
is the ability to make and keep promises.  We are responsible when we have a 
connection to a place in the world.  Our promises, like our opinions and our 
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actions refer to the world that constitutes our plurality.  This is why we do not 
need to follow Keenan and Honig in looking for the conditions that make 
promising possible and the final arbiter who determines the correct 
interpretation of promises.  Responsibility and obligation in the general sense 
precede promising.  Promises are specific enactments of this responsibility 
and obligation which we simply have as separate beings who are connected to 
the same shared world.  It is the shared world which is a condition of 
promising.  It is the world that is, as it were, politically animated by the activity 
of promising.   
For Arendt it is because of our worldliness, that we can make promises and 
that we can build a public realm.  Our connection to the world makes us 
responsible for that world.  It is as responsible beings that we make and keep 
promises.  When we have been separated from that world, we are no longer in 
a position to make meaningful promises, which, as we have seen is, along 
with forgiveness, the primary moral duties of the citizen.  A human being who 
is cut off from the world, who has no responsibility for it, cannot make 
meaningful promises, cannot exercise his/her duties as a citizen is cut off from 
political action.  This person, as Arendt has argued throughout, is precisely the 
person who susceptible to finding himself or herself in a condition of 
rightlessness. 
 
The human being who has lost his place in a community, his 
political status in the struggle of his time, and the legal 
personality which makes his actions and part of his destiny a 
consistent whole, is left with those qualities which usually can 
become articulate only in the sphere of private life and must 
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To summarise Arendt's idea of responsibility.  We are personally 
responsible for what we do ourselves – we are responsible for the 
consequences of our actions on the world we inhabit.  All of our actions initiate 
a new chain of events the effects of which can never be foreseen. We are 
personally responsible for making and keeping our promises which are the 
basis for our living together. However, we are collectively responsible for the 
shared world that we have in our care while we are alive and that is the basis 
for our relationship to our peers to whom we can make promises.    All of these 
forms of responsibility are elements of our political selves – our public selves.  
They all testify to our relationship to the world.  When elements of this 
responsibility aren’t present, it is a sign that we have become disconnected 
from the world – a situation of extreme vulnerability.  The example of the 
stateless person who improves his position by committing a crime is testimony 
to the first relationship.  By being arrested and convicted, one has had one’s 
responsibility for individual actions attested to.  One becomes a being of 
consequence – even a negative one.71  By not having a collective 
responsibility for one’s community, one does not have a connection to other 
human beings by virtue of taking upon oneself the consequences of collective 
action.  By making and keeping promises, one does two things, one 
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repeats/re-enacts the founding promise that made the community possible, 
and one allows for collective action spread out in time.  One creates a 
framework for the durability of the subjective world to go along with the 
durability of the objective world.  At the same time, one inserts oneself into the 
basic purposive relationships that make up our objective world. 
 
While the previous chapter addressed the importance of the world in its 
objective sense, this chapter looked at the importance of the world in its 
subjective sense as a public realm that we are responsible for preserving.  
Together they show that, for Arendt, rights are particular and contingent 
effects of certain forms of government, rather than the primary building blocks 
of political morality.  In this sense, she is not a pure rights skeptic – she would 
never think of them as 'nonsense on stilts' – but rather, like Burke, she sees 
rights as emerging out of the complex relationship between human beings and 
their political institutions and history.  Unlike Burke she remains committed to a 
conception of politics based on the equality of the individuals that make up the 
political community.  This puts her within the liberal-democratic political 
tradition, if not its philosophical tradition.  Her critique of western societies is 
based on the weakening of the link between individuals and their political 
communities.  The idea is that all genuine political action constitutes a 
collective taking of responsibility among for a limited shared place in the world. 
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Conclusion:  Rights and Responsibility 
 
I suggested in the beginning that it is difficult to make liberal human rights 
theory and Arendt's approach to politics speak to each other.  Since they are 
both derived from different traditions, they make different assumptions about 
human beings, political power and authority, even about the relationship 
between philosophy and politics.  What they do share is a common concern 
for finding ways to protect human dignity.  They both advance the idea that 
everyone ought to live in a world where equal rights are respected.  Where 
they differ is that Arendt was skeptical of the idea of basing our political lives 
on human rights.  Nevertheless, I have endeavoured to show throughout this 
dissertation that there are several axes along which their thought can be 
compared as it pertains to the political conditions of the enjoyment of human 
rights.  It has been my contention that by looking at these questions we can 
accomplish two purposes.  First, Arendt's thoughts do provide a powerful 
critique of liberal rights theory which has become dominant is contemporary 
international politics.  Second, by focussing on these questions, which are of 
such immediate consequence and political relevance, we can see how 
Arendt's thought can be brought into these contemporary discussions instead 
of being dismissed as yet another nostalgic appeal to Greek political ideals. 
 
In this last section, I will review the argument so far.  Next, I will discuss the 
relationship between Arendt's thought and liberal theory on the crucial 
question of political boundaries.  I argued in the dissertation that the 
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paradoxes of human rights were related to the boundary problem in 
democratic theory.  I will therefore offer some thoughts on how Arendt can be 
used to think about political boundaries which are so central to the problem of 
rights.  In the last section, I will try to show how some of the insights raised in 
this dissertation can be applied to the question of how responsibility is 
conceived in international politics.  Specifically, I will look at the Responsibility 
to Protect, a document produced by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001.  I will look at the conception of 
responsibility at work in that document in order to show how Arendt’s 
conception of the relationship between rights and responsibility can contribute 
to debates within in international moral theory.  Finally, I will conclude by 
suggesting how the results of this dissertation can inform further research both 
into Hannah Arendt’s thought and in debates in international moral theory. 
 
In the first chapter, I argued that the paradoxes of human rights emerge 
because of the relationship between human rights and sovereignty.  Seeking 
to derive political authority from individual rights, the liberal rights tradition has 
created a circumstance where exclusion from a polity is tantamount to the loss 
of human rights.  I have argued that Arendt's idea of a 'right to have rights' 
does not actually refer to a more basic right to membership or to participation 
or to politics.  Arendt's right to have rights is not a legal construction.  Rather it 
refers to a connection to a shared world.  Liberal human rights theory did not 
sufficiently account for the political conditions of their own appearance. 
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However, since Arendt was writing about human rights in the first half of 
the 20th century, there is some question as to the applicability of her reflections 
to contemporary human rights theory.  In the second chapter, I argued that 
contemporary liberal attempts to generate a political conception of human 
rights are unable to account for the problem that she raised.  I argued that the 
approaches of liberal thinkers such as John Rawls, Charles Beitz, Joshua 
Cohen and Michael Ignatieff, which attempt to develop political conceptions of 
rights as opposed to metaphysical conceptions, do not address the difficulties 
Arendt raised.  Though they try to develop practical conceptions of rights 
which deal with rights as they operate in international politics – as a set of 
norms designed to guide the moral relations between states – rather than 
based on an idea of what a right really is, they cannot avoid using rights to 
justify political authority and thereby recognising that a right functions to 
establish a relationship between individuals and the political entity to which 
they belong.  This relationship is inherent in what a right really is and it 
precisely this relationship that creates the problems Arendt described. 
 
In the third chapter, I addressed one possible liberal version of the right to 
have rights – the right to political membership.  Starting from Henry Shue's 
conception of a basic right – that is, a right that must be effective in order for 
all other rights to obtain – I argued that, according that logic, the right to 
membership should be considered a basic right.  However, once we consider 
what a basic right to membership would mean, it becomes clear that it cannot 
be guaranteed as a right.  In short, if there are basic rights, then the right to 
membership must be one of them.  However, in practice, a right to 
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membership ultimately undermines the logic of basic rights themselves.  I 
argue that the problem of the right to membership is akin to the boundary 
problem in democratic theory – the fact that the consitution of the democratic 
polis cannot be determined through democratic means.  When human rights 
serve as the basis for political authority, the boundary paradox is, in effect, 
imported into human rights theory.  Arendt avoids this by making the 
relationship between human beings and the world the basis for a more 
complex understanding of political membership.   
 
In the fourth chapter,  I investigated the  relationship between human 
beings and their shared world in Arendt's thought.  I argued that it is this 
relationship that sets the conditions for the enjoyment of rights.  Looking at 
Arendt's concept of world as it appeared in the Human Condition, I argued 
that, though not fully elaborated, this concept was at work in the Origins of 
Totalitarianism.  The relationship to the world, which is central to Arendt's 
conception of politics, should be understood as a productive relationship to the 
artificial world created by human beings.  Rightlessness, as separation from 
the world, is therefore not simply exclusion from political participation, but is 
exclusion the productive work of a society.  Her examples of rightlessness, 
specifically, the refugees and the stateless and her descriptions of human 
superfluity, show the importance of an instrumental and productive relationship 
to the world.  On the surface, this is somethat surprising given that Arendt was 
specifically concerned with excluding instrumental action from politics.  
However, it does make sense in that the artificial human world is, for Arendt, 
one of the basic conditions for the appearance of political life. 
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In the fifth chapter, I argued that, in addition to the productive relationship 
to the world, Arendt's understanding of rights also concerns the responsibility 
that we have collectively for the world that we share with members of our 
polity.  I outlined the various ways in which Arendt discusses responsibility and 
argued that collective responsibility is the most important to her understanding 
of rights.  This relationship is not based on aligning the wills of all members of 
a polity in order to generate a political obligation.  Rather it is based on an 
obligation that we acquire either through birth or immigration into a political 
community.   
 
Thus, it is through both our productive relationship to the world and through 
our responsibility for our shared world that we become recognisable as rights 
holders.  Together, these present the basic conditions for rights to be enjoyed.  
These conditions are far more complex than can be addressed through human 
rights politics as it appears in liberal theory – setting the formal terms for 
political authority.  It suggests that international humanitarian action might be 
addressed less through formal, legal methods – establishing lists of rights and 
evaluating states according to these checklists – and more through efforts to 
build relationships between individuals and their shared world.  In the what 
follows, I will suggest some of the ways in which the insights derived from 
Arendt's thought might be applicable to contemporary debates about 
international human rights.  Specifically, I will look at the moral claims of 
political entities, how we might think of the political boundaries of political 
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entities, the relationship between political and social understandings of rights, 
and whether we need human rights to authorise humanitarian military 
interventions. 
 
The Character of the Political Boundary 
 
What is interesting about Arendt's thoughts on human rights is not primarily 
her description of the paradox.  The idea that there are difficulties deriving the 
political authority from individual rights has been noted as early as Burke, 
Rousseau.  What Arendt provides is a concrete description of the conditions 
produced by the total exclusion from political life and an understanding of just 
what inclusion entails.   The point is not, as some liberals view it, that political 
exclusion is bad and that we need to construct a theory of human rights that 
takes that into account.  Nor is it primarily that the problem of exclusion is 
unresolvable within the context of liberal rights theory, though that may indeed 
turn out to be true.  Rather, Arendt advances an understanding of politics that 
allows for a richer understanding of the relationship between human beings 
and the political world that both separates them and holds them together in 
such a way that rights can be held.  By making rights the most important and 
perhaps the only political protection afforded to individuals, the liberal 
conception of rights has contributed to a situation where the loss of rights 
entails the loss of one's place in the world.   The problem is the equivalence of 
rightlessness and worldlessness.  The point of Arendt's thought is to find a 
186 
way to bolster every person's connection to a political world without making 
this exclusively a matter of rights.   
 
Understanding our political relationship as something we inherit does entail 
some 'conservative' conclusions.  The fact that we inherit a political world that 
we must take care of accords some presumptive weight to already existing 
political institutions as well to already existing political boundaries. But Arendt 
also emphasises the human capacity to begin anew – specifically to found a 
new political space.  This means that our responsibility for the world as we 
inherit it is not absolute.  Arendt's writings on revolution clearly indicate that 
she believed that when faced with a tyrannical regime, human beings can and 
should free themselves and create a new shared political community.     
 
It is true that investing the world that houses our political activity with moral 
claims of its own as well as holding individuals responsible for obligations that 
they have not incurred through any action or will of their own runway counter 
to most approaches to international politics.  I have argued, though, that 
Arendt's thought  suggests that these 'collective' political claims are important 
to the enjoyment of  the individual rights that liberalism posits as primary.  It 
shows that the only way out of the paradox of sovereignty and rights is to 
retreat, at least in part, from a total commitment to moral individualism.  
Arendt’s conception of political responsibility 'solves' the boundary problem by 
referring to a relationship that is not constituted by the demos itself (except 
under conditions of the founding of a political space).  Indeed, the demos is 
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constituted by its relationship to a shared political space that is the condition 
for its appearance as a demos.  The boundary problem shows that there must 
always be a non-democratic element in the constitution of the political space.  
By situating our political lives in relation to a space that both precedes and 
outlives us, Arendt shows how our political claims, expressed by rights, are 
products of a specific relationship that we have to a particular place, and are, 
in a sense, independent of us.   
 
By emphasising the world that lies between people rather than the purely 
legal question of how to determine who is to be counted, Arendt shifts the 
focus from where to draw the political boundary to the question of how to 
understand that boundary.  Instead of asking, as liberals do, how do we 
ensure that no one is ever excluded from a community which might guarantee 
rights or how can we justify the arbitrary allocation of goods and rights that is 
determined by birth in this or that state, she asks what is the nature of the 
relationship between individuals and the world that enables them to have 
rights.  The important point is not where the boundary lies or whether there 
should be boundaries at all, but rather, what is the character of the 
relationships that bind people to their separate political entities.  I have argued 
that this relationship is complex but that it involves both a productive 




By both recognising the importance of the relationship between the 
individual and his/her political world and interrogating the character of that 
relationship, Arendt provides the tools to think about the problem of 
constituting the demos as being intimately tied to constituting the political 
space.  The political space is not simply where a group of individual rights-
holders happen to be.   It constitutes and is constituted by those people who 
belong to it. 
 
The political boundary for Arendt has three characteristics:  1) It must 
relate to an artificial world created and/or maintained by its members, 2) It sets 
the terms of collective responsibility and 3) it must allow for the possible 
emergence of  political action in Arendt's sense of free public debate.  The 
temptation for many readers of Arendt is to skip directly to the last 
characteristic, because of her association of action with freedom.  The idea of 
seeing the right to have rights as a right to politics as Birmingham, Ingram and 
others do, neglects the importance of the world that houses that action. It is 
that world which establishes a common context within which action can have 
meaning.  As Markell argued, the world is the contexts in which events to 
which we can respond through action, occur.  Equal rights, as artificial human 
creations, require this world as well and there has been little indication, in 
Arendt's time or since, that human rights discourse can help to build up the 
relationship between human beings and their world. 
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In the next section, I will look at the idea of a Responsibility to Protect, in 
order to show how Arendt’s thoughts on the importance of a collective 
responsibility can be applied to a specific debate in international normative 
theory. 
 
Collective Responsibility and the Responsibility to Protect 
 
The idea of the Responsibility to Protect, conceived by the Canadian 
Government sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty in 2001, was proposed to address the relationship between the 
institution of sovereignty and the demands for intervention raised in incidents 
of genocide and ethnic cleansing.  The Commission's report sought to change 
the language surrounding sovereignty from the idea of a right to intervene to a 
responsibility to protect.1   The logic of the approach was to alter the 
understanding of state sovereignty itself.  According to the logic of previous 
discussions of interventions, the state was considered to be the final arbiter for 
the citizens that belonged to it and therefore immune from legitimate 
intervention into its affairs by other states.  This made it difficult to respond to 
extreme situations, such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, without breaking 
the central principle that governed international relations.  Under the proposed 
formulation, in order to be sovereign, a state must assume a responsibility to 
protect its citizens and, in extreme cases, it should act to protect the citizens of 
                                            
1 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. 2001. The Responsibility to 
Protect. (Available at: http://www.iciss.gc.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf,2001), par. 2:4  
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other states.  In the words of ICISS co-chair Gareth Evans, “We sought to turn 
the whole weary debate about the right to intervene on its head an re-
characterize it not as an argument about any right at all but rather about a 
responsibility – one to protect people at grave risk – with the relevant 
perspective being not that of the prospective interveners but, more 
appropriately, of those needing support.”2 
 
I do not propose here to evaluate the Responsibility to Protect as a 
norm, but rather to examine the idea of collective responsibility that the 
document raises.  I argue that, surprisingly, the responsibility to protect only 
looks at those responsibilities the state and state agents (politicians, office 
holders etc.) have in the exercise of political authority. It does not consider the 
responsibilities that citizens may have for the actions of the collectivity to 
which they belong. In a sense, it breaks from the liberal tradition of deriving 
sovereignty from the real or tacit consent of the individuals that make up the 
state.  I will argue that if we are to say that the exercise of legitimate political 
power is ultimately a question of assuming responsibility, as both this 
dissertation and the Commission claim, then it is important to fully understand 
the two–way relationship of responsibility between the state and the citizen. 
The Responsibility to Protect points to the difficulties that emerge when the 
rights and responsibilities of states are derived from rights and responsibilities 
of individuals.  I will propose Hannah Arendt's conception of collective 
responsibility – a conception which is not derived from the personal 
                                            
2 Evans, Gareth, “From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect”, Wisconsin 
International Law Journal, (Vol. 24 No. 3, 2006), p.  708. 
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responsibilities of the individuals that make up the political entity – as a 
possible way to avoid some of these difficulties.   The state may be indeed be 
responsible to protect the rights of its citizens, but the responsibility for the 
actions of the state falls not only on state decision–makers, but also on the 
citizens in whose name they act. Arendt's approach also separates out 
personal responsibility and collective responsibility, anchoring political action 
in the latter rather than the former.  The Responsibility to Protect, on the other 
hand, by refusing to consider questions of collective responsibility at all, further 
reinforces a Leviathan-like conception of sovereignty in which the state acts as 
guardian of its subjects rather than the agent of its citizens. 
 
Sovereignty and Collective Responsibility in the Responsibility to 
Protect. 
 
The co-chair of International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, Gareth Evans described their approach as trying to change the 
language around sovereignty and intervention away from the language of 
rights towards that of responsibility and from the interests of states to the 
needs of the people who require protection.  The principles guiding 
intervention would then be based on the responsibility of states for the 
protection of their own citizens and, failing that, for the protection of citizens of 
other states.   The considerations at work in the Commission's description of 




Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility, in a way that is being 
increasingly recognized in state practice, has a threefold 
significance. First, it implies that the state authorities are 
responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of 
citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that 
the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens 
internally and to the international community through the UN. 
And thirdly, it means that the agents of state are responsible for 
their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts of 
commission and omission. The case for thinking of sovereignty 
in these terms is strengthened by the ever-increasing impact of 
international human rights norms, and the increasing impact in 
international discourse of the concept of human security.3 
 
The shift in language allowed for three changes to the way that sovereignty 
was previously discussed.  Besides the shift from the language of rights, the 
use of responsibility was intended to shift the focus from the state actors 
asserting their rights to the people who require protection.  Second, it 
expresses that relationship in terms of protection.  The joining of international 
human rights norms with the discourse around human security means that the 
role of the state is not to provide a space for political action but is rather 
“protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare.” 
 
The Responsibility to Protect is also broken out into various different 
components in order to ensure that intervention is not simply a matter of 
military action in crises.  These components are the Responsibility to React, 
the Responsibility of Prevent and the Responsibility to Rebuild.4   Thus, in 
addition to putting a stop to genocides, there is a responsibility to attempt to 
                                            
3 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, par. 2.15 
4 Ibid. par. 2.29 
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anticipate atrocities in order to prevent them without the need for military 
intervention and failing that, there is a responsibility to help to rebuild the state 
in the aftermath.  Moreover, multilateralism is advocated (preferably through 
the UN) in order to prevent the principle being used as an excuse for offensive 
military action.  The underlying idea is that part of being a part of the 
international community is recognising not just one's responsibilities to one's 
own population but to others as well. 
 
However, though the shift from understanding sovereignty as related to a 
right to a responsibility seems significant, it is not immediately evident what 
changes in this linguistic revision.  Though many examples of responsibilities 
are listed (governments to other governments, governments for their citizens, 
government for the citizens of other states), there is no clear theory of political 
responsibility outlined in the report.   Nor is there any indication that one might 
be needed.   There is an extensive description of the responsibilities that 
states have towards their people and even towards those of other states, but 
the document does provide a theoretical justification for adopting the language 
of responsibility nor any account of what might ground that responsibility.  
 
It is not hard to imagine why. A thorough account of the theoretical 
grounding of political responsibility demands an account of the relationship – 
the mutual responsibilities – that obtain between citizens and the state 
institutions that have jurisdiction over them.  Fleshing out that relationship 
would likely have exposed differences in political opinion that might have 
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made it difficult to gain wide agreement within the commission and beyond.  In 
effect the Commission is engaged in a practical experiment in what Joshua 
Cohen has called 'justificatory minimalism.'5  Since there are likely to be 
disagreements about the philosophical justification for normative principles, it 
may be preferable to strive to attain agreement on the principles and not worry 
about potential disagreements about the philosophical justification.  Indeed the 
Universal Declaration of Human rights has been described as just such an 
endeavor. 6  
 
However, by consciously re-conceiving the justification of state 
sovereignty, it is not so simple to avoid confronting a theory of responsibility.  
After all, states are collective entities and if states have responsibilities, then 
these are, in some sense, collective responsibilities.  As a component of an 
international social system based on the mutual recognition of various 
collective entities, sovereignty already implies a theory of collective 
responsibility.   This already raises flags for liberal thinkers.   Liberals are wary 
of the idea of collective responsibility, seeing in it the seeds of the kind of 
collective scape-goating that animates precisely the types of ethnic conflicts 
that creates the demand for intervention in the first place. 
 
                                            
5 J. Cohen, “Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?” Journal of 
Political Philosophy (12 (2), 2004), pp. 190–213 
6 See C. Beitz, “Human Rights as a Common Concern”, American Political Science Review 
(95:2, June 2001), pp.269 -  281 
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Though the name of the report highlights the change in language from a 
right to intervene to a responsibility to protect, I would argue that the shift in 
emphasis from the relationship between states to the perspective of people in 
need of protection is more important. It is this that governs the understanding 
of responsibility at work in the document.  Under the new conception, the 
responsibility is owed by the state to individuals living in its territory.  By 
contrast, in the right to intervene, the relevant relationship is between states.  
States have a right to non-intervention, which, under certain circumstances, 
can be overridden.  Under those circumstances, other states or international 
organisations may acquire a right to intervene.  The right to intervene then 
stands in a symmetrical relationship to the sovereign right to non-intervention.  
One starts where the other ends.  This mutuality exists exclusively at the state 
level. Though states were seen as representing the people over whom they 
had authority, there was no mechanism for making judgements about whether, 
in fact, the state actually did represent its people. 
 
Under the responsibility to protect, a third element is added: that of the 
protection of people. States are responsible for the well-being of their people.  
The justification for political authority is related to whether a state protects its 
citizens. “What is at stake here is not making the world safe for big powers, or 
trampling over the sovereign rights of small ones, but delivering practical 
protection for ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are 
unwilling or unable to protect them.”7  Sovereignty is therefore a function of a 
state's ability (as well as its willingness) to protect its citizens.  More than 
                                            
7 ICISS, op. cit. par. 2.1 
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anything, state capacity – a strong police force, a disciplined military etc – is 
required in order to be able to protect one's population. Since self-
determination has itself been described as a human right, sovereignty has 
frequently been associated with the expression of the rights of the people.  
Indeed, the commission itself refers positively to the importance of sovereignty 
to decolonization.8  However, as we move towards human security in addition 
to human rights as a motivation for intervention, the issue of state capacity 
takes on a greater role than state violence.  Non-intervention is a privilege that 
only applies to those capable of protecting their population.  
 
The paradox is that measures designed to put human beings at the centre 
of the responsibility to protect has the consequence of denying the importance 
of individual political agency to state legitimacy.  State capacity becomes the 
way we determine political authority.  Connecting state sovereignty to 
individual rights raises more questions than it solves. 
 
Secretary-General Annan's own initial solution to this problem 
was to say that in these situations national sovereignty had to be 
weighed and balanced against individual sovereignty.  But this 
formulation, in truth, did little more than restate the basic 
dilemma: When exactly did individual sovereignty claims take 
primacy over state-sovereignty?9 
 
 
We have here a basic restatement of the paradox of sovereignty and rights 
that Arendt pointed out in the Origins of Totalitarianism and discussed in 
chapter 1.  The Responsibility to Protect avoided this question by dropping the 
                                            
8 Ibid. par. 2.8 
9 G. Evans,  op.  cit. p. 707 
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relationship between individual rights and collective political legitimacy.  The 
problem is that it, in the place of the language of political agency, it adopts a 
language of protection.  The state is no longer an expression of the political life 
of its members but simply a protector against physical insecurity.  Sovereignty 
is equally compromised regardless of whether the danger to people comes 
from an unwillingness or an inability on the part of the state to protect them.  
State capacity becomes the primary measure by which sovereignty is judged.  
Despite the fact that this approach was explicitly adopted with the best interest 
of populations in mind, the shift amounts to the adoption of a Hobbesian view 
which sees the state as legitimate only and so long as it is capable of 
protecting the physical security of the people.  “The obligation of subjects to 
the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power 
lasteth by which he is able to protect them.  For the right men have by nature 
to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no covenant 
be relinquished.”10  
 
The danger is that the responsibility to protect further separates the 
institutions that generate political power from the society in which they exist 
and the people in whose name they operate.  It envisions a world in which 
political authorities exist, as it were, on a different plane than the people that 
they rule over.  Under these circumstances, the trick is to create a situation 
where these political authorities are beneficial or, at least, as harmless as 
possible to the people under their control.  As such, the Responsibility to 
Protect reads like a code of conduct for Greek Gods – a set of guidelines that 
                                            
10 T Hobbes, Leviathan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),  p. 144. Italics mine. 
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attempts to ensure that people don't overly suffer from the whims of these 
powerful, unpredictable states or state actors.  I suggest that Hannah Arendt's 
conception of collective presents a possible way out of this difficulty. 
 
Examining the Responsibility to Protect in light of Arendt's thoughts, as well 
as those of others, it is clear that much turns on how political responsibility is 
conceived.    Looking at liberal conceptions of political responsibility, we can 
see that they all have in common a desire to ground collective responsibility in 
individual claims.  In Arendtian terms, they attempt to ground collective 
responsibility in the personal responsibility of individuals.  Given the difficulties 
that this approach entails, notably, the expression of the norm of sovereignty 
in the language of rights, the ICISS attempted to conceive of collective 
responsibility independently of the political claims of individuals.  The difficulty 
here is that since it is no longer an expression of the political claims of 
individuals, the state can only base its legitimacy on its ability to protect its 
citizens.  In short, it reverts to the Hobbesian idea that political claims are only 
generated by the need of human beings for protection of self and property.  In 
short, the ICISS denied states the ability to ground their claim to non-
intervention in the political rights of its people, but in so doing, effectively 
denied that the political claims of individuals have any weight at all. 
 
If Arendt is correct that rights are best understood as the result, rather than 
the grounding, of our political existence, then we must try to understand how 
political responsibility is generated independent of rights.  Her conception of 
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collective responsibility accomplishes this in two ways.  In the first place, it 
avoids the difficulties, so common to liberal human rights thinkers, of trying to 
ground collective claims in individual rights.  Second, by tying responsibility 
directly to political agency, it avoids the temptation, so evident in this 
document (and in Hobbes), to view politics simply as a means of protecting the 
lives otherwise helpless individuals.  For Arendt, collective responsibility is a 
crucial element in political action. Politics is a form of collective agency and 
collective agency only makes sense in relation to a conception of collective 
responsibility.  By trying to escape the conundrums of individualist conceptions 
of political agency, the commission effectively denied political agency 
altogether. 
 
Arendt herself does not pronounce on the question of military intervention, 
but her comments on the crime of genocide does suggest that even military 
intervention might be more than simply the protection of people but also the 
protection of a political entity.  The crime of genocide is not simply the killing of 
people but also the destruction of the political existence that a group of people 
has built for itself.   It may turn out that if we fully flesh out the concept of 
responsibility in the responsibility to protect, there may also be an obligation to 
protect more than just the physical safety of people at risk but the political 
institutions as well.  In some ways, the condemnation of ethnic cleansing 




Despite the criticisms put forth here, I do think that the ICISS is on the right 
track in their characterisation of the problems of international morality as 
having to do with responsibility.  The spirit that animated it – the idea that the 
norms governing international intervention ought to be developed with the 
people who require protection in mind – is clearly a step in the right direction.  
The idea that sovereignty as unlimited and unquestionable mastery over the 
territory of a state is not a morally or even politically acceptable approach to 
international politics.   The international sphere is an arena of colliding 
responsibilities: state responsibilities to citizens and to other states, citizen 
responsibilities to states and to citizens of other states.   The trouble is with its 
characterisation of that responsibility solely in terms of protection.  Most 
problematically, I have argued, the lack of a conception of collective 
responsibility paradoxically leads to a version of sovereignty that is even 
further disconnected from the political agency of people than the version it was 
designed to replace.   Under the Responsibility to Protect, citizens are 
understood as charges of the states to which they belong, rather than as 
active participants in their political life.  I believe that an Arendtian conception 
of collective responsibility in which the political responsibilities for the actions 
of the state are assumed by the citizens by virtue of their citizenship could 
possibly fill that gap. 
 
To be fair, the problems of the international system may require that we 
see responsibility solely in terms of protection. In many countries, state 
institutions are so radically separated from the society they are supposed to 
govern, that their actions seem to be based on whim or even predatory.  Even 
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apparently benevolent states undertake misguided adventures that end up 
causing unintended destruction and loss of life.  Perhaps international morality 
is indeed best understood as a code of ethics for Olympian Gods.  Perhaps 
that is the best we can do. However, one side-effect of shifting to this 
particular conception of responsibility is that states are less likely to be seen 
as representing the political decisions and conversation of its populace.  So 
while the responsibility to protect puts the lives of individuals at the centre of 
the discussion, it does so at the expense of their political voices. 
 
Arendt’s thought suggests that this may be self-defeating.  As we saw in 
the last chapters, holding right is connected to have both a productive 
relationship and a relationship of responsibility for the political world that we 
share and inherit with others.  Conceiving of responsibility solely in terms of 
protection, as the ICISS report does, encourages us to see citizens as less 
responsible for the actions of their states than under the previous, problematic 
understanding of state sovereignty as constituted by individual sovereignty.  
Faced with the paradox of human rights we saw in the first chapter, the 
commission responded by deciding that political responsibility was the purview 
of states.  This leaves individuals in a condition of ‘non-responsibility’ for the 







As I mentioned earlier, understanding rights as a product of a relationship 
to a shared world is unlikely to produce a clear answer to political problems.  
However, it can suggest a way of approaching problems that seeks to re-
establish relationships between individuals and the political space in which 
they move.  It suggests that doing this may make it more likely that human 
beings will not be seen as superfluous and therefore less likely to be targeted.  
Clearly this is only a beginning, more work is required to understand precisely 
how to build connections between individuals and their political worlds and to 
assess their efficacy in protecting human beings from genocide, ethnic 
cleansing as well as other, less dramatic forms of political marginalization.  I 
see this project as a jumping off point for further research in two specific 
directions.   
 
First, from the Arendtian perspective, it is important to further interrogate 
the relationship between rights, responsibility and political space.  Arendt 
provides an account of an artificial political space constituted by a productive 
relationship to the world.  It is this space that and the relationship to it that 
establishes the boundaries between political groups that is required in order to 
see politics as limited.  It may also be the case that, with the arrival of non-
spatial politics in the form of online communication, the idea of politics as 
action within an enduring and limited physical space is becoming further 
problematized.  A fuller version of an Arendtian approach to international 
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politics and humanitarian politics will have to account for exactly how political 
space is produced in the world we now inhabit. 
 
Second, from the perspective of international moral theory, a fuller account 
of collective responsibility would contribute to the questions and problems that 
the ICISS was trying to wrestle with.  As we saw, the liberal tradition attempts 
to derive collective responsibility from the will or the choices of the individuals 
who make up the collectivity.   I have argued that we need to view the political 
space that we inhabit and inherit as having moral claims of its own in order to 
avoid the paradoxes of human rights that produce problems of rightlessness.  
However, what those claims are and how they might be balanced against the 
claims of individuals still needs to be worked out in detail in order for this to be 
relevant and convincing for those who belong to the liberal normative tradition.  
I believe the result would be a more situationalist and consequentialist and a 
less constitutionalist approach to international moral questions.  But whatever 
the result, it would be able to contribute to debates around the morality of 
international politics as well as a growing literature around the understanding 
of collective responsibility.  
 
However, I believe that I have shown that there is a deep relationship 
between the world and rights in Arendt’s thought and that this relationship 
points to problems within contemporary liberal thought around human rights.  
Despite the fact that much more work needs to done from both perspectives, 
the direction that this would take would not have been visible if the problem of 
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human rights had not been investigated at the intersection between these two 
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